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Abstract
Middleboxes, such as proxies, firewalls and NATs play an important role in the modern Internet
ecosystem. On one hand, they perform advanced functions, e.g. traffic shaping, security or enhancing ap-
plication performance. On the other hand, they turn the Internet into a hostile ecosystem for innovation,
as they limit the deviation from deployed protocols. It is therefore essential, when designing a new proto-
col, to first understand its interaction with the elements of the path. The emerging area of crowdsourcing
solutions can help to shed light on this issue. Such approach allows us to reach large and different sets of
users and also different types of devices and networks to perform Internet measurements. In this thesis,
we show how to make informed protocol design choices by expanding the traditional crowdsourcing focus
from the human element and using crowdsourcing large scale measurement platforms.
We consider specific use cases, namely the case of pervasive encryption in the modern Internet, TCP
Fast Open and ECN++. We consider such use cases to advance the global understanding on whether wide
adoption of encryption is possible in today’s Internet or the adoption of encryption is necessary to guar-
antee the proper functioning of HTTP/2. We target ECN and particularly ECN++, given its succession of
deployment problems. We then measured ECN deployment over mobile as well as fixed networks. In the
process, we discovered some bad news for the base ECN protocol—more than half the mobile carriers we
tested wipe the ECN field at the first upstream hop. This thesis also reports the good news that, wherever
ECN gets through, we found no deployment problems for the ECN++ enhancement. The thesis includes
the results of other more in-depth tests to check whether servers that claim to support ECN, actually re-
spond correctly to explicit congestion feedback, including some surprising congestion behaviour unrelated
to ECN.
This thesis also explores the possible causes that ossify the modern Internet and make difficult the
advancement of the innovation. Network Address Translators (NATs) are a commonplace in the Inter-
net nowadays. It is fair to say that most of the residential and mobile users are connected to the Internet
through one or more NATs. As any other technology, NAT presents upsides and downsides. Probably the
most acknowledged downside of the NAT technology is that it introduces additional difficulties for some
applications such as peer-to-peer applications, gaming and others to function properly. This is partially
due to the nature of the NAT technology but also due to the diversity of behaviors of the different NAT im-
plementations deployed in the Internet. Understanding the properties of the currently deployed NAT base
provides useful input for application and protocol developers regarding what to expect when deploying
new application in the Internet. We develop NATwatcher, a tool to test NAT boxes using a crowdsourcing-
based measurement methodology.
We also perform large scale active measurement campaigns to detect CGNs in fixed broadband net-
works using NAT Revelio, a tool we have developed and validated. Revelio enables us to actively deter-
xi
mine from within residential networks the type of upstream network address translation, namely NAT
at the home gateway (customer-grade NAT) or NAT in the ISP (Carrier Grade NAT). We deploy Revelio
in the FCC Measuring Broadband America testbed operated by SamKnows and also in the RIPE Atlas
testbed.
A part of this thesis focuses on characterizing CGNs in Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). We develop
a measuring tool, called CGNWatcher that executes a number of active tests to fully characterize CGN
deployments in MNOs. The CGNWatcher tool systematically tests more than 30 behavioural requirements
of NATs defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and also multiple CGN behavioural metrics.
We deploy CGNWatcher in MONROE and performed large measurement campaigns to characterize the
real CGN deployments of the MNOs serving the MONROE nodes.
We perform a large measurement campaign using the tools described above, recruiting over 6,000 users,
from 65 different countries and over 280 ISPs. We validate our results with the ISPs at the IP level and,
reported to the ground truth we collected. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the largest active
measurement study of (confirmed) NAT or CGN deployments at the IP level in fixed and mobile networks
to date.
As part of the thesis, we characterize roaming across Europe. The goal of the experiment was to try to
understand if the MNO changes CGN while roaming, for this reason, we run a series of measurements that
enable us to identify the roaming setup, infer the network configuration for the 16 MNOs that we measure
and quantify the end-user performance for the roaming configurations which we detect. We build a unique
roaming measurement platform deployed in six countries across Europe. Using this platform, we measure
different aspects of international roaming in 3G and 4G networks, including mobile network configuration,
performance characteristics, and content discrimination. We find that operators adopt common approaches
to implementing roaming, resulting in additional latency penalties of 60ms or more, depending on ge-
ographical distance. Considering content accessibility, roaming poses additional constraints that leads to
only minimal deviations when accessing content in the original country. However, geographical restrictions
in the visited country make the picture more complicated and less intuitive.
Results included in this thesis would provide useful input for application, protocol designers, ISPs and
researchers that aim to make their applications and protocols to work across the modern Internet.
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1 Introduction
The indisputable success of the Internet and, consequently, the
increasing demand from end-users for more secure and faster ac-
cess to the online services drives the need for continuous innovation.
Meeting these performance, security, and policy compliance require-
ments by designing new protocols or even optimizing existing ones
is, however, challenging in today’s Internet. Modern networks often
rely on dedicated hardware components generically dubbed middle-
boxes to perform advanced processing functions like, for example,
enhancing application performance (e.g., traffic accelerators, caches,
proxies), traffic shaping (e.g., load balancers), optimizing the usage of
IPv4 address space (e.g., NATs) or security (e.g., firewalls).
One major criticism of middleboxes is that they might filter traf-
fic that does not conform to expected behaviors, thus ossifying the
Internet and rendering it as a hostile environment for innovation. 1 1 M. Handley. Why the internet only
just works. BT Technology Journal, 2006
Handley [2006]
It demonstrably becomes problematic to extend core Internet proto-
cols, limiting the opportunities for optimization. For example, recent
studies show that for IPv6 some intermediate nodes may inspect
the contents of extension headers and discard packets based on the
presence of unknown IPv6 options. 2 Moreover, it is widely acknowl- 2 F. Gont et al. Transmission and
processing of IPv6 options. Technical
report, IETF draft-gont-6man-ipv6-opt-
transmit-01, 2015
Gont et al. [2015]
edged by the community that several of the protocols standardized
by the IETF over the last few years including DCCP, UDP-lite, SCTP
and several extensions to TCP, e.g. ECN and LEDBAT, face deploy-
ment challenges blamed on interference by middleboxes. 3 3 https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hops.
IRTF, 2015
hop [2015]
This does not mean that it is impossible to deploy new protocols,
but that in order to ensure success it is imperative to first understand
the interaction of the proposed solutions with the middleboxes active
along the path or how middelboxes behave. Recent studies 4, 5 on 4 M. Honda, Y. Nishida, C. Raiciu,
A. Greenhalgh, M. Handley, and
H. Tokuda. Is it still possible to ex-
tend TCP? In Proceedings of the 2011
ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet
measurement conference, pages 181–194.
ACM, 2011
Honda et al. [2011]
5 B. Hesmans et al. Are TCP extensions
middlebox-proof? In Workshop on Hot
topics in middleboxes and network function
virtualization. ACM, 2013
Hesmans et al. [2013]
middleboxes behavior attempt to provide such information. How-
ever, the existing measurements use only a very small number of
vantage points, e.g., only 142 measurement points are used. In order
to perform representative Internet measurements and test realistic
scenarios and different Autonomous Systems (ASes), what is missing
is access to a high number of diverse vantage points. Also, more evi-
2 informing protocol design through crowdsourcing measurements
dences of the nature of the problems and the portions of the network
in which they manifest are needed.
The emerging sea of crowdsourcing can be an efficient and quick
solution to solve the problem. Until recently, large-scale Internet mea-
surement infrastructures necessary to perform this type of analysis
were available only to large Internet players, such as Google, Aka-
mai and large ISPs. Consequently, the lack of public access to such
resources makes it hard to repeat or verify their results. In an attempt
to adjust the balance, several crowdsourcing large-scale measurement
platforms became available to the research and operational commu-
nity in the past years, e.g., RIPE Atlas 6, BISmark 7, SamKnows 8, 6 V. Bajpai, S. J. Eravuchira, and
J. Schönwälder. Lessons learned
from using the ripe atlas platform for
measurement research. SIGCOMM
Comput. Commun. Rev., 45(3):35–42, July
2015. ISSN 0146-4833
Bajpai et al. [2015]
7 F. Krueger and S. R. Andrews. Bis-
mark: a flexible aligner and methylation
caller for Bisulfite-Seq applications.
Bioinformatics, 27(11):1571–1572, 04 2011.
ISSN 1367-4803
Krueger and Andrews [2011]
8 Samknows platform. https://www.
samknows.com/. Accessed on 2019-02-03
sam
PlanetLab 9, MONROE. 10
9 B. Chun, D. Culler, T. Roscoe,
A. Bavier, L. Peterson, M. Wawrzoniak,
and M. Bowman. Planetlab: An overlay
testbed for broad-coverage services.
SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 33
(3):3–12, July 2003b. ISSN 0146-4833
Chun et al. [2003b]
10 O. Alay, A. Lutu, M. Peón-Quirós,
V. Mancuso, T. Hirsch, K. Evensen,
A. Hansen, S. Alfredsson, J. Karlsson,
A. Brunstrom, A. Safari Khatouni,
M. Mellia, and M. A. Marsan. Expe-
rience: An open platform for exper-
imentation with commercial mobile
broadband networks. In Proceedings of
the 23rd Annual International Conference
on Mobile Computing and Networking,
MobiCom ’17, pages 70–78, New York,
NY, USA, 2017a. ACM. ISBN 978-1-
4503-4916-1
Alay et al. [2017a]
Using crowdsourcing, group of people, institution and organiza-
tions can be engaged via a flexible open call for voluntarily complet-
ing a task. Crowdsourcing platforms can be large-scale measurement
platforms such as the ones cited above, where some hardware is
installed on people’s home or institutions and no actions from the
person owned the hardware is required or platform such as Mi-
croworkers 11 or Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 12, where actions from
11 M. Hirth, T. Hoßfeld, and P. Tran-Gia.
Anatomy of a crowdsourcing platform
- using the example of microwork-
ers.com. In 2011 Fifth International
Conference on Innovative Mobile and
Internet Services in Ubiquitous Comput-
ing, pages 322–329, June 2011. doi:
10.1109/IMIS.2011.89
Hirth et al. [2011]
12 M. Buhrmester, T. Kwang, and S. D.
Gosling. Amazon’s mechanical turk:
A new source of inexpensive, yet
high-quality, data? Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 6(1):3–5, 2011
Buhrmester et al. [2011]
people owned phones or personal computers are required.
By expanding the traditional crowdsourcing focus from the hu-
man element to use a diverse and numerous group of end-user de-
vices as measurement vantage points 13, in this work, we leverage
13 A. Doan et al. Crowdsourcing systems
on the world-wide web. ACM, 2011
Doan et al. [2011]
on crowdsourcing platforms to run Internet wide measurements.
We demonstrated how to make informed protocol design choices
by using a novel methodology for performing large scale Internet
measurements, using crowdsourcing solutions approach.
While both crowdsourcing methodologies rely on Internet users
performing a specific task (be that hosting custom equipment or per-
forming custom tasks which require human intelligence), they are
somewhat complementary. If in crowdsourcing large scale measure-
ment platforms we have better control of the measurement agents, we
are aware of the full specifications of the equipment being used and
(in some cases) have more information about the environment where
it is located, we are still limited by the number of vantage points and
the types of tests that can be performed. In the case of crowdsourcing
platforms (e.g, microworkers or amazon mechanical turks), we can
leverage the access to a very high number of active users and their
equipment. Though we lose in terms of control over the measure-
ment agent, we gain in terms of number of available vantage points
and the freedom of deploying our own custom-designed tests.
We exemplify next the efficiency of our methodology considering 7
case studies.
introduction 3
• The feasibility of pervasive encryption in the Internet ecosystem.
• TCP Fast Open (TFO).
• Measuring ECN++.
• Tracking and characterizing the Big NAT across Europe and the
U.S.
• Profiling NATs in the wild.
• Characterizing Carrier Grade NATs in Mobile Broadband Net-
works.
• Measuring roaming in Europe.
Lessons learned from our work can help in designing robust pro-
tocol extensions. The first part of our work is devoted to test the
extensions of new protocols in the Internet.
Through our methodology we tested the operation and function-
alities against middleboxes of used protocols such as TLS (against
different ports) and new protocols such as HTTP/2.
The public disclosure of the NSA global surveillance operations of
U.S. citizens and foreign nationals generated a media frenzy, drawing
a lot of attention towards the individual right for the confidential-
ity of communications in the digital era. The latest revelations on
this topic acted as a catalyst for the urgency of increased privacy in
the Internet. As a reaction from the operational Internet commu-
nity, we now observe a stronger tendency to encrypt traffic over the
Internet. 14 We have witnessed recently that many popular applica- 14 S. Farrell et al. Pervasive monitoring
is an attack. Technical report, RFC 7258,
May, 2014
Farrell et al. [2014]
tions (e.g., web, Youtube video streaming) have migrated from HTTP
to the HTTPS protocol. 15 The long-term objective of the research
15 D. Naylor et al. The cost of the "S" in
HTTPS. In ACM, CoNEXT, 2014b
Naylor et al. [2014b]
community is to provide encryption by default for all Internet com-
munications.
However, before designing any solution, it is first essential to un-
derstand the feasibility of pervasive encryption in the Internet ecosys-
tem by measuring the interaction of middleboxes with the TLS across
the different TCP ports that currently use plain text protocols. In
other words, we need to establish at this point whether using encryp-
tion in traditionally unsecured ports is even possible in today’s Inter-
net. With this goal in mind, we attempt to initiate TLS connections
in 68 different ports that normally do not use any form of encryption
and analyze the success of the connection. This is a first necessary
step towards a full comprehension of the behavior of middleboxes
relative to pervasive encryption.
On the other hand, in May 2015, version 2 of the Hypertext Trans-
fer Protocol (HTTP/2) was standardized as RFC 7540. 16 HTTP/2 16 M. Belshe, R. Peon, and M. Thomson.
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2
(HTTP/2). Technical report, RFC 7540,
May, 2015
Belshe et al. [2015]
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is an effort to reduce the gap between how modern websites are
designed, and how their content is delivered. To do such, HTTP/2 in-
troduces several novel features like header compression, full request
and response multiplexing, and support for request prioritization
and server push.
The IETF longly discussed about whether HTTP/2 should be en-
crypted by default using Transport Layer Security (TLS). Specifically,
the standard defines that H2C should be negotiated by mean of an
Upgrade header field in a classic HTTP/1 request.
Using crowdsourcing platform, over a period of one week we
recruit more than 600 users distributed across 38 countries; 355 users
perform measurements from fixed networks, while 322 users were
only available on mobile. We build a complex dataset for a total of
140,432 connections. Results, from TLS and HTTP/2 campaigns,
show that middleboxes affect H2C deployment, especially on port 80.
H2C Upgrade requests are affected by proxies, failing to upgrade to
HTTP/2.
Our methodology allows us to make an extensive study on how
middleboxes behave in front of TCP new extensions, namely TCP
Fast Open(TFO) and Expicit Congestion Notification++ (ECN++).
We measure in the wild whether TFO is supported by the Internet
paths. To this end we recruit TFO users from Microworkers crowd-
sourcing platform. We create a tool called ExploreTFO that allows
users to connect to our TFO server. Leveraging the access to these ac-
tive users and their equipment we find that the 41,3% of the paths we
test allowed for a successful TFO communication. We present a first
step analysis of the deployability of TFO and we demonstrate that
early results are not promising, reducing the possibility to decrease
the latency due the TCP handshake.
Expicit Congestion Notification (ECN) is a way to mark packets
to indicate that the capacity of a link is approaching exhaustion.
ECN was standardized as a straight replacement for loss signals, but
increasingly ECN is also being recognized as critical for low delay. 17 17 M. Welzl and G. Fairhurst. The
Benefits of using Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN). Internet Draft
draft-ietf-aqm-ecn-benefits-08, Internet
Engineering Task Force, Nov. 2015.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-ecn-benefits. (Work in
Progress)
Welzl and Fairhurst [2015]
A new proposal called ECN++ 18 proposes safe ways to remove all
18 M. Bagnulo and B. Briscoe. ECN++:
Adding Explicit Congestion Notifi-
cation (ECN) to TCP Control Pack-
ets. Internet Draft draft-bagnulo-
tcpm-generalized-ecn-04, Internet
Engineering Task Force, May 2017.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-bagnulo-tcpm-generalized-ecn.
(Work in Progress)
Bagnulo and Briscoe [2017]
the original prohibitions on using ECN on each type of TCP packet.
As with any new protocol, ECN++ can experience deployment prob-
lems, either because existing networks and servers protect themselves
against out-of-the-ordinary behavior, or because optimizations have
been built around a narrow and unchanging interpretation of the way
protocols work. 19
19 M. Honda, Y. Nishida, C. Raiciu,
A. Greenhalgh, M. Handley, and
H. Tokuda. Is it still possible to ex-
tend TCP? In Proceedings of the 2011
ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet
measurement conference, pages 181–194.
ACM, 2011
Honda et al. [2011]
Therefore, this study sets out to measure how much existing net-
works and servers would mangle or block the ECN++ updates to
TCP/IP. Using a crowdsourcing large scale measurement platform
called MONROE, we test ECN and ECN++ support in both fixed and
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mobile networks. In particular, we test 18 mobile carriers, making
it, to the best of our knowledge, the largest measurement study of
ECN in mobile networks so far, even Apple had only tested three
mobile carriers. 20 Although we only set out to measure ECN++ sup- 20 S. Cheshire. Networking for the
Modern Internet. URL: https://
developer.apple.com/videos/play/
wwdc2016/714/, June 2016. (Presentation
video: requires Safari browser)
Cheshire [2016]
port, our measurements from mobile vantage points challenge the
accepted belief that path traversal of ECN itself is free of problems.
The study does not just check for correct transitions of protocol
fields; it also checks behavior. That is, it checks whether ECN-capable
servers correctly reduce their rate in response to ECN feedback.
We discover that:
• More than half of the mobile carriers we tested bleach (clear) the
ECN field at the first upstream IP hop. This contradicts the im-
pression of hardly any ECN traversal problems that has been re-
inforced by all recent studies. Nonetheless, our testing with fixed
connectivity is consistent with these previous studies.
• Bleaching ECN is benign21, the connection continues, but without 21 Nonetheless, if other links precede
the cellular hop (e.g. a home router or
bus/train connected over cellular), any
CE-marking introduced in the home
or vehicle network would be wiped,
which would fool ECN sources into
overrunning their local network.
the benefits of ECN. We find no evidence of the ECN capability
being blocked.
• Wherever ECN gets through, we find no problems for ECN++. We
also find no problems with how servers respond to ECN-marking,
but we do find some interesting congestion behaviors unrelated to
ECN.
The second part of our work focuses on studying the characteris-
tics and the behavior of such middleboxes. We centred our vision on
Network Address Translation(NATs) with a deep analysis on Carrier
Grade NATs (CGNs).
NATs were introduced back in the early 90s as a mean to cope
with the incipient address depletion crisis. Together with Classless
Interdomain Routing (CIDR), they successfully extended the lifetime
of IPv4 from imminent depletion until very recently, when the In-
ternet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) pool of IPv4 addresses
finally ran out. 22 NATs are now a commonplace in the Internet and 22 Potaroo Network Tool. http://www.
potaroo.net/tools/ipv4/. Accessed on
2019-02-02
hus
they are included by default in the Internet Access offerings for both
residential and mobile customers.
NATs successfully extended the lifetime of the IPv4 indeed, but
at a high cost: they hardcoded the client-server paradigm in the
architecture of the Internet. The basic operation of a NAT relies on
the creation of a mapping state between a private address and port
pair and a public address and port pair. This state is created when a
client using a private address initiates a communication with a server
in the public Internet. Deploying applications that have an alternative
paradigm, such as peer-to-peer applications, gaming or Voice-over-
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IP to name a few, that require hosts in the public Internet to initiate
communications towards hosts behind a NAT is challenging and
requires the use of the so-called NAT traversal techniques. These
techniques are usually cumbersome and increase the latency, the
traffic and the energy consumed by the endpoint.
While the aforementioned problem of supporting alternative appli-
cation paradigms is fundamental to the nature of the NAT operation,
it is exacerbated by the myriad of behaviors of the different NAT
implementations deployed in the Internet. Different NATs use dif-
ferent criteria to create, preserve and remove their internal mapping
state and have different filtering and forwarding rules. This severely
complicates the job of applications willing to manage the NAT state
in order to enable alternative communication models other than the
client server one as they need to cope with all possible NAT flavours.
Another approach towards prolonging the life of current IPv4 ad-
dress allocations is to deploy Carrier Grade NATs (CGNs), where
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) share the same public IPv4 address
across multiple end users. CGNs may introduce a number of issues
for end users, service providers, content providers and government
authorities. 23 There is some evidence that CGNs can cause dropped 23 M. Ford, M. Boucadair, A. Durand,
P. Levis, and P. Roberts. Issues with IP
Address Sharing. RFC 6269, June 2011
Ford et al. [2011]
services in peer-to-peer applications, and lead to low performance of
file transfer and video streaming sessions. 24 CGNs also introduce
24 C. Donley, L. Howard, V. Kuarsingh,
J. Berg, and J. Doshi. Assessing the
Impact of Carrier-Grade NAT on
Network Applications. RFC 7021,
September 2013
Donley et al. [2013]
security challenges including traceability of IP addresses and anti-
spoofing. Despite these challenges, CGNs offer an immediate relief to
the IPv4 address scarcity problem, so it is likely that their popularity
will increase over time. The use case for CGN differs in wireline vs.
mobile networks. Given the rapid boost in the number of operational
Internet-enabled mobile devices, and the scarcity of available IPv4
address space, mobile operators usually assign the same public IP ad-
dress to multiple end users. Hence, some form of carrier-grade NAT
technology has always been the norm, rather than the exception. 25 25 Z. Wang, Z. Qian, Q. Xu, Z. Mao,
and M. Zhang. An Untold Story of
Middleboxes in Cellular Networks.
In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM
2011 Conference, SIGCOMM ’11, pages
374–385, 2011. ISBN 978-1-4503-0797-0;
and S. Triukose, S. Ardon, A. Mahanti,
and A. Seth. Geolocating IP Addresses
in Cellular Data Networks. In Passive
and Active Measurement, pages 158–167.
Springer, 2012
Wang et al. [2011], Triukose et al. [2012]
In wireline networks, however, end users are typically assigned pub-
lic IPv4 addresses. While this situation may change as IPv4 addresses
become increasingly scarce and ISP customer bases continue to grow,
there is no source of systematic measurements of the prevalence or
evolution of CGN deployments in ISPs.
While CGNs enable mobile operators to provide Internet-access
to millions of devices with a limited amount of IPv4 addresses, their
adoption imposes functional and potentially also performance penal-
ties to the end-users that may affect their perceived quality of experi-
ence.
However, it is far from clear to what extent the currently deployed
CGN base complies with the aforementioned NATs requirements.
There is also the concern that CGNs utilization may result in perfor-
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mance penalties. It is a common operational practice that a single
CGN serves a very large number of mobile nodes (up to millions
of devices per CGN). Because of this, the CGN itself may become
a bottleneck and impose performance penalties to the communica-
tion. This is especially so for the case of the first packet that creates
the NAT mapping, but it may also affect traffic forwarding once the
mapping has been established. Measuring and understanding the
performance penalties resulting from the use of CGNs is important
for application designers, for end users and for mobile operators
adopting the CGN technology. (e.g. for application designers, this
information should affect the maximum number of communications
open in parallel). This input is very relevant for a measurement plat-
form such as MONROE, since the performance penalties if exist can
affect and bias the measurement results.
In order to achieve a more deterministic behavior from the NAT
boxes, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) produced a number
of specifications defining the requirements that NATs should follow
when creating, preserving and removing their internal state as well
as some recommendations in terms of the different filtering and for-
warding policies that NAT should implement. In particular, the IETF
released NAT behavioral requirements for handling TCP traffic 26, 26 S. Guha, K. Biswas, B. Ford, S. Sivaku-
mar, and P. Srisuresh. NAT Behavioral
Requirements for TCP. IETF, RFC 5382,
October 2008
Guha et al. [2008]
UDP traffic 27 and ICMP packets. 28 However, since these IETF stan-
27 F. Audet and C. Jennings. Network
Address Translation (NAT) Behavioral
Requirements for Unicast UDP. IETF,
RFC 4787, January 2007
Audet and Jennings [2007]
28 P. Srisuresh, B. Ford, S. Sivakumar,
and S. Guha. NAT Behavioral Require-
ments for ICMP. IETF, RFC 5508, April
2009
Srisuresh et al. [2009]
dards specify the internal behavior for a NAT, it is far from trivial to
assess whether NATs are following the recommendations and to the
best of our knowledge there is no information about the prevalence
of NAT boxes that honor the IETF specifications.
The contribution of this part is therefore three-fold:
• First, we design and develop NATwatcher, a tool to measure key
aspects of the behavior of the deployed NAT base, along with a
measurement methodology based on crowdsourcing that allows us
to perform large scale measurement using NATwatcher. We per-
form a large measurement campaign and we deploy NATwatcher
in over 700 measurement points, building a large data set describ-
ing the behavior of over 700 NAT boxes from 65 different countries
and 280 ISPs, testing over 120 different NAT vendors. We find that
a large majority (80%) of the NAT boxes we tested follow the IETF
recommendations for 11 out the 17 of the considered features. We
also observed that about half of the NAT devices we tested exhibit
the exact same behavior for all the features we tested. While the
other half of the devices use a variety of configurations.
• Second, we perform a large scale active measurement campaign
to detect CGNs in fixed broadband networks using NAT Revelio.
29 Revelio enables us to actively determine from within residen- 29 A. Lutu, M. Bagnulo, A. Dhamdhere,
and K. Claffy. NAT Revelio: Detecting
NAT444 in the ISP. In International
Conference on Passive and Active Network
Measurement, pages 149–161. Springer,
2016
Lutu et al. [2016]
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tial networks the type of upstream network address translation,
namely NAT at the home gateway (customer-grade NAT) or NAT
in the ISP (Carrier Grade NAT). We deployed Revelio on two large-
scale hardware-based measurement platforms – RIPE Atlas in
Europe and the FCC “Measuring Broadband America” (FCC-
MBA) in the U.S. – with a total of 5,121 vantage points in over 60
ISPs. The FCC-MBA deployment consisted of 2,477 home routers
operated by SamKnows in 21 large residential broadband Internet
access service providers in the U.S. We also adapted the Revelio
methodology to run on the RIPE Atlas infrastructure (using their
available user tests), and executed the tests from 2,644 Atlas probes
in 43 ISPs mainly active in Europe. We thus demonstrate the flex-
ibility of Revelio and exemplify the use of two fundamentally
different large-scale measurement testbeds.
Our results show that 10% (6 out of 64) of the ISPs we tested have
some form of CGN deployment. In particular, one ISP has a large-
scale deployment where Revelio detected upstream CGN deploy-
ment from all 76 vantage points in that ISP. In the other 5 ISPs
we observed evidence of a localized deployment limited to a sub-
set of customers. We verified our results with representatives of
the ISPs to validate our positive and negative inferences at the
IP level. We confirmed the results for 4 of the 6 positive ISPs by
personal communications with ISP representatives. The combina-
tion of the FCC-MBA and RIPE Atlas study represents (to the best
of our knowledge) the largest active measurement study to date
with confirmed CGN deployments in broadband networks at the
IP-level granularity.
• Finally, we create and test CGNwatcher. The goal of CGNwatcher
is to design, develop, implement, deploy an extensive set of met-
rics to characterize CGN behaviour, to provide useful insight about
the current CGN base deployed in the Internet.
As part of the thesis, we characterize roaming across Europe for 16
different MNOs deployed in six countries. The goal of the experiment
is to try to understand if the MNO changes CGN while roaming,
for this reason, we run a series of measurements that enable us to
identify the roaming setup, infer the network configuration for the 16
MNOs that we measure and quantify the end-user performance for
the roaming configurations which we detect.
International roaming allows mobile users to use their voice and
data services when they are abroad. The European Commission (EC),
in an effort to create a single digital market across the European
Union (EU), has recently (as of June 2017) introduced a set of regu-
latory decisions 30 as part of the “Roam like Home” initiative. This 30 European Commission: New Rules
on Roaming Charges and Open
Internet. https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/news/
new-rules-roaming-charges-and-open-internet.
[Online; accessed 06-March-2018]
ec-
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initiative abolishes additional charges for users when they use voice
and data services while roaming in EU.
In this setting, Mobile Network Operator (MNO) are expected to
deliver services with Quality of Service (QoS) properties similar to
the ones a user experiences when at home.
Several topology architectures can be used for roaming in a mobile
network, namely, home-routed roaming (HR), local breakout (LBO)
and IPX hub breakout (IHBO).
The topology can have a potential impact on the communication
performance. For instance, when the node accesses services inside
the visited network, the performance is likely to be worse in the HR
case, because all packets travel twice between the visited and the
home country; less so when the communication peer is in a third
country and is minimal when accessing services in the home country.
In the last part of this work, we perform an extensive large-scale
measurement study to understand the roaming ecosystem in Europe
after the “Roam like Home” initiative. More specifically, we investi-
gate:
• Which technical solutions are actually being deployed and used
today?
• What are the implications of roaming on the service experienced
by the roaming user?
To address these questions, we built a unique measurement plat-
form, MONROE-Roaming, to assess roaming and its performance im-
plications. The platform integrates dedicated measurement hardware
that we deployed in six different countries across Europe, covering a
total of 16 MNOs. We purchased Subscriber Identity Modules (SIMs)
that support roaming for these MNOs and distribute them across the
six countries. We characterize roaming operation and network perfor-
mance and evaluate the impact on VoIP and web applications while
roaming. We find that all observed MNOs use HR, which yields no-
ticeable latency increases. We do not observe traffic differentiation
policies for VoIP or web, but we do find evidence of content discrimi-
nation for roaming users.

2 State of the art
A broad research corpus is available when studying the deploy-
ment of a new protocol in the Internet. Here we select a subset of
works that share some similarities with our work Honda et al. [2011],
Hirth et al. [2015]. Honda et al. Honda et al. [2011] shed some light
on the feasibility of extending TCP due to its (bad) interaction with
middleboxes. Authors demonstrate that middleboxes are almost om-
nipresent and that they can arbitrarily change packets header (e.g.,
dropping both known and unknown TCP options) or payloads, par-
ticularly over port 80.
The extent to which the Internet deploys and supports ECN has
been a topic visited repeatedly over the past 15 years Medina et al.
[2005], Langley [2008], Bauer et al. [2011], Trammell et al. [2015],
Bhooma [2017]. Previous work focused on three main aspects of
ECN-readiness, namely, server-side support, end-to-end path support
and, finally, client-side support.
Measurements of server-side support usually focus on the pop-
ulation of web servers as ranked by Alexa. While quantifying ECN
server-side support in 2004, Medina et al Medina et al. [2005] found
that as little as 2.1% of the servers tested supported ECN. Ten years
later, Trammell et al Trammell et al. [2015] report an acceleration
in the deployment of ECN-capable servers, finding 56.17% of ECN-
capable servers.
In this work, we corroborate the acceleration of ECN deployment
for wired networks and Alexa servers, and we extend the study to
mobile networks and ECN++.
Regarding support of ECN by the network elements on the end-
to-end path, in 2013, Kühlewind et al Kühlewind et al. [2013] tested
22,487 hosts and reported that in 0.9% of cases ECN was not usable
due to middleboxes along the path. Later, in 2015, Trammell et al
Trammell et al. [2015] finds that when testing 326,743 hosts capable of
negotiating ECN, for 0.02% of them (107 hosts) a device on the path
mangles the TCP/ECN flags. We note that all these above-mentioned
efforts report on measurements performed mostly in fixed networks.
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Only recently, in March 2017, Apple Bhooma [2017] reported 100%
positive results after testing from vantage points connected to ‘a few’
mobile carriers, which on further investigation meant three carriers
Cheshire [2016].
As mobile broadband networks accommodate more traffic, there
is a pressing need for similar analysis of mobile carriers, which are
known to represent a middlebox-rich environment. Because of the
difficulty of instrumenting mobile devices to perform ECN measure-
ments, there is little prior work Kühlewind et al. [2013], Bhooma
[2017]. For example inHonda et al. [2011, 0pt] the authors only have
access to a low number of vantage points. To overcome the latter is-
sue, Hirth et al. Hirth et al. [2015] demonstrate that crowdsourcing
platforms can become a powerful tool to achieve a realistic view of
the network from an end-user perspective.
In this work, we present the largest measurement study of ECN
support in mobile networks to date, using vantage points connected
to 18 mobile operators. The results we find in this work contrast with
the prior work, providing a different picture of the current support
of ECN (in particular in mobile networks) and unraveling significant
challenges yet to overcome towards global ECN adoption.
As we described earlier, we also propose to design and implement
a set of tests that measure a number of functional and performance
metrics to characterize NATs and particularly CGNs. Due to the diffi-
culties that are inherent to perform large-scale measurements in real
residential environments, to date, the few studies that are available
have performed testing of different NAT devices in a lab environ-
ment. In Hätönen et al. [2010] authors study the configurations of
34 different home gateway models, analyzing the processing of vari-
ous TCP and IP options and measuring the success of some network
protocols when traversing NATs (i.e., STUN Rosenberg et al. [2008a],
TURN Mahy et al. [2010] and ICE Rosenberg [2010]). In Jennings
[2007] authors perform a lab study of the support of a number of
features such as mapping, filtering, hairpinning, on 42 NAT device
models. While these studies provide some information about the
capabilities of the different NAT boxes, they provide limited infor-
mation about the actual behavior of the deployed NAT devices in the
Internet. This is so because the behavior of the deployed NAT base
also largely depends on the configuration of the NAT boxes and in
the popularity of the different NAT products.
The usage and impact of CGN-based solutions Skoberne et al.
[2014] has lately drawn much attention from the community Donley
et al. [2013], Ford et al. [2011]. Consequently, we have seen several
approaches for quantifying and confirming the degree in which op-
erators are actively deploying operational CGNs Müller et al. [2013],
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Richter et al. Richter et al. [2016] use passive measurements to
quantify CGN deployment rate in the Internet, after observing that
some nodes in the BitTorrent DHT mistake addresses internal to a
CGN for external addresses and therefore propagate these IP ad-
dresses to other nodes. The authors report the average CGN penetra-
tion rate to be 17-18% of all Eyeball ASes. In this work, however, we
focus on active CGN detection in fixed-line broadband providers at
the IP level. NAT Revelio empowers end-users to test whether their
upstream provider connects them behind a CGN solution active in
the access network. Similar to our efforts, the Netalyzr Kreibich et al.
[2010] tool, initially meant as a networking debugging tool, has been
repurposed to detect CGN solutions in mobile networks. The authors
present the measurements results in Richter et al. [2016], which cor-
roborate the conclusion of prior work Triukose et al. [2012], Wang
et al. [2011] that for mobile providers CGN deployments are com-
monplace. For wireline networks, however, it is non-trivial to detect
and confirm CGN deployment on a per-IP basis.
Another notable effort towards passively quantifying the degree
of CGN deployment is Livadariu et al. [2017]. The authors look at
CGN deployment with a /24 IP prefix granularity. For the 92 lines
Revelio identified as being behind a CGN, we identified 52 covering
/24 prefixes and cross-compared our results with Livadariu et al.
[2017]. We find that 38 prefixes appear as CGN-positive in Livadariu
et al. [2017], while 13 prefixes were classified as not being used in
CGN deployments and one was unaccounted. Given that we were
able to validate at the IP level 89 of these IPs, we thus highlight the
benefits of an active measurements approach, while acknowledging
the advantage of the passive approach to easily scale.
Finally, using an earlier version of NAT Revelio, the authors pre-
sented in Lutu et al. [2016] a smaller study on CGN deployment in
the United Kingdom showing a very low penetration degree. This
work presents an evolution of the Revelio methodology that includes
additional tests designed to support the myriad of technologies and
devices deployed in real operational environments, as described in
Section 8.2.
In terms of measuring the performance of CGNs, there is very
little work available. In particular in Bocchi et al. [2016] authors mea-
sure the RTT, the time required for the TCP 3-way handshake, the
time to start the data transfer and the goodput rate. While, in Ohara
et al. [2014] authors analyze the impact of network delays when a
CGN is used. We believe that there are other relevant metrics that
are useful to understand the potential limitations introduced by the
CGN. For instance, the performance of the CGN when creating new
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mappings (e.g. maximum rate at which mappings are created, and
whether this affects the forwarding of packets for which a mapping
already exists) or metrics regarding the performance of the CGN
when the number of ports allocated to a given end user increases.
International roaming has received little coverage in terms of large
measurement studies, potentially because of the high costs and coor-
dination efforts associated with running such a campaign. Vallina et
al. Vallina-Rodriguez et al. [2015b] has leveraged crowdsourced
measurements and focused only on national roaming agreements
between MNOs in France. The study does not provide any further
evaluation in terms of performance or content implications. Using
controlled measurements in the dedicated platform MONROE Alay
et al. [2017b] enabled Michelinakis et al. Michelinakis et al. [2018] to
analyze the impact of international roaming, but only for two oper-
ators in Europe. They find that the home-routed configuration does
impact the performance of cloud service providers, such as Akamai
or CloudFront. Our work complements this work and presents an ex-
tensive measurement study to understand the international roaming
ecosystem in Europe since the “Roam like Home” initiative.
There have been myriad recent studies focusing on mobile net-
work characterization and performance. For instance, while Huang et
al. Huang et al. [2013] study LTE network characteristics in a cellular
operator in the US, Safari et al. Khatouni et al. [2017] show perfor-
mance measurement in mobile networks are much more complex
than wired networks, due to the different network configurations
such as the presence of Network Address Translation (NAT) or Per-
formance Enhancing Proxies (PEP), which do vary over time. Kaup
et al. Kaup et al. [2016] run a crowdsourcing campaign to measure
RTT and throughput towards popular websites in Germany. They
used the dataset to show that the association of a mobile endpoint
to the Point of Presence (PoP) within the operator network has influ-
ence on network performance. The authors of Molavi Kakhki et al.
[2015] present a mobile app and a mechanism for identifying traf-
fic differentiation for arbitrary applications in the mobile networks.
Ververis et al. Ververis et al. [2015] surveys content filtering for a
mixture of broadband and cellular ISPs and finds a lack of trans-
parency around the policies they implement as well as outdated and
poorly implemented blacklists. In our work, we not only focus on
network performance of roaming infrastructure, but also identify
possible traffic differentiation for particular applications and content
discrimination and geo-restriction for users in international roaming.
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2.1 Existing Crowdsourcing Large Scale Measurement Platforms
In this Section we describe in details the existing large scale measure-
ment platforms. in the next Chapters we use those platforms to make
informed protocol design choices.
2.1.1 RIPE Atlas
Figure 2.1: RIPE Atlas network map.
RIPE Atlas 1 is an active Internet measurement network from the
1 https://atlas.ripe.net/
RIPE NCC. It consists of thousands of measurement probes dis-
tributed around the globe (see Figure 2.1).
A probe (figure 2.2) is a small hardware, located in people’s home,
that runs measurements in the RIPE Atlas system and reports these
results to the data collection components. A host is someone who
hosts a probe for RIPE Atlas. A RIPE Atlas host earns credits for the
time that his probe is connected. It is possible to use these credits to
conduct user-defined measurements, such as Ping, Traceroute, DNS,
SSL and HTTP, using the entire RIPE Atlas network.
Figure 2.2: RIPE Atlas network.
2.1.2 SamKnows
SamKnows 2 is a measurement platform with installed whiteboxes 2 http://www.samknows.com
in over 28,507,000 homes, across many different ISPs. The platform
was born for measuring performance of access networks in UK and
in few year it expanded around the world (Figure 2.3). The gateway
is a Netgear WNR3500L RangeMax Wireless-N Gigabit router with a
480 MHz MIPS processor, 8 MB of flash storage, and 64 MB of RAM.
Samknows can be used by regulators, ISPs and manufactures.
Figure 2.3: SamKnows growth.
2.1.3 MONROE
MONROE Alay et al. [2017a] is the first open and flexible platform
to run experiments on operational 3G/4G Mobile Broadband net-
works. It is composed by 450 MONROE nodes, distributed across
Norway, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Greece and UK. 150 MONROE nodes
are devoted to mobility and installed on trains and buses. MON-
ROE provided also a scheduler web interface, making easy to access
the system and deploy experiments on all or a selected subset of
the nodes. The platform provides also metadata, context informa-
tion about the node useful during the process of the results from the
experiment.
Figure 2.4 shows the system design of MONROE. The nodes are
located in bus, trains or people’s home and each connect to two or
three MNOs. The scheduler allows the access to external users, as-
signing a given slot of time. The experiments results are pulled to
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external repositories, accessible later by the users.
Figure 2.4: The MONROE platform.
Part I Feasibility of New Protocols Extensions

3 Leveraging Crowdsourcing Platforms for Network
Measurements
By expanding the traditional crowdsourcing focus from the
human element to use a diverse and numerous group of end-user
devices as measurement vantage points, we show how to leverage
on crowdsourcing platforms and how to exploit measurements plat-
forms to run Internet wide measurements.
3.1 Microworkers Crowdsourcing Platform
The Internet is nowadays the main venue for crowdsourcing, since
anyone with an Internet connection can become involved. Crowd-
sourcing platforms connect employers and workers from around the
world.
The employer is the one who creates the task (or the "micro-job")
for workers and specifies the parameters of its campaign, e.g., the
size of the set of users performing the task or their geographical
location at country level. Each worker meeting the required criteria
can carry out the task only once, thus validating the uniqueness of
the results for which the employers pays. The platform then acts as
a referee, guaranteeing to the employer that the campaign funded is
successfully completed within the required parameters, while also
making sure that the workers involved get paid for their contribution.
Microworkers offers world-wide access to employers, unlike sim-
ilar more popular crowdsourcing platforms1. Furthermore, it offers 1 For example, Amazon Mechanical
Turks is only available to employers
based in the U.S., thus restricting our
particular access.
an automatic payment method based on a unique verification code,
called VCODE. The latter provides the worker a proof (payment
code) for each task performed on the external page, so that the pay-
ment can be handled via the Microworkers platform. The platform
presents a simple interface and it is very reliable, allowing an em-
ployer to refuse pay for work which does not meet the required qual-
ity. Another important advantage of using Microworkers for Internet
measurements is the possibility to select the vantage points based
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on certain criteria, such as the geographical location at the country
level, the type of Internet access (fixed or mobile) or even the type of
measurement equipment used to perform the tasks (i.e., Android or
iOS mobile operating system).
3.2 Informing Protocol Design through Crowdsourcing
Modern networks often rely on dedicated hardware components
generically dubbed middleboxes to perform advanced processing
functions like, for example, enhancing application performance (e.g.,
traffic accelerators, caches, proxies), traffic shaping (e.g., load bal-
ancers), optimizing the usage of IPv4 address space (e.g., NATs) or
security (e.g., firewalls).
One major criticism of middleboxes is that they might filter traf-
fic that does not conform to expected behaviors, thus ossifying the
Internet and rendering it as a hostile environment for innovation. 2 2 M. Handley. Why the internet only
just works. BT Technology Journal, 2006
Handley [2006]
Middleboxes for example can alter HTTP requests and responses, es-
pecially headers, to provide their functionalities. 3 The unpredictable
3 N. Vallina-Rodriguez, S. Sundaresan,
C. Kreibich, and V. Paxson. Header En-
richment or ISP Enrichment?: Emerging
Privacy Threats in Mobile Networks. In
Proceedings of the 2015 ACM SIGCOMM
Workshop on Hot Topics in Middleboxes
and Network Function Virtualization,
pages 25–30. ACM, 2015a
Vallina-Rodriguez et al. [2015a]
and diverse behaviors of such middleboxes can be problematic when
adopting new protocols. This is a well know problem, and an IRTF
research group is setup 4 to quantify its extent and propose solutions.
4 https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hops.
IRTF, 2015
hop [2015]
Figure 3.1: Some examples of middle-
boxes.
This does not mean that it is impossible to deploy new protocols,
but that in order to ensure success it is imperative to first understand
the interaction of the proposed solutions with the middleboxes active
along the path. Recent studies on middleboxes behaviour attempt to
provide such information. In order to perform representative Internet
measurements and test realistic scenarios and different Autonomous
Systems (ASes), what is missing is access to a high number of diverse
vantage points. In addition, more evidences of the nature of the
problems and the portions of the network in which they manifest are
needed.
Crowdsourcing platforms present a simple interface and they are
very reliable. Another important advantage of using crowdsourcing
platforms for Internet measurements is the possibility to select the
vantage points based on certain criteria, such as the geographical
location at the country level, the type of Internet access (fixed or mo-
bile) or even the type of measurement equipment used to perform
the tasks (i.e., Android or iOS mobile operating system). However,
some information cannot be extract directly from the platform, so
that the interaction with the users appears essential to obtain some
relevant data to perform a realistic analysis. To overcome this issue,
we create a survey in which we ask to the users what kind of con-
nection they are using and other information that help us to have
a complete view of the Internet scenario. We combine the crowd-
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sourcing solution approach with the access to one of the available
crowdsourcing large-scale measurements platforms, like for example
the RIPE Atlas platform, SamKnows, PlanetLab and MONROE.
Figure 3.2: Microworkers crowdsourc-
ing platform.
The MONROE platform is also ideal for our purposes due to its
flexibility allowing the deployment of all kind of sophisticated tests
that include the crafting of specific packet sequences, thing quite
difficult on crowdsourcing platform, since the user does not own a
rooted device. MONROE provides a somehow controlled environ-
ment, as the hardware running the tests is under control of the MON-
ROE consortium. Being part of the external user, MONROE allows
us to complement the main advantage of crowdsourcing techniques
that is scalability with repeatability and control of the measurement
process. Mostly due to privacy reasons, crowdsourcing platforms
measurements do not always provide important context information
like location, kind of equipment, and connection status. Moreover,
MONROE supports the deployment of different applications and
protocols, and enables benchmarking tools and methodologies.
3.3 Experiences and lessons learned measuring the Internet with
crowdsourcing
Figure 3.3: Crowdsourcing Platform
Guidelines.
The experience on studying the seven case studies described be-
fore gave us the opportunity to understand the functionalities of
crowdsourcing platforms for network measurements. Figure 3.3
shows the type of tests we offer to the crowdsourcing platform users.
The browser test is the simpler and the most common and cheap.
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Since what users need is only a standard browser in few days is pos-
sible to get thousands of vantage points. It is possible to deploy an
Android or Apple app and serve through the crowdsourcing plat-
form. In this case the users need to own a smartphone and in few
days it is still possible to have hundreds of users, but with a higher
cost.
Finally, the linux app is an application that users need to down-
load and run on a linux computer. Since Windows OS is more com-
mon between users, it is hard to recruit users with such equipment
and the cost can increase. Despite this, we could recruit dozens of
users in few weeks.
Testing crowdsourcing platform for network measurements, we
understood that the best period for launching a campaign is during
weekend. We recruited more users than during the week.
Creating survey for understanding users network context can be
hard and users can lie. We deploy some methodologies for under-
standing users behavior and the fairness of their answers. Like for
example changing the order of the questions. We discovered that 60%
of the users lie. We did not use that context information in that case.
4 The Feasibility of Pervasive Encryption
In this chapter, we show how to make informed protocol design
choices by using a novel methodology for performing large scale
Internet measurements, using a crowdsourcing solution approach.
We exemplify next the efficiency of our methodology in the case
of evaluating the feasibility of pervasive encryption in the modern
Internet ecosystem.
4.1 The Feasibility of Pervasive Encryption in the Internet Ecosys-
tem
The long-term objective of the research community is to provide
encryption by default for all Internet communications. In order to
achieve that, the use of TLS as a substratum for all communications
is being considered. In particular, the IETF tcpinc working group
devoted to provide ubiquitous, transparent security for TCP connec-
tions considering the use of TLS.
The IETF also longly discussed about whether HTTP/2 should
be encrypted by default using Transport Layer Security (TLS). In
the one hand, encryption provides strong privacy guarantees for the
end-users and also reliability, encrypted streams in fact, have higher
success probability to traverse the network without modification. In
the other hand, the use of encryption has some harmful implications:
• It imposes some server overhead and can degrade user perfor-
mance in high-latency links, like satellite ones 1 or add extra CPU 1 D. Naylor, A. Finamore, I. Leontiadis,
Y. Grunenberger, M. Mellia, M. Munafò,
K. Papagiannaki, and P. Steenkiste. The
Cost of the S in HTTPS. In Proceedings of
the 10th ACM International on Conference
on emerging Networking Experiments and
Technologies, pages 133–140. ACM, 2014a
Naylor et al. [2014a]
load that small devices cannot handle.
• There is a requirement to inspect or cache HTTP traffic for a multi-
tude of reasons, (3) certificates are too expensive.
Based on all these considerations, the final HTTP/2 standard de-
fines two way of supporting HTTP/2: HTTP/2 over TLS (H2) and
HTTP/2 in the clear (H2C), or directly over TCP. Specifically, the
standard defines that H2C should be negotiated by mean of an Up-
grade header field in a classic HTTP/1 request.
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Despite major browser vendors currently only support H2, several
websites already support H2C. As of December 2015, 30,000 websites
announce support for H2C though only about 80 sites fully support
the header Upgrade mechanism. 2 Motivated by the above obser- 2 Is the web HTTP/2 yet?
http://isthewebhttp2yet.com/, 2015b
htt [2015b]
vations, in this work we set out to quantify the feasibility of H2C in
today’s Internet.
However, before designing any solution, it is first essential to un-
derstand the feasibility of pervasive encryption in the Internet ecosys-
tem by measuring the interaction of middleboxes with the TLS across
the different TCP ports that currently use plain text protocols.
In other words, we need to establish at this point whether us-
ing encryption in traditionally unsecured ports is even possible in
today’s Internet. In this work, we attempt to initiate TLS and H2C
connections in 68 different ports that normally do not use any form
of encryption and analyze the success of the connection. This is a
first necessary step towards a full comprehension of the behavior of
middleboxes relative to pervasive encryption.
4.2 HTTP/2: Operations and Characteristics
HTTP/2 aims to address a number of issues of HTTP/1 by providing
an optimized transport of HTTP semantics in a server-client connec-
tion.
HTTP/1 does not really work as a full duplex connection, most
of the time the connection is in an idle state as only one request at a
time can be placed in a connection. Moreover HTTP/1 is very ver-
bose and take a considerable number of bytes to transmit, mainly
because of Cookies, thus slowing down initial requests and adding
a lot of overhead sending the same bytes in every request. Another
problem is that HTTP/1 is a text protocol, so it appears hard for
machines to parse it. Text protocols are not efficient neither easy to
implement correctly: optional white spaces, different termination
tokens and other quirks make it harder to differentiate between the
protocol and the payload.
In order to solve all of these issues, HTTP/2 introduces a binary
framing layer. Requests and responses are broken down into multiple
frames and transferred between client and server in the same connec-
tion. Each tuple request-response runs in its own stream, allowing
the multiplexing of several requests and responses in a single TCP
connection by interleaving frames. These changes allow new features
like flow control and prioritization. Another benefit of using a sin-
gle connection is that the server can push data to the client and send
resources even before the client knows they will be needed. Due to
all these changes the HTTP/2 frame format is, indeed, completely
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different from the HTTP/1.
The high-level API of the HTTP protocol remains exactly the same
and the changes are only low-level, to address the performance limi-
tation of the protocol and add extra features. There are two groups of
frames:
• HEADERS, PUSH_PROMISE, CONTINUATION and DATA
which are used mainly to send data between peers and they are
associate with a stream;
• PRIORITY, RST_STREAM, SETTINGS, PING, GOAWAY and
WINDOW_UPDATE frames are used for flow-control, manage-
ment and configuration in the connection and streams.
All frames are composed by a 9-octet header and a variable-length
payload as shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: HTTP/2 frame layout.
Once the connection has been established, either plain TCP using
HTTP upgrade mechanism or via TLS, both ends send a connec-
tion preface as final confirmation of HTTP/2 being used. Client and
server send a SETTINGS frame to indicate the configuration pa-
rameters which are not negotiated and must be acknowledged by
the other end. Then the client can start sending HTTP requests to
the server. First the client sends a HEADERS frame, followed by
some CONTINUATION frames. As HTTP headers are stateful for
the connection in HTTP/2, to avoid race-conditions, no other frames
can be sent until they are sent. If there is some body in the request,
DATA frames are used. The same process will be used by the server
to respond. This happens concurrently for multiple communications
on the same connection.
If server push is enabled, the server can send a PUSH_PROMISE
frame for data that it will be requested by the client. This frame is
basically a request sent by the server instead of the client. Once the
PUSH_PROMISE frame is sent, the server can send DATA frames
with the response. As PUSH_PROMISE must be cacheable, this
streams can be closed by the client if the resource is not needed.
In contrast with HTTP/1, HTTP/2 uses one connection for multi-
ple requests-responses. Once the connection is not longer needed, a
GOAWAY frame is sent to terminate gracefully the connection. If an
issue occurs during the connection and it becomes unusable, client
and/or server can close the TCP connection. They should first try to
send a GOAWAY frame.
HTTP/2 uses the same HTTP and HTTPS URI schemes used by
HTTP/1 and it shares the same default ports: 80 for HTTP URIs and
443 for HTTPS URIs. HTTP/2 standard offers two kinds of imple-
mentation:
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• over TLS (H2), using the ALPN or NPN identifiers for protocol
negotiation;
• over TCP (H2C), in which the initial Upgrade request must be
implemented. In this case the client sends an HTTP/1 request
that includes an Upgrade header field with the H2C token. The
server accepts the Upgrade and responds using a 101 (Switching
Protocols) status code, showing that the server is changing to a
different version of HTTP.
These frames must include a response to the request that initiated the
upgrade.
In this work we test the two implementations of the protocol (i.e.,
over TLS and using Upgrade), additionally we test H2 without ALPN
negotiation and H2C without the Upgrade request. A client, that
makes a request for an HTTP URI without prior knowledge about
support for HTTP/2, uses the HTTP Upgrade mechanism. Basically, the
client makes an HTTP/1 request that includes an Upgrade header
field with the H2C token. A server that supports HTTP/2 accepts the
Upgrade with a 101 (Switching Protocols) response. After the empty
line that terminates the 101 response, the server can start sending
HTTP/2 frames. These frames must include a response to the request
that initiated the upgrade.
4.2.1 HTTP/2 Encryption
Figure 4.2: HTTP/2 ALPN extension.
A client that makes a request to a HTTPS URI uses TLS with the
application-layer protocol negotiation (ALPN) extension. The proto-
col identifier in this case is HTTP/2. Once TLS negotiation is com-
pleted, both the client and the server must send a connection preface
(Figure 4.2).
4.3 The Case of the Pervasive Encryption: Experimental Setup
We try to establish TLS connections from a large number of vantage
points (from now on, measurement agents (MAs)) to a large number
of ports, which traditionally do not use TLS in a target server (from
now on, measurement server (MS)), using crowdsourcing based mea-
surements.
We realize our measurement campaign—to study TLS HTTP/2 in-
teraction with potential middleboxes—through Microworkers crowd-
sourcing platform. In order to attract a large set of workers, our “mi-
crojob” should be as simple as possible, which is quite challenging
when performing Internet measurements. 3 Workers should not be 3 V. Paxson. Strategies for sound
internet measurement. In Proceedings
of the 4th ACM SIGCOMM conference
on Internet measurement, pages 263–271.
ACM, 2004
Paxson [2004]
required to have any technical background, and all data should be
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automatically collected and reported to us, without any worker in-
put. Ideally, workers should perform only a simple task like visiting
a Web page from a browser, or launching a (provided) application on
their mobile phone.
4.3.1 TLS Campaign Setup
Measurement Server. To capture how effective would pervasive
encryption actually be if deployed in today’s Internet, we collect and
analyze the results from more than 2,000 MAs that try to establish
TLS connections in a large number of ports which normally do not
use TLS. The target of our tests is a dedicated server (MS) which we
are able to control and which receives the communication from the
different measurement agents.
The MAs attempt to establish both HTTP and TLS connections to
68 different ports, namely 10 well-known ports, 56 registered ports
and 2 ephemeral ports. All the server ports we select are ports that
normally use HTTP-based protocols, such that the HTTP connection
is effectively what any middlebox would be expecting in that port.
We select only 2 ephemeral ports, since we expect that the behavior
for the rest of ephemeral ports is similar. We use the success rate of
the HTTP connections as the benchmark against which we compare
the number of TLS successful connections. We establish then the
success rate of the TLS connection by contrasting the result against
the status of an unencrypted HTTP connection established in the
same port.
We have installed two dedicated servers to collect clients’ HTTP
and HTTPS activity. Information about the attempted HTTP and
HTTPS connections are stored for the post-processing phase. We
utilize the LAMP model (Linux, Apache Server, MySQL relational
database management system, PHP) to allow storage and retrieval of
data in a modifiable format using simple query APIs. We also store
and analyze in detail the server side packet exchanges.
Measurement Agents. When designing our experiment, we want to
capture and compare the results from MAs that include both fixed
and mobile Internet access. To this end, we create several interna-
tional crowdsourcing campaigns directed either to mobile user or
desktop users exclusively. We recruit in total 2,120 MAs. We spec-
ify the number of users we want to recruit, the Country in which
we want to direct the campaign an the kind of campaign we want
to spread. However, when designing Internet measurements crowd-
sourcing campaigns, one has to bear in mind the fact that the level of
direct control over the end-user and the measurement device is still
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limited. Some information that is of importance for the designed ex-
periment may not be available through the platform. For this reason
we create a methodology to collect the data from each MA complet-
ing the task. The procedure is as follows. First, we start by asking the
user to connect using a HTTP connection in port 80 to a webpage we
provide. Meanwhile, in the background, HTTP and HTTPS connec-
tions are performed from the measurement devices to our servers in
all the other 67 ports. In this case, data about the performance are
collected in the MS.
Second, the webpage we provide contains a short form asking for
additional input about the type of Internet access they are using. This
allows us to gather the information that the crowdsourcing platform
cannot provide directly and that we are not able to collect on the
server side. The fixed-line MAs can indicate the place from where
they are connecting (Home, Hot Spot, University or other institution,
Company). Additionally, for the category Home, we offer 4 different
choices for the residential access technology used, namely Cable,
xDSL, Fiber and Other. Contrariwise, the workers in the campaigns
for mobile access can choose between 2G, 3G or 4G, based on the
mobile technology they are using.
Finally, on the server side, we also collect and store metadata on
each of the MAs that connect to our servers, such as the IP address,
the user agent type, the language, and any other information in-
cluded in the HTTP header.
4.3.2 HTTP/2 Campaign Setup
Measurement Tool. We build the tool with one focus in mind: sim-
plicity for the test workers. The workers do not necessarily have any
technical background and, as external entities to the test, all the in-
formation should be produced and collected within our tool, with
minimal requirements and input from them. We built two clients ap-
plications (a Web application and an Android app) that connect to
two Web servers (for non secure and secure communications). The
reason for which we use two different clients is that HTTP/2 ne-
gotiation is done during the handshake using the extension ALPN,
this extension has limited support in Android because of a bug. 4 4 https://github.com/square/okhttp/issues/1305.
Don’t use broken ALPN on Android 4.4 |
GitHub, 2015
okh [2015]
For this reason, we modify the Android library to remove the ALPN
negotiation and perform HTTP/2 connections over TLS without
ALPN negotiation. To perform the test using HTTP/2 over TLS with
ALPN negotiation, we use the workers browser (i.e., Chrome, Fire-
fox and Opera) that currently support HTTP/2 only over TLS. On
the server, we built a PHP application that provides the information
to the clients and saves the data generated by them, storing it in a
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MySQL database for post-processing phase.
We create two different crowdsourcing campaigns, a browser cam-
paign in which workers, using their own browser, need to follow
a link to the application that performs h2 connections with ALPN
negotiation in the 68 ports and an Android campaign in which work-
ers need to download an app that performs h2 connections without
ALPN negotiation, h2c and h2c without Upgrade connections in 68
different ports, first using mobile network and then if available the
WiFi connection to test fixed line. The procedure to collect measure-
ments is as follows. Following the information in the Microworkers
platform, workers are redirected to our web pages containing the in-
struction to perform the tasks. Basically they need only to press the
button Start, then the application is responsible for performing all the
tests.
Our tool consists of a set of resources that can be accessed via
URI endpoints based on a REST architecture, these resources can be
invoked using JSON inputs. We implement 3 endpoints in the server:
Start, Test and Finish. Workers make a request to the Start endpoint
to obtain a list of URLs to perform the test on. These URLs point
to the Test endpoint with different combination of hosts and ports.
Once the test is completed, the application confirms it by making a
finally request to the Finish endpoint.
Figure 4.3: Server Endpoints.
The server endpoints (Figure 4.3) provide the following functional-
ity:
• Start: a message with an unique token and a list of URLs to per-
form requests on is returned. The token helps to distinguish be-
tween different requests produced by the workers, even by the
same worker.
• Test: this endpoint receives the token as part of the URL. HTTP1.1,
h2, h2 without ALPN, h2c and h2c without Upgrade requests are
performed from the workers to our servers over 68 different ports.
If the request is correct, a JSON message confirms it and also re-
turns the protocol used. This endpoint saves all the information
about the request into the database: remote IP address, remote
port, HTTP method, protocol (HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2), scheme
(http or https), hostname, port, if the request is an upgrade, etc. It
also saves all the HTTP headers.
• Finish: this endpoint receives the token as part of the URL and
it marks as completed the test for that token. At that point new
requests against the token are discarded.
Measurement Server. To collect workers’ HTTP1.1 and HTTP/2
activity we decide to use H2O server as target of our tests. It is a rel-
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atively new Web server that natively supports HTTP1.1 and HTTP/2.
Within its features there is the possibility to establish an HTTP/2
communication without a previous negotiation for both types of
communication, secure and non-secure.
We install two servers with identical configuration, one of them is
listening non secure communications and the other server is listening
over the same ports but only secure communications.
Attached to them through FastCGI, a PHP application provides
to the client applications all the information needed for the tests and
also collects all the information produced by them. This information
is stored into a MySQL database for a post-processing phase.
Measurement Client. To implement the Android client for per-
forming HTTP/2 requests, we use and modify the library OkHttp. 5 5 https://github.com/square/okhttp.
OkHttp - An HTTP+SPDY client for
Android and Java application, 2015a
htt [2015a]
OkHttp is an HTTP client that supports HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2. As
we explained before, we deploy two different clients: a browser client
and an Android client, in this subsection of the paper we describe
them and then we explain how the workers use them to perform the
measurements.
Figure 4.4: Browser App.
Browser Client. To perform the browser test, we built a Web ap-
plication using PHP and JavaScript. As current browsers support
HTTP/2 only over TLS, workers only performs test to secure URLs, it
does not make any request using HTTP Upgrade mechanism, neither
over plain text.
We start by asking the worker to connect to a webpage we pro-
vide and to start the Web application, using their own browser (i.e.,
Chrome, Firefox and Opera). We verify that the browser supports
HTTP/2, if it is not the case we show an alert box to the worker. On
start, the server returns an unique token and a list of URLs to make
requests. Then, the application starts to send the h2 requests to the
server and a progress bar is shown to the worker about the status
of the test. To avoid overwhelming the server, we perform a request
every 400ms. Once all the tests are completed, the application shows
an alert box with the number of test performed and the number of
successful tests (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.5: Android App.
Android Client. The Android application performs two tests, one
mandatory test over mobile network and secondly, if available, an-
other test using the WiFi connection to test fixed line. Once the test
starts, the application sends extra information about the worker: local
IP, network type and subtype, mobile country code, mobile network
code and cell ID. The servers returns the unique token and the list of
URLs to make requests on.
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For each URL, the application makes first an HTTP/1.1 request,
then an h2, an h2c and finally an h2c without Upgrade request over
68 different ports. A progress bar shows the status of the test to
the workers. The application sends the plain HTTP Upgrade using
HTTP/1.1 and it reads the response. If the response has a 200 status
code, that means no Upgrade was performed and then the appli-
cation continues with the next test. If the response has a 101 status
code, the server accepts the HTTP/2 Upgrade6. The interface of the 6 OkHttp does not support HTTP/2
Upgrade. To perform those tests, we
use a TCP socket and implement that
functionality.
Android app is very similar to the browser implementation, basically
the workers need only to press the button Start. Figure 4.5 shows a
screenshot of the HTTP/2 Android Client’s GUI.
If the request is responded by the server with a 200 status code,
the application increases a counter to show the results at the end. In
the case of HTTP/2 Upgrade, not only it checks for a 200 status code
response, but also the application reads the JSON response looking
for the protocol used and returned by the server. Once the test are
completed for mobile network, the application switches on the WiFi.
If the WiFi connection is available, the client performs all the tests
again. Finally, the application shows an alert box with the results of
the tests.
4.3.3 Limitations
There are a number of limitations that needs to be considered during
the development of the tool.
Firstly, only last versions of Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer and
Opera browser support HTTP/2 and only over TLS. Additionally,
the Android application works in devices with the versions 4.4 and
above, which it is about 58% of the market.
4.4 The Case of the Pervasive Encryption: Results
In this Section, we present the dataset and we evaluate the perfor-
mance of HTTP and HTTPS protocols for the tested ports and results
from the HTTP/2 campaign.
4.4.1 Results from the TLS Campaign
Dataset. In the campaigns for fixed lines, we recruit 1,165 workers
from 53 different countries. The MAs are hosted in 286 ASes overall.
79% of the users indicated that they are connecting from Home, 10%
from a Company, 6% from an University and 5% from a Public Hot
Spot. Also, in the case of residential users, we collected data from
DSL (36%), Cable (31%), Fiber (12%) and Others (21%). For the mobile
case study, we recruit 956 workers, from 45 different countries and 183
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ASes. 26% of the users indicated that they are using a 2G network,
the 64% a 3G network and the remaining 10% a 4G cellular network.
Considering that each MA performs 68 connections to our MS,
we build a complex dataset for a total of 114,228 connections. When
processing the data, we verify that we only observe data from unique
IP addresses, to ensure that the MAs perform the test only once.
Aggregated results. We start by comparing HTTP and TLS connec-
tions that we get from the same IP address in each port for both fixed
line and mobile network. We compute the percentage of errors that
occur when users perform a TLS connection as
ERRORS(%) = (
100
http
) (http  tls) (4.1)
where http indicates the amount of HTTP connections in a specific
port, while tls indicates the amount of TLS connections in the same
port.
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Figure 4.6: Error rate vs. port number,
aggregated results.
The computed percentage of error for each port is shown in Figure
4.6. Results show that the amount of errors in port 80 is 16,5%. This
is much larger that the error rate for the other tested ports, which is
in average 5,8%. Next, we split the analysis for the categories of MAs
we recruit, namely fixed line and mobile.
Fixed line vs. mobile network. In this Section we analyze the results
from users that use a fixed line and from users connected to a cellular
network to reach our server, as they declare when they complete the
task, submitting the form in our web page.
Figure 4.7 (a) and Figure 4.7 (b) show the results for the campaign
in which we consider users connected by fixed line compared to the
percentage of errors of users that attempt to connect by a cellular
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a) Fixed line b) Mobile network
Figure 4.7: Error rate vs. port number.
network. In the case of fixed line, we observe an error rate of 6,95%
in average, considering all the tested ports. Registered ports present
in average an error rate slightly greater than the one we calculate for
the Ephemeral and the Well-known.
To better understand the case of users behind a fixed line, we an-
alyze specifically the category indicated by the users about the place
which they are connecting. Results show that the average percentages
of errors in the categories we consider for all ports are: 2% for Uni-
versity, 4,5% for Public Hot Spot, 5,7% for Company and 7,4% for Home.
In this case, results from office or University are similar. Clearly the
error rate from University is significantly lower then the other cate-
gories.
In mobile scenario the average percentage of errors is equal to the
4,54%, considering all ports. However, it is interesting to observe the
behavior of middleboxes respect to TLS when port 80 is used. In this
case, 25% of the users are not able to perform a TLS connection.
Figure 4.8 shows the average percentage of errors in the categories
we consider for all ports. Results show a large number of errors
from users connected by home. Results from office or University are
similar. Clearly errors rate from University is lower then the other
categories.
Figure 4.8: Average percentage of errors
for each category in the fixed line use
case for all ports.
It is well known that cellular network operators employ a large
amount of middleboxes to ensure security, traffic management, and
performance optimization. Unfortunately, they are rarely transparent
about middlebox policies and their impact on representative mobile
workloads is poorly understood. However, we try to figure out the
possible reasons of errors, in particular in port 80, analyzing the
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different rate of errors between users that use proxy and users that
does not use it.
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a) Mobile proxy b) Mobile non-proxy
Figure 4.9: Error rate vs. port number.
Proxies. The experiments described above highlight that, when TLS
is used over port 80 in cellular network, 25% of users are not able to
perform connections to our MS. In this Section, we try to understand
how a proxy interacts with the communication between the MA and
the MS.
Proxies are mostly used for connectivity, caching, monitoring,
control and privacy. We observe two kinds of proxies in today’s In-
ternet: transparent and non-transparent. A transparent proxy, typically
centralizes network traffic for security purposes before delivery to
a client on the network. They transparently handle all requests to
destination servers without requiring any action on the part of the
client. Contrariwise, a user who is behind a non-transparent proxy
knows that the proxy is being used and it can be configured. In both
cases, the proxy establishes two separate connections: they terminate
the TCP connection initiated by the client and they initiate a separate
TCP connection between the proxy and the server. A proxy can insert
into the HTTP header some standardized fields through which we
are able to detect that the request has been forwarded by a proxy. It
may also contain the IP address of the client. However, the admin-
istrator of a proxy server can decide whether or not to send these
fields, determining the level of anonymity proxy. In our experimental
setup, we can observe the HTTP headers allowing us to sometimes
detect the usage of a proxy for both transparent and non-transparent
category.
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The HTTP proxy, depending on the anonymity that fail to pro-
vide, can be divided into: NOA (not anonymous proxy) that modifies
some header sent by the browser and adds others, also it shows the
real IP address of the applicant. They are very easy to recognize by
the server. ANM (anonymous proxy server) proxy anonymous that
does not transmit the IP address of the applicant, but modifies or
adds some header. They are therefore easily recognizable. HIA (high
anonymous proxy) highly anonymous proxy that does not transmit
the IP address of the applicant and does not modify request head-
ers. They are difficult to detect through normal controls. Through
our methodology based on observing HTTP headers, we are able to
detect if a user use NOA or ANM proxies, but we cannot detect the
users that use HIA proxies.
In the case of fixed line we find that the 1% of the users use a
proxy. In the case of mobile the percentage increases to 25%.
In Figure 4.9 we compare the rate of successful TLS connections
for users we detect using a proxy (a) and for users that do not (b)
in mobile network scenario. We observe that in the case proxies are
present, the error rate of TLS in port 80 is 70% and the error rate in
all other ports is 4,23% in average. When proxies are not used the
behavior of the connections is similar to the case of the fixed line.
It is interesting to note the different rate of errors respect to the
different networks through the users are connected, when a proxy is
used. Results demonstrate that when users use a proxy the average
percentage of errors in 2G is 49%, in 3G is 80% and in 4G network is
100%.
Packets analysis. To better understand how proxies or other mid-
dleboxes behavior impacts the performance of the TLS protocol in
unconventional ports, we focus on the packet analysis, splitting the
analysis for fixed line, mobile and for users that use or not a proxy.
We observe that in a large number of cases, for the TLS connection,
the server does not even receive the TCP SYN packet from the MA.
When we analyze the packet-level traffic our analysis tests for the
following possible middleboxes behavior:
• Connection is reset by the middlebox: we do not receive the SYN
packet;
• Connection is reset before the TCP handshake: we receive the SYN
packet.
Table 4.2 refers to the percentage of SYN we receive when users
try to establish a TLS connection to our MS from fixed line use case
and from mobile network, considering all port and particularizing
the analysis for port 80 (labels All, Port 80). Moreover, in the case of
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Analysis
Fixed Line Mobile
SYN(%) NO SYN(%) SYN(%) NO SYN(%)
All 96,8 3,2 36 64
Port 80 88,3 11,7 27,7 72,3
Proxy 22,2 77,8
Non-proxy 12,7 87,3
Proxy (80) 9,6 90,4
Non-proxy (80) 36,4 63,6
Table 4.1: Packets analysis
mobile network we particularize the analysis for proxy/non-proxy
case (labels Proxy, Non-proxy, Proxy (80), Non-proxy (80)).
We observe that in the case of proxies, 90% of the SYN packets are
missing. While this may seem non causal at first (as the SYN packet
is forwarded before the middle box actually knows whether this is a
regular HTTP connection or a TLS connection), proxies usually wait
until they receive the GET from the client to establish the connection
to the server in order to apply their policies. This explains why in the
case of TLS, we miss a high number of SYN packets.
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Figure 4.10: Conditional probability vs.
port number.
Consistent filtering. In this Section, we try to understand if the
filtering of TLS is consistent across the different ports for a given MA.
In other words, if the TLS connection fails in a given port, how likely
is that it will fail in other ports. In order to quantify this, we estimate
the conditional probability of failure in a given port X given that the
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TLS connection in port 80 has failed. We choose the port 80 as it is in
general a port with high failure rate. We estimate the aforementioned
conditional probability for the case of fixed line and for the case of
mobile network without proxies (Figure 4.10). The case of mobile
network with proxy is not very interesting, as there is a much larger
failure rate in the port 80, so the conditional probability will look like
the error rate in the different ports.
Figure 4.10 shows the percentage of errors in other ports, when an
error occurs in port 80, considering the fixed line case and the mobile
use case when users do not use proxies. We can see that the esti-
mated conditional probability is around 90% in both cases (slightly
higher in the fixed line case), implying that when the TLS connection
fails in port 80, it is very likely that it will fail in the other ports. It
is reasonable then to guess that the same behavior will occur in the
other ports beyond the ones we have measured.
4.4.2 HTTP/2: To Encrypt or Not to Encrypt?
In this subsection, we first present the data-set collected; next, we
analyze the interaction between HTTP/2 and the Internet ecosys-
tem, differentiating between fixed line and mobile network. Our
main goal is to quantify how likely HTTP/2 connections are to be
(un)successful. We thus introduce the following metric:
ERRORS(%) = (
100
http
) (http  http2) (4.2)
where “http” and “http2” indicate the number of successful
HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 connections on a given port. We leverage
HTTP/1 connections to eliminate non-HTTP/2 related phenomenons,
such as connectivity issues.
We perform 4 different tests: using H2, H2 without ALPN ne-
gotiation, H2C and H2C without Upgrade. In this Section we
present the results for the browser-based campaign over fixed
line, the application-based campaign over fixed line (WiFi) and the
application-based campaign over mobile network.
Data Set. We run the browser-based campaign for 4 days and we
pay each worker 0.2$. Instead, we run the application-based cam-
paign for seven consecutive days, and we pay each worker 0.4$, on
average, as the cost of a campaign depends on the worker’s coun-
try. Overall, we recruit 628 workers: 306 workers participate to
the browser-based campaign, while 322 workers participate to the
application-based one. Out of these 322 workers, only 49 workers had
both mobile and WiFi connectivity available, and thus generate fixed
line results (over WiFi).
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In the browser-based campaign, each worker attempts two con-
nections (HTTP/1 and H2) for each of the 67 available ports at our
servers. In the application-based campaign, each worker attempts
four connections per port (HTTP/1, H2 without ALPN, H2C and
H2C without Upgrade). It follows that our data-set consists of 54,136
unique connections from fixed line, and 86,296 connections from a
mobile network.
Mobile users are partitioned among 2G (17%), 3G (71.8%), and 4G
(3,6%); we could not detect the access network used by the remainder
7,6% of the mobile workers. Overall, workers are distributed among
38 countries (cf. Figure 7.3).
Fixed line. In this subsection, we present the results for the fixed
line case study. First, we show the percentage of workers that are
not able to perform an H2 connection using their own browser; next
we show the percentage of errors when workers use the Android
application over WiFi connection.
Figure 4.11: Distributed vantage points
map.
Browser-based Campaign. Figure 4.12a shows the error rate as a
function of the port number; these results were collected via a regu-
lar browser (running our Web application) using a fixed access. We
asked explicitly the workers to perform the test using their personal
computer and fixed line. On average, we measure an error rate of
only 2%; such low number is to be expected, since these results are
originated by regular (encrypted) H2. However, we also measure
high error rates for the following ports: 80 (4.90%), 593 (6.90%) and
5554 (5.55%). These are well-known ports used for, respectively, the
Web (80), remote procedure call over HTTP (593) and SGI ESP HTTP
(5554). It follows that, likely, middleboxes are instrumented to moni-
tor traffic on these given ports, and somehow manage to interact even
with encrypted H2 traffic. Strengthening such thesis, we also observe
an error rate of 0% on port 443, the default port used by encrypted
HTTP/1 (HTTPS) which middlebox are likely ignoring.
To further understand this result, we resort to pcap traces collected
at our servers. Table 4.2 categorizes the errors detected for workers
that participated to the browser-based campaign. When an error is
detected on port 80, more than 80% of the time even the TCP SYN
packet is not received. In this case, an anonymous HTTP proxy is
likely used by the ISP. HTTP proxies, in fact do not forward the SYN
packet before to know whether this is a regular HTTP connection and
they usually are employed to inspect traffic over port 80.
Considering port 593 and port 5554, SYN is not received for more
than 85% of the time. Since we do not detect this kind of error in
the case of Android applications (cf. Subsection 4.4.2) and in the
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knowledge that these ports are usually filtered due to Windows Virus
and worms 7, we can conclude that in the case of port 80 errors are 7 http://www.speedguide.net/port.php?port=593.
Port 593 filter, 2015
por [2015]
due to middleboxes interaction, while in the case of port 593 and
port 5554 the errors are due to the operating system. Inspecting the
user agent field for that workers in fact, it is confirmed that they are
using Windows operating system. We also note a case in which a
middlebox do not recognize the ALPN extension over port 80, and
we receive a normal HTTPS connection (labeled No ALPN). There are
some random ports for which the server sends a reset (RST) flag after
the client key exchange procedure and the workers are not able to send
the data (labeled No data).
H2 behavior Number of workers (%)
No SYN 80 81.81
No SYN 593 86.66
No SYN 5554 91.66
No ALPN 9.09
No data 100
Table 4.2: Browser-based campaign
errors classification
Application-based Campaign. Figure 4.12b shows the error rate as
a function of the port number, differentiating between H2 without
ALPN negotiation, H2C, and H2C without Upgrade. These results
were generated via our Android application, while using WiFi con-
nectivity. Overall, over port 80 we detect an error rate of 2.04% for
both H2C and H2 test cases. As the browser-based campaign this
port is affected by middleboxes that expect HTTP protocol. For that
particular port in fact, we do not receive the SYN packet. Some errors
appear on few random ports (port number 2082, 2083, 2381 and 3478)
and only for H2 test case. In order to better understand the commu-
nication issue for those ports we leverage the pcap traces. We detect
connectivity problems during the TLS handshake. As in the browser-
based campaign case the server resets the communication after the
client key exchange, which excludes a middlebox interference.
Mobile Network. Figure 4.12c shows the error rate as a function of
the port number, differentiating between H2 without ALPN negotia-
tion, H2C, and H2C without connection Upgrade. These results were
generated via our Android application, while using mobile connec-
tivity.
As above, the overall error rate is quite low: 0.58%, on average.
Differently from above, we observe a noticeable trend: 7% of the H2C
connection attempts fail over port 80! This result is remarkable, since
this is the most common usage of H2C we would expect. The error
rate reduces to 4.3% when we assume direct H2C, i.e., where a con-
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(a) Error rate vs. port number, browser results (fixed line).
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(b) Error rate vs. port number, Android client WiFi results (fixed line).
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(c) Error rate vs. port number, Android client results (mobile network).
Figure 4.12: Error rate vs. port number.
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nection Upgrade was not performed. It follows that H2C might face an
additional challenge in its adoption, due to the presence of middleboxes that,
ironically, very much like encrypted content.
In order to further understand the latter result, we investigate the
pcap traces collected at our servers. In the specific case of port 80,
we observe that about 80% of the SYN packets are not received by
our servers. This is due to a more common usage of middleboxes in
mobile networks compared than in fixed lines. For example, proxies
wait until reception of the first GET request from a client before
opening a connection with the server; they can therefore discard a
protocol that is not the expected on that port.
We also verify if the filtering of HTTP/2 is consistent across the
different variation of the protocol for a given worker over port 80.
Basically, we compute the probability of failure for a given variation
of HTTP/2 (e.g., H2C) respect to other variations (e.g., H2C without
Upgrade and H2). Specifically, if a worker fails an H2C connection,
how likely is that it will fail an H2C without Upgrade and an H2
connection. Results show that when a worker fails an H2C connec-
tion, he fails also the H2C without Upgrade and the H2 connection.
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(a) Error rate vs. port number, NATs Android client results (mobile network).
Figure 4.13: Error rate vs. port number.
Proxies. In order to better understand the results in mobile environ-
ment, we extend our study by analyzing proxy behavior over port 80.
We consider the HTTP header of the workers that produced errors
for HTTP/2 without ALPN, H2C and H2C without Upgrade and we
try to identify the use of proxies along the path for those test cases.
Today’s proxies can be divided into two groups: anonymous and
non-anonymous. Anonymous proxies are not detectable by servers,
non-anonymous proxies leave traces of their presence in the HTTP
headers.
To discover if workers are using a proxy, we check for the existence
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of the following headers in the HTTP requests:
• CLIENT-IP
• FORWARDED
• FORWARDED-FOR
• FORWARDED-FOR-IP
• PROXY-CONNECTION
• VIA
• X-FORWARDED
• X-FORWARDED-FOR
• X-GATEWAY
• X-NETWORK-INFO
Protocol # of errors (%) # of proxies(%)
H2 without ALPN 3.32 18
H2C 6.6 24
H2C without Upgrade 5 12.5
Table 4.3: Android-based mobile cam-
paign proxy errors.
Table 4.3 refers to the percentage of workers that produce an er-
ror and are behind a proxy, for H2 without ALPN, H2C and H2C
without Upgrade in mobile network case studies. Considering the
case of H2C results show that 24% of errors are due to proxies. Some
of these requests (40%) do not arrive to our server and the 60% of
them do not Upgrade to HTTP/2. When we try to send the H2C re-
quest without the Upgrade the percentage of errors due to a proxy
is 12.5%. Consequently, a direct H2C request (without Upgrade) is
more successful that an H2C connection. In this case, in fact, prox-
ies does not recognize the Upgrade and changes the HTTP/1 101
Switching Protocols header to a normal HTTP/1 request.
4.5 Privacy Consideration
To preserve the privacy of the workers we recruited through the
Microworkers crowdsourcing campaigns, we give sufficient infor-
mation in order that a worker would be able to make a choice of
whether or not to participate to the test. This information has been
written in a way that was understandable to the people who have
been approached as participants. Even though the goal of this paper
is understand the ISPs infrastructure and does not focus on human
personal information, the data collected on our server are accurately
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protected and shared once they have been rendered anonymous,
for example sensitive information have been replaced with indirect
identifiers (e.g. numbers). Accepting to run the test workers give
the informed consent to share such data to the research community.
Once the campaign is run, we provide to the worker the clarifica-
tion of the main objective of our work and some references to our
research. We also publish the source code we use to perform the tests
to be checked by the workers that run it in their own machine.

5 TCP Fast Open: Initial Measurements
Given the transition of mobile technologies from GSM
to LTE-advanced, users rely more and more on mobile broadband
networks. Mobile devices are becoming pervasive, raising the ex-
pectation of users for faster connectivity in a mobile scenario. In
this context, employing optimizations solely focused on eliminating
round-trip protocol messaging is central to surmounting critical per-
formance issues. TFO is one such solution, focused on making TCP
faster by eliminating one RTT in the three-way hand shake (3WHS).
TFO 1 allows to send data directly in the SYN packet. Latency 1 S. Radhakrishnan, Y. Cheng, J. Chu,
A. Jain, and B. Raghavan. Tcp fast open.
In Proceedings of the Seventh COnference
on Emerging Networking EXperiments
and Technologies, CoNEXT ’11, pages
21:1–21:12, New York, NY, USA, 2011.
ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-1041-3
Radhakrishnan et al. [2011]
sensitive applications such as gaming, audio/video calls, financial
transaction and embedded advertisement can benefit from it. The
3WHS employs one RTT before the server’s application receives the
data and two RTTs for the server response. TFO should speed up the
exchange of information between client and server and reduce of one
RTT the 3WHS. Sending the initial SYN with data, TFO could reduce
the loading of pages up to 40%.2 2 S. Radhakrishnan, Y. Cheng, J. Chu,
A. Jain, and B. Raghavan. Tcp fast open.
In Proceedings of the Seventh COnference
on Emerging Networking EXperiments
and Technologies, CoNEXT ’11, pages
21:1–21:12, New York, NY, USA, 2011.
ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-1041-3
Radhakrishnan et al. [2011]
Unfortunately, the existence of middleboxes can influence the nor-
mal operation of TFO. One major criticism of middleboxes is that
they might filter traffic that does not conform to expected behavior.
For example, they may drop SYN packets with data or with un-
known TCP options. In this work we force TFO connections from dif-
ferent vantage points, in different ports to evaluate the performance
impact of these drop behaviors.
5.1 TFO Operation
In this subsection we describe the TFO standard operation. Figure 5.1
and Figure 5.2 show the operation of TFO when the client connects
to the server for the first time. At the begging of a TCP connection,
the client creates a SYN packet with the TFO option enabled. IANA
assigned to TFO the option number 34, however, Linux currently
uses the old experimental TCP option 254. This option corresponds
to a TFO cookie request. Because no TFO connections have been
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established, the cookie is empty. Through this procedure the client in-
dicates that it supports TFO and it would like to receive a cookie. In
this first connection, no data are sent into the SYN packet. Practically,
connections benefit from TFO only after an initial TCP connection is
established (Figure 5.1).
Once the server receives the SYN with the TFO cookie request and
it supports TFO, it generates a message authentication code (MAC)
for the client, using the IP address of the client and its secret key. if
it does not support TFO it will ignore the TFO option and establish
a standard TCP connection. Then, it sends the cookie to the client in
the SYN-ACK packet, using the same TFO option and it establishes a
standard TCP connection (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: TFO cookie request.
The client, receiving the TFO cookie, caches it and the correspon-
dence to the server’s IP that sent it. The client will use the cookie to
establish a TFO connection to the same server in the next connec-
tion. When the client tries to connect to the server again, it sends a
SYN packet containing the TFO option enabled, the cookie previous
cached that corresponds at the server’s IP, and the application data.
When the server receives the SYN packet with the TFO option, the
cookie and the data, it generates the cookie and compares it to the
cookie sent by the client. If the cookie matches, the server sends a
SYN-ACK, acknowledging the SYN and the data, consecutively it
sends the data to the client. If the cookies do not match, the server
only acknowledges the SYN, including the new cookie to use next
time. Once the client receives the SYN-ACK, it checks the packet to
ensure that the server acknowledges also the data. If it is not the case,
the client sends the ACK to the server and successively it sends a
packet containing the application data, switching in a standard TCP
connection (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2: TFO cookie request.
5.2 TCP Fast Open: Experimental Setup
In this section we describe the methodology to measure in the wild
whether TFO is supported by the Internet paths. To this end we
recruit TFO users from Microworkers crowdsourcing platform. We
create a tool called ExploreTFO that allows users to connect to our
TFO server.
TFO requires client and server kernel support. To this purpose we
create a tool namely TFOExplorer.
TFOExplorer is composed by a client (from now on, TFO Client
(TC)), a target server that supports TFO protocol (from now on, TFO
Server (TS)) and a script needed to be run in the TC machine (from
now on, TFO Script (TSC)).
In order to test the successful of the TFO connections through
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the Internet we recruit TCs from the Microworkers crowdsourcing
platform. We collect and analyze the results from 46 TCs that try
to establish TFO connections in a large number of ports to our TFO
Server (TS) and over port 80 and 443 to Google servers.
Our methodology allows us to control the TCs and the TS at the
same time. Therefore, in the eventuality of a connection failure we
are able to know if the TC attempted to connect to our server.
TFO Server (TS). Server side, TFO protocol is available in Linux
3.7+. Moreover, nginx 1.5.8+ web server already supports it. We con-
figure a dedicated nginx web server version 1.6.2 with TFO support-
ing in 68 different ports, namely 10 well-known ports, 56 registered
ports and 2 ephemeral ports. We expect middleboxes along the path
change their behavior depending on the unusual application port,
for this reason we consider ports normally used by HTTP applica-
tions. Moreover we store and analyze in detail the server side packet
exchanges. If an error occurs in some ports, we analyze the packets
exchanges to monitor the behavior of the TCP with respect to the
middleboxes active along the path.
TFO Client (TC). Client side, TFO protocol is available in Linux
3.7+ or Android 5.0 (Lollipop). Browsers supporting TFO are
Chrome/Chromium on Linux, ChromeOS, and it needs to be en-
abled manually. Through an appropriate script we ensure that TCs
have a version of Linux > 3.7 to support TFO.
TFO Script (TSC). The TSC includes a TFO client, written in C
programming that allows workers to establish TFO connections to the
servers that support it and to send a HTTP GET directly into the SYN
packet.
The TFOExplorer allows us to control the client, capturing auto-
matically the packets exchange in the TC’s machine and sending the
files containing the results of the experiment directly to our server to
be analyzed.
The common procedure is as follows. We ask the workers to con-
nect to our server through a normal browser over port 80 and to fol-
low the instructions in our web page. Basically, they need to down-
load the TSC and run it in their Linux machine, using root privileges.
Once completed, a code appears in their screen, this will be the proof
for Microworkers payment.
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5.3 TFO: Initial Results
We collect and analyze the results from 46 users from 18 different
countries and 22 different ISPs. Each user tries to establish TFO con-
nections in a large number of ports to our TS. Considering that each
TC performs 68 connections to our TS three times (twice to perform
a complete TFO connection and one to send data in the initial SYN
packet), we build a dataset for a total of 9,568 connections 1. Table5.1
shows the results from workers that attempts to connect to our TS,
using TFO. Analyzing the data, we check for the following behav-
iors: TC is able to perform a TFO connection (label Successful); mid-
dleboxes drop packets with unknown TCP options and we receive
the SYN without option (label No option SYN); middleboxes drop
packets with unknown TCP options and we do not receive the SYN
without option (label No option no SYN); middleboxes drop packets
with data in the SYN packet and we receive the SYN without data
(label No data SYN); middleboxes drop packets with data in the SYN
packet and we do not receive the SYN without data (label No data no
SYN ).
TFO behavior Number of workers Number of workers (%)
Successful 19 41,3
No option SYN 18 39,13
No option no SYN 0 0
No data SYN 8 17,39
No data no SYN 1 2,18
Table 5.1: TFO connection
TFO behavior Number of workers Number of workers (%)
Successful 23 50
No data SYN 23 50
No data no SYN 0 0
Table 5.2: Data in the SYN
Results show that only the 41,3% of the packets with the TFO
experimental option are able to arrive to our TS. The 39,13TFO al-
lows for payloads to be carried in SYN frame. Once the client has
the cookie, it tries to send the data in the SYN. In this case, only the
67,86% of the packets are received by our TS. The remainder of the
packets arrive with no data in the SYN. In this case, middleboxes
block the connection completely after processing the SYN packet
with data, causing a connection timeout and the TC switches to a
standard TCP connection, retransmitting the SYN packet with no
option and no data. If, for example TFO connection fails in port 80,
then it fails in all other ports. We detect only three TCs that succeed
to perform a TFO connection in the Well-known and the Ephemeral
ports, but that fail in some Registered ports. Table5.2 shows the re-
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sults considering that case when TCs send data in the initial SYN
with no TFO option set. In this case, the 50% of the SYN packets con-
taining data is received by our TS, the rest of the packets are dropped
by middleboxes, forcing a SYN retransmission client side.

6 ECN++
Expicit Congestion Notification (ECN) 1 is a way to mark 1 D. B. K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd.
The Addition of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) to IP. RFC 3360
(Best Current Practice), Sept. 2001.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc3168. Accessed on 2019-02-02
K. Ramakrishnan [2001]
packets to indicate that the capacity of a link is approaching ex-
haustion. ECN was standardized as a straight replacement for loss
signals, but increasingly ECN is also being recognized as critical for
low delay. 2
2 M. Welzl and G. Fairhurst. The
Benefits of using Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN). Internet Draft
draft-ietf-aqm-ecn-benefits-08, Internet
Engineering Task Force, Nov. 2015.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-ecn-benefits. (Work in
Progress)
Welzl and Fairhurst [2015]
Despite early evidence of its positive impact Salim and Ahmed
[2000], a succession of unfortunate incidents stalled ECN deployment
for 15 years: some firewalls treated all TCP/ECN connection attempts
as port scanning attacks Floyd [2002]; TCP/ECN connection attempts
were mistakenly discarded by certain home router models and one
popular model crashed Thaler et al. [2007]; and when routinely wip-
ing the Diffserv field between networks, a bug wiped the IP/ECN
field too.
In recent years, ECN adoption on end-systems has accelerated,
with the majority of servers supporting ECN Trammell et al. [2015].
Currently, motivated by an increasing need to reduce queuing de-
lay in modern networks, solutions such as DCTCP Alizadeh et al.
[2010] in data centers or L4S 3 in public networks are further driving 3 B. Briscoe (Ed.), K. De Schepper, and
M. Bagnulo. Low Latency, Low Loss,
Scalable Throughput (L4S) Internet
Service: Architecture. Internet Draft
draft-ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch-00, Internet
Engineering Task Force, Apr. 2017.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-arch. (Work
in Progress)
Briscoe [Ed.]
interest in ECN. In 2016, Apple enabled client negotiation of TCP
ECN in a random subset of iOS and macOS devices. In March 2017
they presented a measurement study Bhooma [2017] showing almost
universal path traversal support for ECN. Other recent measurement
studies 4, 5 are consistent with these findings.
4 S. Bauer, R. Beverly, and A. Berger.
Measuring the State of ECN Readiness
in Servers, Clients, and Routers. In Proc
ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement
Conference (IMC’11)) ,, pages 171–180,
2011
Bauer et al. [2011]
5 B. Trammell, M. K’´uhlewind, D. Bop-
part, I. Learmonth, G. Fairhurst, and
R. Scheffenegger. Enabling Internet-
Wide Deployment of Explicit Conges-
tion Notification. In In Proc Passive &
Active Measurement (PAM’15) Conference,
2015
Trammell et al. [2015]
If both sender and receiver support ECN, they set up a feedback
loop between them with whatever transport layer protocol they are
using (TCP, RTP, etc) . Then at the IP layer the sender sets packets as
ECN-capable, which indicates that the end-systems would prefer the
network to mark rather than drop packets to indicate approaching
congestion.
This work focuses on using TCP over ECN in IP. The original ECN
specification for TCP K. Ramakrishnan [2001] prohibited retransmit-
ted packets and control packets from using ECN. This was unfortu-
nate, because TCP performance, particularly short-flow completion
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time, is much more sensitive to loss of certain control packets, such as
the SYN at the start of a connection.
A new proposal called ECN++ 6 proposes safe ways to remove all 6 M. Bagnulo and B. Briscoe. ECN++:
Adding Explicit Congestion Notifi-
cation (ECN) to TCP Control Pack-
ets. Internet Draft draft-bagnulo-
tcpm-generalized-ecn-04, Internet
Engineering Task Force, May 2017.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-bagnulo-tcpm-generalized-ecn.
(Work in Progress)
Bagnulo and Briscoe [2017]
the original prohibitions on using ECN on each type of TCP packet.
As with any new protocol, ECN++ can experience deployment prob-
lems, either because existing networks and servers protect themselves
against out-of-the-ordinary behavior, or because optimizations have
been built around a narrow and unchanging interpretation of the way
protocols work 7
7 M. Honda, Y. Nishida, C. Raiciu,
A. Greenhalgh, M. Handley, and
H. Tokuda. Is it still possible to ex-
tend TCP? In Proceedings of the 2011
ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet
measurement conference, pages 181–194.
ACM, 2011
Honda et al. [2011]
In this work we exploit the great potential of the MONROE mea-
surement platform for informing on the good functionality of ECN++
on mobile networks, which are plenty of middleboxes, and its inter-
action with the top 100k Alexa servers.
We do not just check for correct transitions of protocol fields, but
also characterize the TCP behavior of the servers we test. We leverage
the TBIT methodology, introduced by Padhye et al. 8 TBIT is a tool 8 J. Padhye and S. Floyd. On Infer-
ring TCP Behavior. Proc. ACM SIG-
COMM’01, Computer Communication
Review, 31(4):287–298, Oct. 2001. (Aka.
Identifying the TCP Behavior of Web
Servers)
Padhye and Floyd [2001]
designed specifically to characterize the TCP behavior of web servers
– to answer questions such as the distribution of TCP’s initial value
of the congestion window on servers in the wild. Spoofing conges-
tion markings has also been proposed for receiver compliance testing
by operational servers. 9
9 R. Sherwood, B. Bhattacharjee, and
R. Braud. Misbehaving TCP Receivers
Can Cause Internet-Wide Congestion
Collapse. Tech report UMD-CS-TR-
4737, UMD, 2005
Sherwood et al. [2005]
6.1 ECN Background
Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) is a standardized mecha-
nism 10 to signal congestion by marking a field in the Internet Pro- 10 D. B. K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd.
The Addition of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) to IP. RFC 3360
(Best Current Practice), Sept. 2001.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc3168. Accessed on 2019-02-02
K. Ramakrishnan [2001]
tocol headers. ECN 11 can be deployed in any buffer in any network
11 S. Floyd. TCP and Explicit Congestion
Notification. ACM SIGCOMM Computer
Communication Review, 24(5):10–23, Oct.
1994. (This issue of CCR incorrectly has
’1995’ on the cover)
Floyd [1994]
element. A bottleneck buffer will mark the standardized ECN field 12
12 D. B. K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd.
The Addition of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) to IP. RFC 3360
(Best Current Practice), Sept. 2001.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc3168. Accessed on 2019-02-02
K. Ramakrishnan [2001]
increasingly often as it detects early signs of increasing load. These
ECN markings then propagate to all the hosts receiving data through
the buffer. In turn, the receivers feed back these signals to the respec-
tive hosts that are sending them data. The aim is that data senders
will use this feedback to regulate the load on the bottleneck buffer.
ECN is intimately tied to Active Queue Management (AQM) tech-
nology. With AQM, buffers drop a small proportion of packets at
the first sign of queue growth to fool TCP senders into thinking the
buffer is full and backing off. ECN allows AQM to keep the queue
short without dropping packets.
6.1.1 ECN in IP
The ECN field has two bits, hence it supports the 4 codepoints in
Table 6.1. Before using ECN, the standard requires a data sender
to have checked that the receiver has logic for feeding back ECN
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Codepoint IP/ECN field Meaning
not-ECT 00 Not ECN-capable transport
ECT(0) 10 o
ECN-capable transport
ECT(1) 01
CE 11 Congestion experienced
Table 6.1: The ECN field in IP.
markings. Each transport protocol (TCP, SCTP, QUIC, etc.) does this
differently. If at least one end does not support ECN, there is not an
‘ECN-capable transport’ (ECT) so the sender must set not-ECT in all
packets, which is also what legacy hosts send by default. According
to 13, ECT(0) and ECT(1) are equivalent and either can be set by the 13 D. B. K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd.
The Addition of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) to IP. RFC 3360
(Best Current Practice), Sept. 2001.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc3168. Accessed on 2019-02-02
K. Ramakrishnan [2001]
sender to signify the packet is ECT, which means "ECN-capable but
not ECN-marked".
Network elements have to check the ECN field before using ECN.
If it is not-ECT (00), they must use drop rather than the CE codepoint
to indicate congestion. If the ECN field is non-zero, any buffer can
set the CE codepoint (11) increasingly often to indicate increasing
congestion.
Feedback
Packet
TCP ECN flags Allowed IP ECN
mode Description flags ECN ECN++
Non-ECN All ECN disabled 000 00 00
ECN
SYN ECN setup 011 00 00
SYN/ACK ECN setup 001 00 XX
Data
Regular 000 XX XX
Echo CE 001 XX XX
CWnd Reduced 010 XX XX
Control Same as data packet 00 XX
AccECN
SYN AccECN setup 111 00 XX
SYN/ACK
AccECN setup 010 00 XX
with CE Echo 110 00 XX
Data
CE counter XXX
XX XX
Control 00 XX
Table 6.2: Allowed IP ECN field for
all types of TCP packet in all three
feedback modes. X means 0 or 1.
6.1.2 ECN in TCP
Three flags in the main TCP header are assigned to ECN. They are
called NS, CWR and ECE for Nonce Sum, Congestion Window Re-
duced and Echo Congestion Experienced. These names are not de-
scriptive of their usage in most circumstances, so this paper will
represent them as a 3-bit codepoint, as shown in the ‘flags’ column of
Table 6.2.
Table 6.2 succinctly supports the following explanations of stan-
dard ECN (this Section), Accurate ECN (Section6.1.3) and ECN++
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(Section6.1.4). For the present explanation of standard ECN, ignore
the AccECN rows at the bottom and the ECN++ column on the right.
Also, the NS TCP flag is not used for standard ECN (always zero).
For the example of an ECN client contacting an ECN server, the
table should be read down the rows as follows. The client sends an
‘ECN setup SYN’ with TCP ECN flags 011 and the server responds
with an ‘ECN setup SYN/ACK’ with TCP ECN flags 001. Only 00
is allowed in the IP ECN field of both these handshake packets, as
shown in the ‘Allowed IP ECN’ column.
Once the TCP connection is established, ECN feedback proceeds
independently in either direction for the two half-connections. Reg-
ular data packets have 000 in the TCP ECN flags and, according to
the IP ECN column, the data sender can set either ECT codepoint
(XX means theoretically any of the 4 values in Table 6.1 are allowed).
Then, if congestion is experienced along the path, the buffer will set
the CE codepoint on some of these packets.
The data receiver will then feed this back by setting the Echo CE
(ECE) flag in the TCP header of acknowledgement (ACK). The data
sender then confirms receipt of a new ECE flag by setting the CWR
flag on the next segment, which confirms (or at least claims) that it
has reduced its congestion window (cwnd). For reliability against
loss of an ECE message, the data receiver is required to set the ECE
flag repeatedly on every ACK until it receives the CWR, one round
trip later.
6.1.3 Accurate ECN
Because the original ECN scheme repeats the ECE flag for a whole
round trip for reliability, more than one CE mark within a round trip
cannot induce any more feedback. Since 2010, it has become well-
known 14, 15 that queuing delay can be reduced to extremely low 14 M. Alizadeh, A. Greenberg, D. A.
Maltz, J. Padhye, P. Patel, B. Prabhakar,
S. Sengupta, and M. Sridharan. Data
Center TCP (DCTCP). Proc. ACM
SIGCOMM’10, Computer Communication
Review, 40(4):63–74, Oct. 2010
Alizadeh et al. [2010]
15 B. Briscoe (Ed.), K. De Schepper, and
M. Bagnulo. Low Latency, Low Loss,
Scalable Throughput (L4S) Internet
Service: Architecture. Internet Draft
draft-ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch-00, Internet
Engineering Task Force, Apr. 2017.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-arch. (Work
in Progress)
Briscoe [Ed.]
levels if more accurate feedback gives the extent, not just the exis-
tence, of CE-marking. This was first proved in Data Centres with
DCTCP Alizadeh et al. [2010], and subsequently for the public Inter-
net using the new Low Latency Low Loss Scalable throughput (L4S)
technology. 16
16 B. Briscoe (Ed.), K. De Schepper, and
M. Bagnulo. Low Latency, Low Loss,
Scalable Throughput (L4S) Internet
Service: Architecture. Internet Draft
draft-ietf-tsvwg-l4s-arch-00, Internet
Engineering Task Force, Apr. 2017.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-briscoe-tsvwg-l4s-arch. (Work
in Progress)
Briscoe [Ed.]
AccECN Briscoe et al. [2016] adds more accurate ECN feedback to
TCP. We introduce it in our testing, but we do not expect to find it in
the wild yet because standardization is not yet complete.
The handshake for a client and server supporting AccECN feed-
back can be seen in the AccECN setup SYN and SYN/ACK rows of
Table 6.2. We will not step through the table again, except to high-
light differences. The 110 combination of TCP ECN flags allows
feedback on the SYN/ACK in the event that the SYN arrives at the
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server with a CE mark, otherwise the SYN/ACK uses 010. This en-
ables the SYN to be ECN-capable (see ECN++ in Section6.1.4). Once
an AccECN connection is established, an AccECN data receiver uses
the ECN TCP flags as a 3-bit counter to continually repeat feedback
of a count of how many CE-marked packets it has received over the
half-connection. AccECN also uses a TCP Option for feedback in
bytes, but the 3-bit feedback is sufficient if the option does not sur-
vive traversal over the network.
Note that if a server supports a more recent mode of ECN feed-
back than that requested in the client’s SYN, the server downgrades
its response to match the client. For instance, an AccECN server will
respond to an ECN client as if it is an ECN server. Or, it will respond
to a non-ECN client as if it is a non-ECN server. Similarly, if the client
supports a more recent mode, it will recognize the server’s legacy
SYN/ACK response and downgrade itself.
6.1.4 ECN++
When ECN was first standardized, SYNs and SYN/ACKs were pre-
cluded from being ECN-capable at the IP layer. IP/ECN was simi-
larly prohibited for pure ACKs, window probes, and retransmissions
(termed ‘Control and RTX’ in Table 6.2). In 2005, the IETF sanctioned
an experiment allowing IP/ECN on the SYN/ACK, termed ECN+.
The ECN++ proposal has found ways to safely allow each type of
TCP control packet or retransmission to use IP/ECN, including FIN
(finish) and RST (reset) packets as seen in the rightmost column of
Table 6.2. ECN++ can be used with either standard ECN feedback
or AccECN feedback. Except, the SYN can only be ECN-capable in
the IP header if it requests AccECN feedback in the TCP flags (111).
This is because only AccECN provides space in the SYN/ACK for
feedback in the event that the SYN gets CE-marked.17 17 If the server does not support Ac-
cECN at all, for safety the client has to
behave as if it had received feedback of
a CE on the SYN.6.2 ECN++: Experiments
The goal of our experiments is to test how the ECN++ modifica-
tions to TCP/IP just described in Section6.1.4 would be treated in the
current Internet, particularly over mobile networks. In order to do
that, we designed two series of experiments. The first series of tests
explores how the different ECN++ related fields are treated by the
currently deployed base of network elements and servers. The second
series of tests measures how the congestion control algorithms run-
ning in deployed servers react to ECN+ congestion signals. In both
cases, we design our experiments to measure how equivalent non-
ECN and ECN packets are treated in order to compare them with the
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ECN++ measurement results.
6.2.1 ECN++ Support
As described in Section section 6.1 ECN++ enables the use of ECN
in TCP control packets and pure ACKs. The experiments to test
support for ECN++ exchange TCP control packets and pure ACKs
with different values in the ECN-related fields and check how those
packets are treated by the network and by servers. We next describe
the tests performed for each type of packet.
TCP SYN and TCP SYN/ACK. To test support for ECN++ in the
SYN and the SYN/ACK, we design the experiments to exchange
packets containing the values used by ECN++ in the ECN field of
the IP header and in the TCP ECN flags. We design two types of
experiments, namely, client-side experiments and client/server ex-
periments. In the client-side experiments, we only control the client
side that sends the TCP SYN packets against existing servers in the
Internet (Alexa top 100k servers). This allows us to learn information
about a large number of paths and about support for ECN++ in both
network elements and servers.
While client-side measurements provide a lot of information about
support for ECN++ in the SYN packet, it usually provides little infor-
mation about support for ECN++ in the SYN/ACK packet, since the
SYN/ACK packet is generated by a server that is out of our control
and does not support ECN++.
In the client/server experiments we control both the clients and
servers of the connection. This allows us to perform exhaustive
testing of all possible combinations of AccECN and ECN++ fields
both in the SYN and the SYN/ACK. However, these experiments are
limited to a few servers that we control, which also constrains the
number of paths traversed.
Client-side Experiments. To observe how the ECN field in the IP
header is treated by network elements we use Tracebox. 18 Tracebox 18 G. Detal, B. Hesmans, O. Bonaven-
ture, Y. Vanaubel, and B. Donnet.
Revealing Middlebox Interference with
Tracebox. In Proceedings of the 2013
Conference on Internet Measurement Con-
ference, IMC ’13, pages 1–8, New York,
NY, USA, 2013. ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-
1953-9. doi: 10.1145/2504730.2504757
Detal et al. [2013]
uses the same principle as traceroute (i.e., sends packets with increas-
ing TTL and receives an ICMP TTL exceeded error message from the
router that discards the original packet when the TTL reaches zero).
Tracebox uses information about the original packet returned in the
ICMP error message to identify any changes in the IP header.
We run Tracebox sending TCP SYN packets with different code-
points in the ECN field of the IP header enumerated in Table 6.2. We
executed these tests with all possible combinations of the CWR and
ECE flags. With this test, we check whether the ECN field is modi-
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fied, and if so at which hop along the path it is modified.
While Tracebox is very powerful for seeing how the fields in the
IP header are treated, it cannot detect the changes in the ECN flags
in the TCP header. This limitation stems from the fact that most
routers implement RFC792 19 which requires them to return only the 19 J. Postel. Internet Control Mes-
sage Protocol. RFC 792 (INTER-
NET STANDARD), Sept. 1981. URL
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc792.txt.
Updated by RFCs 950, 4884, 6633, 6918,
accessed on 2017-11-27
Postel [1981]
first 64 bits of the IP payload of the packet (leaving out all the ECN
related flags later in the TCP header) while a few routers implement
RFC1812 20 which requires them to return the full packet if possible.
20 F. Baker. Requirements for IP Ver-
sion 4 Routers. RFC 1812 (Proposed
Standard), June 1995. URL http:
//www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1812.txt.
Updated by RFCs 2644, 6633, accessed
on 2017-11-27
Baker [1995]
Because of this, we implement a test that directly sends SYN packets
from the clients we control to the Alexa top 100k servers with the
different values for the ECN codepoints and TCP flags used by ECN
and ECN++ as described in the rows corresponding to SYN packets
in Table 6.2.
This test enables us to check, through the reception of the
SYN/ACK, if the SYN was delivered to the server and the server pro-
cessed it. We can further identify how many servers use RFC3168 21 21 D. B. K. Ramakrishnan, S. Floyd.
The Addition of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) to IP. RFC 3360
(Best Current Practice), Sept. 2001.
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc3168. Accessed on 2019-02-02
K. Ramakrishnan [2001]
(Classic ECN) and how many servers use RFC5562. 22
22 A. Kuzmanovic, A. Mondal,
S. Floyd, and K. Ramakrishnan.
Adding Explicit Congestion Noti-
fication (ECN) Capability to TCP’s
SYN/ACK Packets. RFC 5562 (Ex-
perimental), June 2009. URL http:
//www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5562.txt.
Accessed on 2017-11-27
Kuzmanovic et al. [2009]
Client/Server Experiments. In these experiments we control the
client and the server side. We implement both a client and a server
side of the test that exchange every allowed ECN++ packet sequence.
We also test for the case where ECN is not used. We test for the pos-
sible SYN-SYN/ACK packet sequences involving the different code-
point/flag combinations described in the SYN and SYN/ACK rows
of Table 6.2.
Data packets, pure ACKs and FINs. We designed these experiments
to show how the ECN++ FIN and pure ACK packets are treated by
the network and the servers. We also measure how ECN-enabled
data packets are treated to establish a baseline for comparison. Like
previous experiments, we perform both client-side and client/server
experiments (i.e., we perform these experiments with the Alexa top
100k servers and with our own servers).
In the experiments, the client uses Tracebox with PureACKs, Data
packets, and FINs with the different combinations of the ECN code-
points and TCP flags included in the rows describing data packets,
and ’Control and RTX’ in Table 6.2. In all cases, the client establishes
a standard ECN TCP connection before sending the test packets.
6.2.2 Response to Congestion Signal
We execute a number of client-side experiments to determine how
the deployed base of ECN-enabled servers respond to ECN conges-
tion signals. In particular, we want to learn if the congestion response
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to a CE marked packet echoed through one or more packets with the
ECE flag set is equal to the response to three duplicate ACKs. We test
for the case when a data packet is marked with CE (regular ECN)
and the case when the CE marked packet is the SYN/ACK (ECN+
case). The approach we use is similar to the one used by TBIT. 23 For 23 J. Padhye and S. Floyd. On In-
ferring TCP Behavior. Proc. ACM
SIGCOMM’01, Computer Communication
Review, 31(4):287–298, Oct. 2001. (Aka.
Identifying the TCP Behavior of Web
Servers)
Padhye and Floyd [2001]
a given server, we measure the Initial Window (IW) of the TCP con-
nection. More in detail, first we crawl the server’s content to find a
file that is large enough so that the TCP connection is not application
limited in the downloading direction. Once we find such, we open a
TCP connection to download it. We define the MSS to 100B, so that
the Initial Window (IW) consumes as little as possible of the file24. 24 RFC6928 defined the IW to be 10 MSS
The client sends the HTTP GET and does not sends any ACK back
when packets arrive. Because the client is not sending any ACK back,
the server will timeout and will retransmit the first data packet. We
use the reception of the retransmission as a strong hint that the full
IW has been sent by the server, so we calculate the IW as the number
of bytes received since it first sent the GET.
After learning this, we establish a new TCP connection to the same
server and we pretend that the first data packet sent by the server has
experienced congestion (either pretending the packet is lost and by
sending 3 duplicated ACKs or by sending the ACK for that packet
with the ECE flag set) and we measure the resulting congestion win-
dow after such a congestion signal, learning the response to conges-
tion from the server in these two situations (CE mark, or packet loss).
In particular, we are able to learn if the response is the same for the
two congestion signals. We also perform this test pretending that the
packet that encountered congestion is the ACK of the TCP three way
handshake (3WHS), allowing us to test the congestion response for
servers that support ECN+.
6.2.3 Experimental Setup
We perform all the experiments we designed and described above
between January and May 2017. For the client-side experiments, we
use both the MONROE platform (mobile carriers) and PlanetLab
(wired service providers). The MONROE platform 25 is the first open 25 Ö. Alay, A. Lutu, R. García, M. Peón-
Quirós, V. Mancuso, T. Hirsch, T. Dely,
J. Werme, K. Evensen, A. Hansen,
et al. Measuring and Assessing Mobile
Broadband Networks with MONROE.
In World of Wireless, Mobile and Multi-
media Networks (WoWMoM), 2016 IEEE
17th International Symposium on A, pages
1–3. IEEE, 2016
Alay et al. [2016]
source 26 and open access hardware-based platform for indepen-
26 MONROE: Git repository, 2017.
https://github.com/monroe-project/
mon [2017]
dent, multihomed, large-scale experimentation in commercial mobile
environments. MONROE allows authenticated external users to ac-
cess the platform and deploy their own experiments. As explained
in Chapter2 the platform comprises hundreds of nodes multihomed
to three of the mobile providers in each of 4 EU countries (Spain,
Italy, Sweden, Norway). For the purpose of this study, we instrument
11 MONROE nodes distributed in all the countries with MONROE
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coverage. We measure the following mobile carriers: Vodafone (IT),
TIM (IT), WIND (IT), Orange (ES), Yoigo (ES), Movistar (ES), Telia
(SE), Telenor (SE), Three (SE), Telia (NO), Telenor (NO). To test wired
providers, we instrument 54 PlanetLab 27 nodes distributed in 25 27 B. Chun, D. Culler, T. Roscoe,
A. Bavier, L. Peterson, M. Wawrzo-
niak, and M. Bowman. PlanetLab: An
Overlay Testbed for Broad-coverage
Services. SIGCOMM Comput. Com-
mun. Rev., 33(3):3–12, July 2003a. ISSN
0146-4833. doi: 10.1145/956993.956995
Chun et al. [2003a]
networks over 22 countries.
All experiments test two TCP ports, namely port 80 and port
443. We execute all the tests both from the MONROE and Planetlab
nodes. In all cases, we test only IPv4 hosts. We run the experiments
we describe in Section6.2.1 and Section6.2.1 towards the Alexa top
100k web servers and to our own servers. We run the experiments
we describe in Section6.2.2 towards the Alexa top 500k web servers,
allowing us to also measure support for ECN in the wild. MONROE
nodes resolve the Alexa top-N websites using Google’s public DNS
resolver; not the mobile carrier’s default resolver. This enables us to
build a vast and complex dataset, which we open to the community.
For example, considering that each client attempts to send TCP SYN
packets with 4 different codepoints in the ECN field of the IP header
(Table 6.1) and TCP SYN and SYN/ACK packets with 5 different
combinations for the TCP flags (Table 6.2), we collect information for
a total of 26 million end-to-end communications, testing 6.5 million
different paths.
6.3 ECN++: Good News for ++, Bad News for ECN over Mo-
bile
In this Section, we describe the main findings of our measurement
study.
Bad news: 7.5 out of 11 Mobile operators tested bleach ECN
in outgoing packets. Using Tracebox in the MONROE nodes we
find that 7 out of 11 Mobile operators bleach the ECN field in the IP
header for all ECN codepoints in all packets going from the client
to the Internet, for all types of packets tested (SYN, data packets,
pure ACKS and FINs) and for both ports (80 and 443). The operators
bleaching ECN are: Yoigo (ES), Orange (ES), Vodafone (IT), TIM
(IT), Wind (IT), Telia (NO), Telia (SE). In all the bleaching cases, we
observe that the ECN field is cleared in the first hop (i.e., the mobile
operator is clearing it in its radio access).
One mobile operator (Movistar (ES)) bleaches the IP/ECN field
only for port 80 and not for port 443. Using the client/server exper-
iments, we learn that Movistar is using a web proxy that does not
support ECN 28. We find that two other providers, TIM and Voda- 28 We observe that the TCP 3WHS is
established between the client and
the proxy first and when the HTTP
GET is issued, the proxy establishes a
connection with the server
fone, also use a proxy on port 80.
For the three mobile operators that honor the IP/ECN field in
outgoing packets, (Telenor(NO), Telenor(SE) and 3 (SE)), we observe
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that 0,53% of paths bleach the ECN field of outgoing packets further
than 5 hops away. We find similar results in the experiments using
the PlanetLab clients (0,23% bleaching), which is consistent with
other measurements (see Chapter2).
Regarding incoming packets (towards the client), through
client/server experiments we find that all providers that do not use a
proxy honour the value in the ECN field. We verified this by sending
ECT marked packets from our servers to all the MONROE clients in
the different ISPs.
We conjecture that ECN bleaching could be due to a bug seen
occasionally since 2009, where routers apply a DiffServ policy for
bleaching the Differentiated Service Code Point (DSCP) that incor-
rectly wipes the ECN field as well (before 1998, both fields were
combined in the ToS field). We try to validate that hypothesis by cor-
relating changes to DSCP values and ECN bleaching. For this, we use
Tracebox with all possible IP/ECT codepoints (see Table 6.1) and a
random DCSP value. We find no correlation is possible because mo-
bile operators always change the DSCP. These results neither invali-
date nor confirm our hypothesis. We are in the process of contacting
the ISPs to try to validate it.
Given the majority of mobile carriers that bleach the IP/ECN
codepoint, we complement the set of mobile networks we measure
with 7 additional operators active in 4 countries other than the ones
with MONROE coverage (i.e., Elisa (FI), DNA (FI), Vodafone (DE),
Blau (DE), Vodafone (UK), O2 (UK), Base (BE)). For these, we run
a limited set of measurements only against four servers (two that
we control and two that run in the wild). We find that out of the
seven mobile carriers, 3 of them (DNA (FI), Vodafone (UK), O2 (UK))
present the same IP/ECN bleaching behavior in the first hop as the
other 7.5 carriers we identified in MONROE.
Good news: ECN fields do not cause packet drop. As previ-
ously mentioned, Tracebox is unsuited for measuring traversal of
the TCP/ECN flags because the deployed router base implements
RFC792. In our dataset, we find that only 2,4% of routers (11k out
of 468k) along the paths we tested are RFC1812-compliant. Through
our client-side, end-to-end tests, we find that, irrespective of the
TCP/ECN flags and IP/ECN codepoint combination, for the 6,5M
paths tested, the packets sent using different TCP/ECN value com-
binations are acknowledged by the other end. We find this to be true
for SYNs (we receive a SYN/ACK back), for data packets and FINs
(we received ACKs back). It is true both for mobile and wired op-
erators. This does not means the ECN related fields arrive at the
other end unchanged though (we know it is not the case for the
ECN field in the IP header, as per the previous finding). Through
ecn++ 61
the client/server experiments, we observe that while the IP/ECN
field is frequently bleached, all tested paths forward the TCP flags
unchanged, except for the paths going through the mobile operators
that use a non-ECN-capable proxy on port 80 (i.e., Movistar (ES) and
TIM(IT)). Vodafone (IT) uses an ECN-capable proxy that honors the
TCP flags.
Good news: ECN++ support is as good as ECN support. As de-
scribed in the two earlier findings, we observe that in the 6,5M paths
tested, ECN++ packets are treated by the network in the same way as
ECN packets. In other words, ECN bleaching occurs as often in SYN,
PureACKs and FIN packets as in data packets. The combinations of
the ECN related fields used by ECN++ are not discarded or bleached
more often than when used in ECN.
Good news: 61% of Alexa top 500k server supports ECN. We
used the results of the experiments we describe in Section6.2.2, which
we ran against Alexa top 500k web servers. Our finding corroborate
the acceleration of ECN deployment reported in previous work. 29 29 B. Trammell, M. K’´uhlewind, D. Bop-
part, I. Learmonth, G. Fairhurst, and
R. Scheffenegger. Enabling Internet-
Wide Deployment of Explicit Conges-
tion Notification. In In Proc Passive &
Active Measurement (PAM’15) Conference,
2015
Trammell et al. [2015]
We also observe that 3.51% of servers (10,709) support ECN in the
SYN/ACK, a slight increase over the 1.3% reported in. 30 Five of
30 B. Trammell, M. K’´uhlewind, D. Bop-
part, I. Learmonth, G. Fairhurst, and
R. Scheffenegger. Enabling Internet-
Wide Deployment of Explicit Conges-
tion Notification. In In Proc Passive &
Active Measurement (PAM’15) Conference,
2015
Trammell et al. [2015]
them answer with ECT(1) in the SYN/ACK, while the others use
ECT(0).
Good news: All the ECN-capable top-500k Alexa servers we
were able to test have the same response to ECE as to 3 DupACKs.
Out of the 305k Alexa servers that support ECN, we were able to test
158k of them for their congestion response to ECE marks. We found
that their response to an ECE mark is the same to the response to 3
DupACKs. We were unable to test the congestion response of 147k
servers for various reasons, including that we were unable to find
enough content to fill the IW; or that they were redirected.
Good news: At least, 51% of the Alexa top-500k servers support
IW of 10 segments. Additionally, out of the Alexa top-500k, 9.2%
support IW of 2 segments and 9.3% support IW of 4 segments. We
were unable to measure the IW of 74k (14%) of the servers because
we were unable to find enough data to fill IW.
Bad News: 0.4% of the Alexa top-500k servers use IW larger than
10. The 0.4% we observe account for 1,745 servers, all using an IW
larger than 10. Out of these, 1,121 servers deliver the whole file in
the first RTT (the largest IW observed is 585 packets of 100 Bytes).
Similar behavior was also previously reported in. 31 31 J. Padhye and S. Floyd. On In-
ferring TCP Behavior. Proc. ACM
SIGCOMM’01, Computer Communication
Review, 31(4):287–298, Oct. 2001. (Aka.
Identifying the TCP Behavior of Web
Servers)
Padhye and Floyd [2001]
Bad news: ECN+-enabled servers do not respond to congestion
in the SYN/ACK. For the 3.51% of servers of the Alexa top-500K that
respond with a SYN/ACK with the ECT codepoint, they all show
the same odd behaviour, which superficially seems like ECN+.32
32 H. Schulzrinne. Location-to-URL
Mapping Architecture and Framework.
RFC 5582 (Informational), Sept. 2009.
URL http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc5582.txt
Schulzrinne [2009]
However, none of them respond to an ECE flag in the ACK of the
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3WHS, none respond with a second non-ECT SYN/ACK, and none
reduce their initial congestion window, all contrary to the ECN+
RFC. Instead, they all enter Congestion Avoidance phase (i.e. in the
second RTT the congestion window is 1 MSS larger than IW).
Part II Measuring NATs in the Wild

7 Not all NATs are Equal: NATWatcher
From a functional perspective, NATs only naturally supports
client-server applications. The basic operation of a NAT relies on
the creation of a mapping state between a private address and port
pair and a public address and port pair. This state is created when
a client, using a private address, initiates a communication with a
server in the public Internet. Deploying applications that have an
alternative paradigm, such as peer-to-peer applications, gaming or
Voice-over-IP to name a few, that require hosts in the public Internet
to initiate communications towards hosts behind a NAT is challeng-
ing and requires the use of the so-called NAT traversal techniques.
These techniques are usually brittle and increase the latency, the traf-
fic and the energy consumed by the endpoint. In this work we mine
the obtained measurement results to identify common NAT profiles
and usage in fixed and mobile lines, providing valuable data for ap-
plication developers about the ground truth of NAT behavior in the
current Internet for taking informing protocol design decisions.
192.168.0.101
192.168.0.112
192.168.0.115
192.168.0.1
 
83.185.243.17
Figure 7.1: NAT operation.
7.1 NATs in Fixed Line
Network Address Translators (NATs) are now a commonplace
in the Internet and they are included by default in the Internet Ac-
cess offerings for both residential and mobile customers. Network
Address Translators (NATs) were introduced back in the early 90s
as a mean to cope with the incipient address depletion crisis. To-
gether with Classless Interdomain Routing (CIDR), they successfully
extended the lifetime of IPv4 from imminent depletion until very re-
cently, when the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) pool
of IPv4 addresses finally ran out.
NATs successfully extended the lifetime of the IPv4 indeed, but
at a high cost: they hardcoded the client-server paradigm in the
architecture of the Internet.
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While the aforementioned problem of supporting alternative appli-
cation paradigms is fundamental to the nature of the NAT operation,
it is exacerbated by the myriad of behaviors of the different NAT
implementations deployed in the Internet. Different NATs use dif-
ferent criteria to create, preserve and remove their internal mapping
state and have different filtering and forwarding rules. This severely
complicates the job of applications willing to manage the NAT state
in order to enable alternative communication models other than the
client server one as they need to cope with all possible NAT flavours.
In order to achieve a more deterministic behavior from the NAT
boxes, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) produced a number
of specifications defining the requirements that NATs should follow
when creating, preserving and removing their internal state as well
as some recommendations in terms of the different filtering and for-
warding policies that NAT should implement. In particular, the IETF
released NAT behavioral requirements for handling TTCP traffic 1, 1 S. Guha, K. Biswas, B. Ford, S. Sivaku-
mar, and P. Srisuresh. NAT Behavioral
Requirements for TCP. IETF, RFC 5382,
October 2008
Guha et al. [2008]
UDP traffic 2 and ICMP packets. 3 The goal of these requirements is
2 F. Audet and C. Jennings. Network
Address Translation (NAT) Behavioral
Requirements for Unicast UDP. IETF,
RFC 4787, January 2007
Audet and Jennings [2007]
3 P. Srisuresh, B. Ford, S. Sivakumar,
and S. Guha. NAT Behavioral Require-
ments for ICMP. IETF, RFC 5508, April
2009
Srisuresh et al. [2009]
to achieve a more deterministic behavior of NATs and hence signif-
icantly simplifying the job of deploying new application paradigms
in the Internet, fostering innovation and competition. However, since
these IETF standards specify the internal behavior for a NAT, it is far
from trivial to assess whether NATs are following the recommenda-
tions and to the best of our knowledge there is no information about
the prevalence of NAT boxes that honor the IETF specifications.
In this work, first we design and develop NATwatcher, a tool to
measure key aspects of the behavior of the deployed NAT base, along
with a measurement methodology based on crowdsourcing that
allows us to perform large scale measurement using NATwatcher
(§ 3).
7.1.1 IETF Standard for NATs
In this Section we describe all the requirements that the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) produced for NATs and specifically for
CGNs. In the next chapters we explain the methodology we used for
testing the following requirements.
TCP Requirements.
1. TCP mapping. NATs can be classified in 3 groups according to
their mapping behavior:
• Endpoint-Independent mapping: The NAT reuses the port
mapping for subsequent packets sent from the same private IP
address and port to any public IP address and port.
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• Address-Dependent mapping: The NAT reuses the port map-
ping for subsequent packets sent from the same private IP ad-
dress and port to the same public IP address, regardless of the
external port.
• Address and Port-Dependent mapping: The NAT reuses the
port mapping for subsequent packets sent from the same pri-
vate IP address and port to the same public IP address and port
while the mapping is still active.
2. IP address pooling and persistent. Some applications require that
same source IP address is used for the entire session. The NAT
should have an IP address pooling behavior of Paired. This means
that the same internal IP address should be mapped to the same
external IP for the entire duration of the session. The NAT can
have also an IP address persistent behavior (independently from
the IP pooling behavior). The IP address can be preserved over
time.
3. Supporting the Simultaneous Open Connection Establishment.
Simultaneous connections are used when 2 hosts want to reach
each other. In this case there is no a 3 way handshake, but 2 simul-
taneous connections (2 way handshake): each host sends a SYN
and receive the SYN of the other host, ACKs it and then wait for
its ACK. A NAT sometimes blocks the inbound SYN and blocks or
translate badly the outbound SYN/ACK.
4. TCP filtering. When an unsolicited packet is received from the
Internet, the NAT applies filtering rules that can be classified as
follows:
• Endpoint-Independent filtering: The NAT forwards any packets
destined to an internal host as long as a mapping exists.
• Address-Dependent filtering: The NAT filters packets received
from a specific external host to a specific internal host if the
internal host has not previously sent any packet to that specific
external host’s IP address.
• Address and Port-Dependent filtering: The NAT filters packets
received from a specific external host to a specific internal host
if the internal host has not previously sent any packet to that
specific external host’s IP address and port.
5. Unsolicited inbound SYN packets. A NAT MUST NOT respond
to an unsolicited inbound SYN packet for at least 6 seconds after
the packet is received. If during this interval the NAT receives and
translates an outbound SYN for the connection the NAT MUST
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silently drop the original unsolicited inbound SYN packet. Oth-
erwise, the NAT SHOULD send an ICMP Port Unreachable error
(Type 3, Code 3) for the original SYN. As well as verifying the
requirements of 6 seconds, we measure the time for the inbound
SYN packet response.
6. Source port selection. The NAT leaves the port unchanged when
creating a mapping and implement port parity, if so an even port
will be mapped to an even port, and an odd port will be mapped
to an odd port. This behavior is recommended from the RFCs.
Some applications expect that at least the port range is maintained.
7. Supporting hairpinning. Hairpinning enables a host in the home
network to access another host in the home network using the ex-
ternal IP address. As well as verifying the support of hairpinning,
we verify the “External source IP address and port" for hairpin-
ning.
8. Behaviour with respect to the ICMP Destination Unreachable.
The NAT should translate also this message.
9. Mapping and ICMP packets. The mapping should be maintained
after that an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet is received by
the NAT.
10. TCP Connectivity with the STUN Server. The NAT should
allow TCP STUN requests.
11. Packet modification. A NAT should maintain the packets it has
been sent.
UDP Requirements.
1. UDP mapping.
2. Source port selection.
3. Mapping lifetime over 2 minutes. NATs are required to maintain
UDP mappings during no less than 2 minutes.
4. Outbound refresh behavior. According to the UDP requirements,
outgoing packets must refresh the existing binding.
5. UDP filtering.
6. Supporting hairpinning.
7. Deterministic behavior. The NAT maintains the same mapping or
filtering during time.
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8. Unreachable ICMP packets. The mapping should be maintained
after that an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet is received by
the NAT.
9. Mapping and ICMP packets. Receipt of any sort of ICMP mes-
sage MUST NOT terminate the NAT mapping.
10. Supporting the “do not fragment” flag. The NAT should prop-
erly generate the “ICMP fragmentation needed” message when a
packet is received with the “do not fragment" flag set and discard
that packet.
11. Out-of-order UDP fragments. When packets are fragmented and
received out of order some NATs are required to try to reassemble
and then forward the packet.
ICMP Requirements.
1. ICMP query from internal.
2. ICMP query session less over 60 sec. An ICMP Query session
timer MUST NOT expire in less than 60 seconds.
3. Handling ICMP error packet. When an ICMP Error packet is re-
ceived, if the ICMP checksum fails to validate, the NAT SHOULD
silently drop the ICMP Error packet.
4. Refreshing mapping ICMP error packet. If a NAT device receives
an ICMP Error packet from the external realm, and the NAT de-
vice does not have an active mapping for the embedded payload,
the NAT SHOULD silently drop the ICMP Error packet. If the
NAT has active mapping for the embedded payload, then the NAT
MUST do the following prior to forwarding the packet
5. Error packet hairpinning. NATs are required to support hairpin-
ning for error messages.
6. Support of ICMP destination unreachable.
7. ICMP time exceeded.
8. Timestamp and Timestamp Reply Messages.
9. Source route options. A NAT device MAY support modifying
IP addresses in the source route option so the IP addresses in the
source route option are realm relevant. If a NAT device does not
support forwarding packets with the source route option, the NAT
device SHOULD NOT forward outbound ICMP messages that
contain the source route option in the outer or inner IP header.
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This is because such messages could reveal private IP addresses to
the external realm.
10. Address Mask Request/Reply Message.
11. Parameter Problem Message.
12. Non-QueryError ICMP Messages. A NAT MAY drop or appro-
priately handle Non-QueryError ICMP messages.
7.2 NATwatcher: Profiling NATs in the Wild
In order to test the aforementioned NATs behavior.
• First, we design and develop NATwatcher, a tool to measure key
aspects of the behavior of the deployed NAT base, along with a
measurement methodology based on crowdsourcing that allows us
to perform large scale measurement using NATwatcher.
• Second, using the proposed methodology, we perform a large
measurement campaign using the methodology explained before.
• Finally, we mine the obtained measurement results to identify
common NAT profiles, providing valuable data for application
developers about the ground truth of NAT behavior in the current
Internet.
Similarly to the methodology used in Section4.3.1, we use Mi-
croworkers platform to recruit workers around the world that are
using a NAT to connect to the Internet to run out NATwatcher tool in
order to characterize the behavior of their respective NAT.
7.2.1 NATwatcher: Methodology Overview
NATwatcher is the tool we build to detect the characteristics of a
NAT using a number of active tests. Figure 7.2 summarizes the op-
erational setup of NATwatcher. In a nutshell, the worker downloads
and executes the NATwatcher application. The NATwatcher ap-
plication automatically executes the tests to characterize the NAT
behavior, by sending different combinations of packets to our Mea-
surement server deployed in the public Internet and processes the
response packets sent from the server back to the NATwatcher client
(step 1 in Figure 7.2) . Once all the tests are completed the applica-
tion sends the compiled measurement results to a collector server
where they are stored (step 2 in Figure 7.2) and the code that can be
used to redeem the payment.
We designed NATwatcher to be suitable to be used in a crowd-
sourcing environment. In particular, we designed it to be as simple as
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Figure 7.2: NATwatcher operational
setup.
possible in order to be tractable for a large number of workers. Work-
ers are not required to have any technical background. Workers just
need to download and execute the NATwatcher application and all
data are automatically collected and reported to our collector server
without further worker intervention.
In order to reach a high number of workers, we developed three
versions of NATwatcher, one for Android, one for Windows and
one for Linux. We therefore create two crowdsourcing campaigns,
Android-based and Windows/Linux-based, which we detail next.
Android-based Campaign — This campaign requires the worker to
install our Android application. The worker then just have to launch
the application and all the tests are then run sequentially. In order
to ensure that workers’ Internet access is provided through a fixed
line (and not 3G, 4G, etc.), the application is instrumented to run the
microjob using the WiFi interface.
Windows and Linux-based Campaign — This campaign requires
workers to download the application and run it from a Windows or
Linux machine. The application takes care of all the measurements to
be performed as in the Android app. We asked workers to perform
the test from their own personal computers, using a fixed line.
We also deploy a measurement server, connected to the public
Internet. This server implements the server side of the tests described
below including the UDP tests, the UDP STUN tests and the TCP
STUN tests.
7.2.2 NATwatcher Tests
According to our experience, a microjob offered in a crowdsourcing
platform is less likely to be performed by a large number of workers
if it takes more than 5 minutes. In order to minimize of execution
72 informing protocol design through crowdsourcing measurements
time of the microjob, we carefully selected 17 key NAT characteristics
that NATwatcher will test for. We use the tests described in. 4 as 4 C. Jennings. Nat Classification Test
Results. IETF Internet Draft draft-
jennings-behave-test-results-04, July
2007
Jennings [2007]
starting point We then expand the tests set and adapt them to be
run in a crowdsourcing platform. We developed all the tests in C
programming language to be able to reuse the code through the
different platforms (i.e., Android, Windows and Linux). All the tests
are implemented crafting UDP, ICMP and TCP packets using Raw
Sockets or Standard Sockets whenever possible.
TCP Tests. For the first four tests enumerated below, we use the
same methodology than for UDP tests, but using TCP packets.
1. Mapping behavior: The test verifies if the NAT is Endpoint-
Independent, Address-Dependent or Address and Port-Dependent
with respect to the TCP mapping behavior.
2. Filtering behavior: This test verifies the filtering behavior of
the NAT with respect to TCP packets (Endpoint-Independent,
Address-Dependent and Address and Port-Dependent filtering).
3. Port preservation.
4. Hairpinning support: The test checks the support of hairpinning
for TCP packets.
5. Mapping and ICMP packets: This test verifies if the mapping is
maintained after that an ICMP Destination Unreachable packet is
received by the NAT.
UDP Tests.
1. Mapping behavior: The test verifies if the NAT assigns the same
mapping for communications between a specific internal IP ad-
dress and port and any external IP address and port for UDP
packets. NATs can be classified in 3 groups according to their
mapping behavior:
• Endpoint-Independent mapping: The NAT reuses the port
mapping for subsequent packets sent from the same private IP
address and port to any public IP address and port.
• Address-Dependent mapping: The NAT reuses the port map-
ping for subsequent packets sent from the same private IP ad-
dress and port to the same public IP address, regardless of the
external port.
• Address and Port-Dependent mapping: The NAT reuses the
port mapping for subsequent packets sent from the same pri-
vate IP address and port to the same public IP address and port
while the mapping is still active.
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The test is as follows: we first send two STUN binding requests5 5 The STUN protocol operates as fol-
lows: the client located behind the NAT
sends a binding request message to a
STUN server. The STUN server replies
with a response message containing the
IP address and port of the client in its
payload, as observed from the server.
to two different public addresses of our STUN server6. We com-
6 A STUN server has two public IP
addresses, the primary one and the
alternate one.
pare the address and port returned in the two STUN responses
received. If both the addresses and the ports match then we
conclude that the mapping behavior of the NAT is Endpoint-
Independent. If this is not the case, we send a third binding request
to our STUN server using the primary addresses used before and
a different port. If the address and port reported in the STUN re-
sponse is the same than the one reported before when using the
primary address and a different port, the NAT is Address dependent,
else the NAT is Address and Port-Dependent.
2. Filtering behavior: The test detects the filtering behavior of the
NAT. When an unsolicited packet is received from the Internet, the
NAT applies filtering rules that can be classified as follows:
• Endpoint-Independent filtering: The NAT forwards any pack-
ets destined to an internal host as long as a mapping exists.
• Address-Dependent filtering: The NAT filters packets received
from a specific external host to a specific internal host if the
internal host has not previously sent any packet to that specific
external host’s IP address.
• Address and Port-Dependent filtering: The NAT filters packets
received from a specific external host to a specific internal host
if the internal host has not previously sent any packet to that
specific external host’s IP address and port.
The test is as follows: We send a binding request to the primary
address of our STUN server with a change port and change address
attributes. These binding request attributes solicit the server to
send the response from the alternate IP address and port. If the
client receives the response, then the filtering behavior of the NAT
is Endpoint-Independent. If not, we send a third binding request to
the primary address with only change port. If the client receives a
response then the NAT is Address-Dependent Filtering, if not it is
Port-Dependent Filtering.
3. Port Preservation: This test checks if the NAT leaves the port
unchanged when creating a mapping. We send a packet using a
particular local source port and then we compare the port number
with the external bound port. If they match the NAT is performing
port preservation. If they do not match, it is possible that the NAT
does not implement port preservation, but it is also possible that
the specific port used as source port was already in use in another
mapping (from another internal host). Because of this limitation,
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this test only provides a lower bound to the number of NATs that
implement port preservation. It would be possible to increase the
accuracy of this test by repeating the test several times. However,
this would increase the time budget of the test, which we cannot
afford.
4. Hairpinning support: Hairpinning enables a host in the home
network to access another host in the home network using the
external IP address. In order to check it we send two packets: the
first one to discover our mapped address using STUN protocol
and the second one from a different source port and towards the
discovered mapped address. If we receive the response it means
the NAT supports hairpinning.
5. Supporting the “do not fragment" flag: the NAT should prop-
erly generate the “ICMP fragmentation needed" message when
a packet is received with the “do not fragment" flag set and dis-
card that packet. Our application sends a packet with the Do not
Fragment flag set and waits for the reception of the correspondent
ICMP message.
6. Out-of-order UDP fragments: When packets are fragmented and
received out of order some NATs are required to try to reassem-
ble and then forward the packet. In order to check this behavior,
we send from our server disordered fragments and check their
reception in the application.
7. Mapping lifetime over 2 minutes: NATs are required to main-
tain UDP mappings during no less than 2 minutes. In order to
check this, we send a first binding request to our server and after
2 minutes we send another binding request using a different port
but specifying that the response should be sent to the previous
binding. If the answer is not filtered, it means that the previous
mapping has been preserved.
8. Outbound refresh behavior: According to the UDP requirements,
outgoing packets must refresh the existing binding. This test is
similar to the previous one, except that an additional outgoing
packet is sent one minute after the initial binding request and the
second binding request is sent after 3 minutes.
ICMP tests.
1. Reply/Request of ICMP packets: The test verifies if the NAT sup-
ports simple ICMP Reply/Request message exchange by sending a
query and waiting for the answer.
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2. Supporting of ICMP Destination Unreachable: This test verifies
the NAT is capable of forwarding ICMP Destination Unreachable
messages generated as a response to a previous UDP packet. We
send an UDP packet to our server and the server replies with
Destination Unreachable behavior. We then verify is the ICMP
error is received by the NATwatcher client.
3. Supporting of ICMP Time Exceeded: Same as the previous one
but for ICMP Time Exceeded messages.
4. Supporting error packet hairpinning: NATs are required to sup-
port hairpinning for error messages. NATwatcher check this by
sending two packets, the first one to discover our mapped address
using STUN protocol and the second one is an ICMP Echo Error
message sent to the mapped address from a different port. The
NATwatcher verifies the reception of the error message.
We implement all the tests described before in the Linux and Win-
dows versions of NATwatcher. However, 9 of the 17 tests need root
permissions for their execution and unfortunately, Android devices
are not commonly rooted. For this reason we implement only 8 over
17 NATwatcher tests in the case of the Android app. Specifically we
implement test number 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8 for UDP NAT behavior and
tests number 1, 2 and 4 for TCP behavior.
Figure 7.3: Worldwide distribution of
vantage points.
7.3 NATwatcher: Results and Dataset
In this Section, we present the collected data set, and we analyze the
obtained results.
7.3.1 Crowdsourcing Campaign
We defined two campaigns, one for the Windows/Linux-based appli-
cation (each worker attempts 17 tests) and the other one for Android
(each worker attempts 8 tests) and both were available for 28 days
during June 2016. Overall, we recruited 781 workers: 170 workers
participated in the Windows/Linux-based campaign, while 611 work-
ers participated in the Android-based one.
After the campaigns, our data-set consists of 7,778 unique tests
results.
Overall, workers are distributed among 65 countries (cf. Figure
7.3). The devices cover more than 280 ISPs for a total of 120 different
OUIs. 7 7 We use the WHOIS database to re-
trieve the ISP from the public IP ad-
dress of each NAT and we use the MAC
address of the NAT to retrieve the OUI.
Since some vendors use multiple OUIs
or rebrand other products, we clarify
that when we refer to 120 different
vendors in the paper we refer to 120
different OUIs.
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Protocol NATwatcher tests NAT behavior Number of devices(%)
UDP
Mapping behavior Endpoint-Independent mapping 80.9%
Address-Dependent mapping 0.7%
Address and Port-Dependent mapping 18.4%
Filtering behavior Endpoint-Independent filtering 14.63%
Address-Dependent filtering 1.79%
Address and Port-Dependent filtering 83.56%
Port Preservation Yes 78.2%
No 21.8%
Supporting hairpinning Yes 15.5%
No 84.5%
Supporting the “not fragment" flag Yes 100%
No 0%
Supporting receiving UDP fragments out-of-order Yes 100%
No 0%
Mapping lifetime over 2 minute Yes 12.5%
No 87.5%
Outbound refresh behavior Yes 86.03%
No 13.97%
ICMP
Reply/Request of ICMP packets Yes 84.8%
No 15.2%
Supporting of ICMP Destination Unreachable Yes 69.6%
No 30.4%
Supporting of ICMP Time Exceeded Yes 91.22%
No 8.78%
Supporting error packet hairpinning Yes 83.04%
No 16.96%
TCP
Mapping behavior Endpoint-Independent mapping 78.4%
Address-Dependent mapping 0.6%
Address and Port-Dependent mapping 21%
Filtering behavior Endpoint-Independent filtering 12.5%
Address-Dependent filtering 4.85%
Address and Port-Dependent filtering 82.65%
Port Preservation Yes 78.2%
No 21.8%
Supporting hairpinning Yes 15.5%
No 84.5%
Mapping and ICMP packets Mapping is maintaining after receiving 29.8%
Mapping is not maintaining after receiving 70.2%
Table 7.1: IETF NAT requirements
compliance results, based on the NAT-
watcher test.
7.3.2 General Results
Table 7.1 summarizes the results for both campaigns. For each test
we show the percentage of NATs that follow a particular behavior.
We color in grey the IETF recommended behaviors.
We can see that for 11 out of 17 there is wide compliance with the
IETF sanctioned behavior (for these 11 tests, more than 80% of the
analyzed NATs follow the recommended behavior). For the remain-
ing 6 tests, the large majority of tests NAT boxes do not follow the
IETF recommendation.
Most of the measured NATs models implement UDP and TCP
Endpoint-Independent mapping, support UDP not fragment flag and
receiving UDP fragments out-of-order, moreover most of them follow
all the ICMP requirements. All these requirements are reported as
a MUST in 8, 9 and 10. For the rest of the tests the success rate de- 8 S. Guha, K. Biswas, B. Ford, S. Sivaku-
mar, and P. Srisuresh. NAT Behavioral
Requirements for TCP. IETF, RFC 5382,
October 2008
Guha et al. [2008]
9 F. Audet and C. Jennings. Network
Address Translation (NAT) Behavioral
Requirements for Unicast UDP. IETF,
RFC 4787, January 2007
Audet and Jennings [2007]
10 P. Srisuresh, B. Ford, S. Sivakumar,
and S. Guha. NAT Behavioral Require-
ments for ICMP. IETF, RFC 5508, April
2009
Srisuresh et al. [2009]
creases dramatically. In particular it is interesting to see less than 16%
of the devices fulfill the requirements on UDP and TCP Endpoint-
Independent filtering, hairpinning support and mapping lifetime
over 2 minutes. The Endpoint-Independent filtering is not a manda-
tory requirement, but it is highly recommended if transparency is a
priority. If security is the priority, NAT should follow an Address-
Dependent filtering, but as results show, the majority of NATs set an
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Address and Port-Dependent filtering. Applications such as online
gaming for instance would not benefit from this kind of behavior.
Hairpinning and binding lifetime over 120 seconds are two
mandatory requirements for UDP. Most of the NATs do not support
these features as the failure rate is higher than 84% for these tests.
Port preservation support is recommended particularly for out-
going TCP connections, in order to allow NAT port prediction. In
our results, we find a lower bound of 78% of devices that use port
preservation.
Results show that about 70% of NATs delete the TCP mapping if
an ICMP error message is received affecting that specific mapping.
This is strongly recommended against in 11 as it exposes the NAT 11 S. Guha, K. Biswas, B. Ford, S. Sivaku-
mar, and P. Srisuresh. NAT Behavioral
Requirements for TCP. IETF, RFC 5382,
October 2008
Guha et al. [2008]
to attacks relying on ICMP error messages to delete existing NAT
bindings.
7.3.3 NAT Classification
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Figure 7.4: Configuration number vs.
device ID.In this subsection we identify the most common NAT configura-
tions. For this analysis we only consider the 8 of the tests have been
performed for all the tested NAT devices (i.e. the 8 tests that are exe-
cuted in all the campaigns). We characterize a configuration through
the different combinations of the results of these 8 tests. We identified
19 different configurations across the 781 NATs we tested. We detail
in Table7.2 the configurations that appear in more than 5 devices (11
out of 19).
We assign the number to each configuration basing on the IETF
requirement compliance (i.e., we named “1" the configuration with
higher RFC requirements compliance and the one with less RFC
requirements compliance is the number “19"). For example, configu-
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2 E.I. E.I. 3 A.P.D. A.P.D. 3 3 5.5
18 A.P.D. A.P.D. E.I. A.P.D. 5.2
5 E.I. E.I. A.P.D. A.P.D. 2.5
1 E.I. E.I. 3 E.I. E.I. 3 3 2
11 E.I. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. 1.8
17 A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. 3 1.5
4 E.I. E.I. E.I. E.I. 1.15
7 E.I. A.D. E.I. A.D. 0.8
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19 A.P.D. A.P.D. E.I. A.D. 3 0.8
8 E.I. A.P.D. E.I. A.P.D. 3 0.65
Table 7.2: Most common NAT config-
urations. For each configuration it is
reported the behavior with respect to
each test. An Endpoint-Independent be-
havior is reported as E.I., A.D. indicates
Address-Dependent and A.P.D. de-
scribes an Address and Port-Dependent
behavior. For other tests RFC require-
ments compliance are shown with a
tick.
ration number 1 in Table II is the configuration recommended in the
different RFCs, which has UDP Endpoint-Independent mapping and
filtering, TCP Endpoint-Independent mapping, supports hairpinning
and the UDP mapping lifetime is over 2 minutes. We consider this
configuration “open", meaning that transparency is the top priority
compared to security.
Overall 52.5% of devices implement the configuration number
9. The devices come from over 50 countries and 173 unique ISPs,
for a total of 72 different vendors. The most common configuration
includes Endpoint-Independent mapping for UDP and TCP and the
filtering as strict as possible (Address and port dependent).
This is a clear trend towards security for the rest of configura-
tions, as only 4 over 11 NAT configurations implement Endpoint-
Independent filtering behavior.
Table II also shows that for both UDP mapping lifetime and the
hairpinning, the majority of analyzed devices fail to comply with the
IETF recommendations.
7.3.4 Vendors and ISPs
In this Section we try to figure out if the adoption of a certain com-
mon NAT configuration depends on the vendor or on the ISP.
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Figure 7.4 shows the configuration number for each tested device.
The devices (in the horizontal axis) are ordered first by vendor (Fig-
ure 7.4 (a)) and second by ISP (Figure 7.4 (b)). Each vendor/ISP is
delimited by a vertical line. Devices from vendors/ISPs present in
our data set with not more than 2 devices are grouped after the last
line on the right.
Apart from a clear trend to use configuration number 9, as men-
tioned earlier, we observe some “open" configurations for few van-
tage points in some vendors. This can be explained considering that
users can change the basic configuration that vendors impose by de-
fault to accommodate the NAT to their own needs (i.e., activating
hairpinning or Endpoint-Independent filter).
In Figure 7.4 (b), we identify 2 ISPs (identified by arrows) where
the behavior for all NATs connected to these ISPs is very uniform,
exhibiting one or two configurations. These two ISPs are mobile
ISPs that provide 3G and LTE Internet access services. Given that
NATwatcher only runs using the WiFi interface and not the cellular
one, this means that the NATwatcher client was executed in a mo-
bile phone connected to a hotspot which in turn was connected to
the Internet using 3G or LTE. We believe it is safe to conclude that in
these cases, the NATwatcher client was behind two cascaded NATs,
the one from the WiFi access point and the one from the mobile op-
erator. This means that when the client executes NATwatcher, the
results reflect the superposition of both NATs along the path, reflect-
ing the more restrictive behavior of the two, which is likely to the one
of the NAT of the mobile operator explaining the uniform behavior
observed.

8 Tracking and Characterizing CGNs in Fixed Lines
Europe and U.S.
In light of the IPv4 address scarcity problem, another ap-
proach towards prolonging the life of current IPv4 address allo-
cations is to deploy Carrier Grade NATs (CGNs), where Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) share the same public IPv4 address across
multiple end users. CGNs may introduce a number of issues for
end users, service providers, content providers and government au-
thorities. 1 There is some evidence that CGNs can cause dropped 1 M. Ford, M. Boucadair, A. Durand,
P. Levis, and P. Roberts. Issues with IP
Address Sharing. RFC 6269, June 2011
Ford et al. [2011]
services in peer-to-peer applications, and lead to low performance
of file transfer and video streaming sessions. 2 CGNs also introduce
2 C. Donley, L. Howard, V. Kuarsingh,
J. Berg, and J. Doshi. Assessing the
Impact of Carrier-Grade NAT on
Network Applications. RFC 7021,
September 2013
Donley et al. [2013]
security challenges including traceability of IP addresses and anti-
spoofing. Despite these challenges, CGNs offer an immediate relief to
the IPv4 address scarcity problem, so it is likely that their popularity
will increase over time.
8.1 CGNs in Fixed Line
The use case for CGN differs in wireline vs. mobile networks. Given
the rapid boost in the number of operational Internet-enabled mo-
bile devices, and the scarcity of available IPv4 address space, mobile
operators usually assign the same public IP address to multiple end
users. Hence, some form of CGN technology has always been the
norm, rather than the exception. 3 4 In wireline networks, however, 3 Z. Wang, Z. Qian, Q. Xu, Z. Mao,
and M. Zhang. An Untold Story of
Middleboxes in Cellular Networks.
In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM
2011 Conference, SIGCOMM ’11, pages
374–385, 2011. ISBN 978-1-4503-0797-0
Wang et al. [2011]
4 S. Triukose, S. Ardon, A. Mahanti,
and A. Seth. Geolocating IP Addresses
in Cellular Data Networks. In Passive
and Active Measurement, pages 158–167.
Springer, 2012
Triukose et al. [2012]
end users are typically assigned public IPv4 addresses. While this sit-
uation may change as IPv4 addresses become increasingly scarce and
ISP customer bases continue to grow, there is no source of systematic
measurements of the prevalence or evolution of CGN deployments in
ISPs.
In order to achieve a more deterministic behavior from the CGNs,
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) produced a number of
specifications defining the requirements that NATs should follow
when creating, preserving and removing their internal state as well
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as some recommendations in terms of the different filtering and for-
warding policies that CGNs should implement. 5 However, it is far 5 S. Perreault, I. Yamagata, S. Miyakawa,
A. Nakagawa, and H. Ashida. Common
Requirements for Carrier-Grade NATs
(CGNs). RFC 6888, April 2013
Perreault et al. [2013]
from clear to what extent the currently deployed CGN base com-
plies with the aforementioned requirements. Learning the behaviour
of currently deployed CGNs is an important input for application
and protocol designers, so that they can adapt their design to work
properly in the Internet.
There is also the concern that CGNs utilization may result in per-
formance penalties. It is a common operational practice that a single
CGN serves a very large number of mobile nodes (up to millions
of devices per CGN). Because of this, the CGN itself may become
a bottleneck and impose performance penalties to the communica-
tion. This is especially so for the case of the first packet that creates
the NAT mapping, but it may also affect traffic forwarding once the
mapping has been established. Measuring and understanding the
performance penalties resulting from the use of CGNs is important
for application designers, for end users and for mobile operators
adopting the CGN technology. (e.g. for application designers, this
information should affect the maximum number of communications
open in parallel). This input is very relevant for a measurement plat-
form such as MONROE, since the performance penalties if exist can
affect and bias the measurement results.
8.1.1 CGNs Usage in a Famous ISP in Italy
During our studies on CGNs we were very keen on learning about
operational CGN solutions in the Internet, deployment architectures
and CGN configurations. We contacted various ISPs and we got some
information about the usage of CGNs on an ISP in Italy:
• The reason for deploying a CGN solution is the IPv4 depletion.
• The customer of the IP Ratio is 1 to 8.
• They deploy CGN at each ISP PoP, they have actually deployed
about 20 PoP.
• The estimation of the size of the IPv4 address pool they configure
at each CGN is typically /20.
• For each CGN they assign Min 32768 – Max 65536 users.
8.2 Tracking the Big NAT across Europe and the U.S: Revelio
We perform a large scale active measurement campaign to detect
CGNs in fixed broadband networks using NAT Revelio. 6 Revelio 6 A. Lutu, M. Bagnulo, A. Dhamdhere,
and K. Claffy. NAT Revelio: Detecting
NAT444 in the ISP. In International
Conference on Passive and Active Network
Measurement, pages 149–161. Springer,
2016
Lutu et al. [2016]
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enables us to actively determine from within residential networks
the type of CGN. Our contributions are twofold. First, we performed
a large measurement campaign to detect CGN in fixed broadband
access networks. Second, as a result of this large-scale measurement
campaign, we added additional tests to Revelio to decrease the prob-
ability of false positives when quantifying the degree of CGN pene-
tration in broadband providers.
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Figure 8.1: Revelio experimental setup
for a DSL access network (the DSLAM,
BRAS and CR are standard elements
in the DSL architecture). The Revelio
client runs on a device connected to the
home network, whose exact topology we
do not know. In the case of (a) standard
DSL network access, the CPE performs
the translation to the GRA, thus it is the
GRA-NAT. In the case of (b) standard
DSL network configuration with NAT444
deployment, the CGN is the one performing
the translation to the GRA, thus it is the
GRA-NAT.
In Figure 10.4 we depict the residential setup we consider for
Revelio in the context of a DSL access network. The home network
may have an arbitrary topology consisting of multiple hosts, routers
and switches including multiple levels of NATs. The home network
connects to the Internet through the Customer Premises Equipment
(CPE) also known as “home router" or “home gateway". The access
link connects the CPE with the ISP access network. In the case of DSL
technology, the access network includes the digital subscriber line
access multiplexer (DSLAM), the broadband remote access server
(BRAS) and the Core Router (CR). The ISP network connects with the
rest of the Internet.
In terms of IP addressing, the home network generally uses pri-
vate IP address space. The home gateway usually performs the NAT
function (home-NAT) from the private addresses within the home
network to the addresses used in the ISP access network which may
be public, private or shared. 7 In some cases, end-users can config- 7 J. Weil, V. Kuarsingh, C. Donley,
C. Liljenstolpe, and M. Azinger. IANA-
Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Ad-
dress Space. RFC 6598, April 2012
Weil et al. [2012]
ure several different realms of private addresses within their home
network in the context of cascaded home NATs. Independently of the
home network topology, when a host within the home network com-
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municates with a host in the rest of the Internet, the private address
used by the host in the home network translates to a public address
that we call the Globally Routable Address (GRA). For the majority
of the residential Internet market, the ISP configures the GRA on
the Internet-facing interface of the CPE and the NAT function in the
CPE translates from the private addresses in the home network to
the GRA. 8 An alternative, incipient, setup is one including an ad- 8 S. M. Garland and D. B. Smith. Com-
munications Between Service Providers
and Customer Premises Equipment,
Dec. 26 2000. US Patent 6,167,042
Garland and Smith [2000]
ditional NAT function that operates in the ISP network (in addition
to the NAT function in the CPE) and performs the final translation
to the GRA. These configurations are usually called Carrier Grade
NAT (CGN), Large Scale NAT (LSN) or NAT444. In this case, packets
flowing between the home network and the Internet go through two
upstream NAT-capable devices: the CPE (customer grade NAT) and
the ISP NAT (Carrier-Grade NAT). The goal of the Revelio method-
ology is detect CGNs by distinguishing whether the NAT function
translating to the GRA is located within the home network or it is
located in the ISP network.
In order to discern where the translation to the GRA occurs, Rev-
elio performs active tests from a device connected to the home net-
work. The probe running Revelio connects to the home network and
may or may not be directly connected to the CPE, i.e., there may be
multiple hops, including ones performing NAT function(s), between
the probe and the CPE. The target of the active tests the probe per-
forms are servers located in the Internet (Figure 10.4). NAT Revelio
does not require any cooperation from the ISP beyond forwarding
Internet packets to and from the customer.
8.2.1 Revelio Methodology Overview
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of Revelio is to detect whether
the device performing the translation to the GRA (hereinafter, the GRA-
NAT) resides in the home network or in the ISP network. In order to do
this, Revelio attempts to pinpoint the location of the GRA-NAT with
respect to the access link. If the GRA-NAT lies between the probe and
the CPE, we conclude that the user is not behind a CGN. If the GRA-
NAT lies after the CPE, we conclude that the ISP deploys CGN. In
order to achieve this, Revelio needs to determine the location of the
GRA-NAT and the location of the access link with respect to the probe
and compare them.
Initial Revelio tests. To determine the location of the GRA-NAT,
Revelio performs the following steps: 1) discovers the GRA by run-
ning STUN 9 against a public STUN Server located in the Internet 9 J. Rosenberg, R. Mahy, P. Matthews,
and D. Wing. Session Traversal Utilities
for NAT (STUN). RFC 5389, October
2008a
Rosenberg et al. [2008a]
(FCC MBA) or by using the Atlas API (RIPE Atlas); 2) runs traceroute
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to the GRA, computing the number of hops from the probe to the
GRA-NAT;
The determination of the location of the access link is challenging
because we aim to support arbitrary topologies in the home network
and we do not have any prior information about where in the home
network the probe connects. To determine the location of the access
link we make the following assumption: the propagation delay of the
access link is one order of magnitude or higher than the propagation
delay of the links in the home network. We believe this is a realistic
assumption for the different access technologies and home network
technologies available in the market and it is supported by existing
empirical evidence. 10 In order to locate the access link, we estimate 10 S. Sundaresan, W. De Donato,
N. Feamster, R. Teixeira, S. Crawford,
and A. Pescapè. Broadband Internet
Performance: a View from the Gateway.
In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communi-
cation Review, volume 41, pages 134–145.
ACM, 2011
Sundaresan et al. [2011]
the propagation delay of different links between the probe and an
arbitrary target server in the Internet using pathchar. 11 Pathchar is a
11 A. B. Downey. Using Pathchar to
Estimate Internet Link Characteristics.
In Proceedings of the Conference on Appli-
cations, Technologies, Architectures, and
Protocols for Computer Communication,
SIGCOMM ’99, 1999
Downey [1999]
well-known technique for estimating transmission and propagation
delays along the path using multiple traceroute measurements with
different packet sizes. Since we only need to estimate the order of
magnitude of the delays, the precision of pathchar is sufficient. Using
the propagation delays measured by pathchar, we determine the ac-
cess link as the first one with a propagation delay at least one order
of magnitude higher than the previous links.
By comparing the respective locations obtained for the GRA-NAT
and for the access link, we can establish whether the GRA-NAT is
located before the access link (no CGN) or after the access link (ISP
uses CGN).
Supplementary Revelio tests. In addition to the main detection
tests, the Revelio client performs two other tests to gain additional
insight about the presence of CGNs. In particular, Revelio performs
the following tests:
Invoke UPnP actions. If the probe directly connects to the CPE
(i.e., the access link is one hop away), Revelio tries to run the UPnP
protocol 12 from the probe to retrieve the IP address of the WAN- 12 UPnP Forum. UPnP Speci-
fications. http://upnp.org/
sdcps-and-certification/standards/.
Accessed: 2016-06-17
upn
facing interface of the CPE. If this IP address matches the GRA, we
conclude that there is no CGN. Otherwise, if the UPnP query returns
a private/shared address, Revelio detects an upstream CGN.
Private/shared addresses along the path: To detect the access
link location, Revelio runs multiple traceroute measurements to a
fixed target. This enables us to retrieve the IP addresses operators
configure in their network. We then search for private and shared
addresses after the access link. The detection of private/shared ad-
dresses after the access link alone does not imply the presence of an
upstream CGN, but it serves as a hint that the ISP might be operating
one. In particular, the presence of shared addresses after the access
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link provides a stronger indication about the presence of CGNs, be-
cause this address block is specifically reserved for CGN deployment
13 13 J. Weil, V. Kuarsingh, C. Donley,
C. Liljenstolpe, and M. Azinger. IANA-
Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Ad-
dress Space. RFC 6598, April 2012
Weil et al. [2012]8.2.2 Evolving Revelio
After the first phase of the large scale measurement campaign (May
2016) with Revelio on RIPE Atlas and FCC MBA and communicating
with several of the ISPs we measure, we identified some corner cases
that may confuse Revelio, which we describe in detail below. The
common link between these corner cases is the fact that they counter
the logic of the access link detection approach we integrated in the
original Revelio test-suite. Given Revelio’s reliance on the correct de-
tection of the access link location, incorrectly mapping non-standard
home network topologies leads to false positives. To tackle these
particular issues and increase the robustness of Revelio, we enhance
the original methodology by adding the following two tests to the
test-suite.
Pathchar to the GRA. We identified 165 home gateways that
replied to traceroute to the GRA as if they were two hops (148 in
RIPE Atlas and 17 in FCC MBA), thus generating spurious links in
the results. When processing the traceroute to the GRA from the
probe, the home gateways generate one reply from the internal in-
terface (for packets with TTL=n) and a second reply from the ex-
ternal WAN-facing interface that assigns the GRA (for packets with
TTL=n+1). When running pathchar to the external server, however,
the home gateway only replies to traceroute from the internal in-
terface (for packets with TTL=n), while the subsequent reply comes
from the following hop (for packets with TTL=n+1). This behavior
breaks the Revelio methodology because the GRA appears to be one
hop farther from the probe than it actually is, making us believe that
the GRA-NAT is past the access link. We detected this behaviour in
several models of home routers, including SpeedPort or FritzBox.
In order to control for these cases, we run pathchar from the probe
to the GRA, similarly to the pathchar to the external server. The
home gateway replies as if it were two hops, generating a spurious
link that masquerades as the access link. We contrast the access link
propagation delay value we obtained running pathchar to the external
server with the one we obtained running pathchar to the GRA and
observe that they are significantly different. If the CPE generates two
replies to the traceroute to the GRA, the delay of the spurious link
from the CPE to the GRA measured by the pathchar to the GRA is
significantly smaller than the delay of the real access link measured
by the pathchar to the external server. This is so because the spurious
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Figure 8.2: We observed that some home
gateways reply to traceroute as if they are
two hosts, generating spurious links. When
running pathchar to an external server,
Revelio shows that the access link is the
spurious link (Figure (a)). We run pathchar
to the GRA (Figure (b)) and compare the
results with the previous output from
pathchar to the external server to correct
these Revelio false positives.
link is internal to the CPE, while the link we measure with pathchar
to the external server is the actual access link. By comparing the two
pathchar results, we can identify these anomalous CPEs and correctly
identify the GRA at hop n.
We exemplify this non-standard behavior in Figure 8.2. The orig-
inal Revelio suite generated positive results for upstream CGN be-
cause the GRA-NAT appears to be outside the home network (Fig-
ure 8.2(a)) based on the pathchar to the external server test and the
number of hops until the GRA (from traceroute to the GRA). The
pathchar to the external server results shows that the access link is
the red link with a delay of 9ms. In the same time, we see that the
GRA-NAT is after the access link, in the access network, based on the
results of the traceroute to the GRA. However, when running pathchar
to the GRA, we obtain a different value for the propagation delay on
what seems to be access link (Figure 8.2(b)). The dotted red link is ac-
tually not the access link, but the spurious link that is internal to the
CPE. Given the large difference between the value of the propagation
delay on the spurious link (Figure 8.2(b))) and the propagation delay
on the actual access link (Figure 8.2(a)), we conclude that the home
router replied to the traceroute to the GRA as two hops and Revelio
generated a false positive.
Expected access technology delay. In some cases, we have de-
tected that the propagation delay of the different links within the
home network differs in one order of magnitude (e.g., one link with
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a delay of tens of ms and another one with delay in the hundreds
of ms), confusing the Revelio methodology. In this case, the delays
of both home network links are still one order of magnitude less
than the propagation delay of the actual access link. In order to deal
with this case, we define an expected range for the access link delay
based on the access technology and we verify if the access link delay
we measure falls within the expected range. If this is not the case,
we mark the first link that falls within the expected range as the ac-
cess link. In the case of the FCC MBA platform, we know the access
link from the per-probe metadata we received. For RIPE Atlas, we
leverage the user tags that also contain information about the access
technology.
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Figure 8.3: We observed that propagation
delay of the different links within the
home network differs in one order of
magnitude. When applying the original
Revelio methodology, we erroneously
conclude that the GRA-NAT is in access
network of the ISP (Figure (a)). When
factoring the expected propagation delay
corresponding to the access technology we
correct the Revelio false positive (Figure
(b)).
We exemplify such an example in Figure 8.3. We first observe that
the two red routers in Figure 8.3.(a) reply to the traceroute probing
with private addresses. Then, after running pathchar we obtain the
propagation delay for the links. The first link with a propagation
delay higher by one order of magnitude than the previous one is the
one we mark as the access link. Because we detect that the GRA-NAT
is after the access link (and we also detect private addresses in the
access network) we conclude that there is an upstream CGN active.
However, when comparing the propagation delay on the access link
with the expected propagation delay corresponding to DSL access
(i.e., between 2ms and 30ms), we conclude that the first two links
are part of the home network, and the access link is the green link in
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Figure 8.3.(b).
In Figure 8.4 we show the spread of access link propagation delay
values we obtained using the original Revelio methodology. The
horizontal lines show the expected range of propagation delay per
access technology. The points that fall outside the expected range are
potential false positives which we tackle within the evolved Revelio
suite.
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Figure 8.4: Scatter plot of the access link
delays we identified using the original
Revelio methodology. The horizontal lines
represent the range od expected access link
propagation delay per access technology.
The points that lie outside the expected
range are potential false positives in the
Revelio results.
8.2.3 Revelio Limitations
The evolved Revelio methodology still suffers from a series of limita-
tions, which we discuss in this Section.
The Revelio methodology heavily relies on traceroute. If traceroute
packets are filtered, the Revelio tests will be inconclusive because we
cannot reliably locate the access link. However, in the case of tracer-
oute to the GRA, receiving ICMP error replies from at least one hop
immediately after the access link (i.e., after the CPE in Figure 10.4) is
enough to establish whether the GRA-NAT lies after the access link,
in the ISP network. In other words, even if the traceroute does not
reach the target GRA, the Revelio methodology only requires for the
packet to be routed outside the home network, in the ISP network.
Anecdotal evidence exists about home routers rate-limiting gen-
eration of ICMP packets 14, which can hinder the pathchar method- 14 T. Burbridge. Personal Communica-
tion, 2016
Burbridge [2016]
ology we use to measure the link propagation delays. Rate-limited
ICMP errors will add additional delay to the traceroute messages,
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thus artificially increasing the delay we estimate for that link. Since
we subtract ICMP round-trip delays to infer per-link delay, ICMP
rate-limiting will mislead our inference. Also, the lack of informa-
tion about the type of access technology may increase the number of
false positives in the case of non-standard home topologies. However,
this is a non-issue when the end-user deploys Revelio to verify her
upstream configuration. In the case of deploying Revelio on other
hardware platforms or crowdsourcing the Revelio measurements,
we assume this type of information is not hard to obtain from the
platform operators.
One of the Revelio tests requires the probe to send UPnP queries
to the CPE, which should also support UPnP. These devices do not
always support UPnP, limiting the effectiveness of Revelio. The Atlas
probes do not allow users to perform UPnP queries. Additionally, for
some of the SK probes, the CPEs do not support UPnP and cannot
reply to the query the probe sends.
8.3 Revelio Deployments and Data
We deployed the evolved Revelio test-suite in two large measure-
ment platforms, the FCC-MBA platform and RIPE Atlas. We ran the
measurement campaign in two phases (May 2016 and August 2016)
on both platforms. Based on the experimental results from the first
phase (May 2016), we evolved the methodology of NAT Revelio to
tackle a number of corner cases that confused our original approach.
We enhanced the test suite to account for a wide diversity of home
network topologies and various access technologies. In the second
phase of the measurement campaign (August 2016) we deployed the
evolved Revelio suite to investigate the state of CGN deployment in
broadband networks.
We next detail the two platforms and describe the dataset we
obtained.
FCC-MBA platform: The United States Federal Communication
Commission’s (FCC) initiative “Measuring Broadband America"
program 15 is an ongoing nationwide performance study of broad- 15 Measuring Broadband America.
https://www.fcc.gov/general/
measuring-broadband-america
MBA
band service in the United States that aims to improve the availability
of information for consumers about their broadband service. The
initiative manages a large hardware-based measurement platform
operated by SamKnows (SK), an international statistics and analyt-
ics firm supporting similar projects in other countries around the
world. The SK probes are off-the-shelf routers that users voluntarily
host in their home networks. The SK probes run pre-installed software
that measures Internet connection performance metrics including
download speed, upload speed or latency. Apart from the standard
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pre-installed measurements, the SK probes can execute other custom
tests. We deployed the NAT Revelio client to run on 2,477 SK probes
operating as part of the MBA testbed. This allowed us the unique
convenience of running active measurements from inside the end-users
home networks across the U.S. and attempt to reveal the presence on a
NAT in their ISP. For each probe in the FCC-MBA platform, we also
have access to metadata regarding the access technology and ISP of
each user line, which SamKnows collects and maintains. Based on
this information, the FCC-MBA panel covers 23 different ISPs and
tests 4 different access technologies overall. These include 10 ma-
jor DSL providers, 8 different cable providers, 3 ISPs that offer fiber
to the home Internet connectivity and 2 main satellite providers in
the U.S. In terms of aggregated number of probes per technology,
according to the metadata we have available, cable Internet access
is predominant with approximately 40% of the probes operating on
cable access. DSL follows with a share of approximately 20% of the
probes we tested. Fibre access lines account for 9% of the US-Revelio
testbed. 3.5% of the testbed is made up of satellite access lines.
RIPE Atlas platform: For the RIPE Atlas probes, we use the API
to check the user tags regarding the access technology, which we
retrieve from the information that the hosts of the probes volunteer
to RIPE. At the time we deployed the Revelio suite, Atlas consisted of
9,231 active probes distributed in 3,381 Autonomous Systems (ASes),
according to the RIPE Atlas API.
To ensure a statistically significant sample of vantage points in
an ISP, we only tested the ISPs with at least 20 Atlas probes. We
aggregated the probes per AS using the probe metadata. Thus, we
deployed Revelio in 2,644 Atlas probes, corresponding to 43 different
ASes. However, the set of tests that we were able to run in the Atlas
probes is more limited than the ones we can run on the SK probes. In
particular, the Atlas probes do not provide support for UPnP. Thus, as
opposed to FCC-MBA where we ran the complete Revelio test suite,
on the Atlas infrastructure we only deployed the traceroute-based
tests.
8.3.1 Revelio Dataset
We scheduled the Revelio client to run over 20 times on each probe
during August 2016 for the FCC-MBA platform and in the RIPE Atlas
platform. The data we collected from the probes in each run of Revelio
are the following: the Globally Routable Address (GRA), the mapped
port number, traceroute results to the GRA, traceroute results to a
fixed target address (with 21 different packet sizes), UPnP query re-
sult to retrieve the IP address on the external interface of the device
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to which the probes connect (only for SK probes). In total, we collected
data from 5,121 probes in 64 ISPs with an average of 20 repetitions2 2 In the FCC-MBA platform, in order
not to interfere with normal user
Internet activity, the probes perform
cross-traffic sensing and run the tests
we schedule only when they detect no
end-user traffic. Thus, the number of
Revelio repetitions differs for various
measurement vantage points.
per probe which resulted in over 2 million traceroutes. The ISPs we
tested include 42 DSL providers, 16 cable providers, 4 ISPs that offer
fiber to the home Internet connectivity and 2 satellite providers. We
are in the process of releasing the FCC-MBA Revelio dataset after
proper anonymization. The RIPE Atlas measurements are publicly
available and retrievable using the RIPE Atlas API. We can make
available the measurement identifiers (MIDs) corresponding to Rev-
elio tests upon request (interested parties can retrieve them to then
query the RIPE Atlas database).
We processed the raw data we collect using Revelio and combined
it with metadata we received from SamKnows and RIPE to build the
Revelio State for each probe. The Revelio State consists of the device
identifier, ISP name, access technology, local IP address of the probe,
GRA, number of hops we measure until the GRA, location of the
access link, set of private IPs we detect immediately after the CPE (if
any), set of shared IP addresses we detect after the access link (if any)
and number of times Revelio successfully ran on the probe. Revelio
then feeds this information to the algorithm for detecting the type of
upstream NAT.
8.3.2 Catching the Big NAT
We deploy NAT Revelio to detect the presence of CGN on a total
of 5,121 different customer lines. In function of the upstream NAT
configuration, Revelio classifies each probe into one of the following
cases: (i) inconclusive (cases Revelio was unable to draw any conclu-
sion due to incomplete or inconsistent results). (ii) no home NAT (i.e.,
the probe where Revelio runs is directly connected to the public In-
ternet), (iii) simple home NAT (the CPE performs the GRA-NAT), (iv)
Carrier Grade NAT (the GRA-NAT is outside the home network, in the
ISP’s network) and We aggregate the results by the inferred upstream
NAT configuration (Table 8.1).
Inconclusive. For 1,276 probes (307 SK probes and 969 Atlas probes),
Revelio gave inconclusive results either because none of the tests
could run on the probe or because we did not obtain enough infor-
mation to properly interpret the results we were able to collect. Our
approach is conservative and tags as inconclusive the case of mixed
responses from different tests. For example, traceroute limitations
and ICMP traffic being filtered along the path to the external target
server hamper our capacity to identify the access link (Section 8.2.3).
Without knowing the location of the access link, when the end-user
deploys several levels of NAT in the home, we cannot draw conclu-
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ISP ID CC Tech. # of probes Inconclusive Simple Home
NAT
Carrier Grade
NAT
Confirmed
1 (Undisclosed ISP) US Satellite 76 0 0 76 Yes
2 (Kabel Deutschland) DE Cable 49 27 14 8 Partially
3 (Fastweb) IT Fiber 26 14 8 4 Yes
4 (OTE) GR DSL 21 5 14 2 No Reply
5 (Liberty Global) NL Cable 280 133 146 1 Yes
6 (Zen) UK DSL 32 11 20 1 No Reply
Table 8.1: Revelio Positive Results: List
of ISPs with at least one probe with
positive Revelio result (i.e., operates
behind a CGN). We report the Country
Code (CC), the access technology
(Tech.), the total number of probes we
tested for that ISP (# of probes), the
number of probes for which Revelio
gave inconclusive results (Inconclusive),
the number of probes Revelio tested
negative (Simple Home NAT), the
number of probes Revelio tested as
positive (Carrier Grade NAT) and the
current status of the confirmation from
representatives of the ISP with positive
Revelio results (Confirmed). For the
latter, we mark this field with Yes if the
ISP confirmed the Revelio results at the
IP level, Partially if the ISP confirmed
they use CGN but did not confirm the
specific IP lines tested, No Reply if we
did not get any feedback from the ISP.
sions regarding the presence of NAT in the ISP. These probes account
for approximately 24% of the total, (12% of the SK probes and 36% of
the Atlas probes). We discard these cases from further analysis.
No home NAT. Revelio found that in 299 different cases (85 in
SK probes and 214 Atlas probes), the Revelio client was running on
a probe configured with a public IP address that was also the GRA.
These probes were operating in the public Internet, which implies
that the lines were not connected behind a NAT solution. In all these
cases, the traceroute to the GRA test also confirmed the lack of a NAT
solution in the corresponding ISPs.
Simple home NAT. Out of the rest, for 3,454 probes (2,009 SK
probes and 1,445 Atlas probes) Revelio established the presence of
simple home NAT and excluded the possibility of further NAT in the
ISP. Revelio reports the simple home NAT configuration (and, thus,
the lack of NAT in the ISP for the respective line) when at least one of
the traceroute to GRA and invoking UPnP actions tests establish that the
home gateway is performing the GRA-NAT. In the case of the UPnP
test, for 1,300 SK probes the address retrieved through UPnP from the
CPE matched the GRA, concluding that the CPE was the GRA-NAT.
For 815 SK probes, the Revelio client was unable to communicate with
the CPE through UPnP, either because the CPE did not supported
UPnP or because the SK probe was not directly connected to the CPE.
In the case of the traceroute to the GRA test, for 2,965 probes (1,520
SK probes and 1,445 Atlas probes) Revelio located the GRA-NAT before
the access link, concluding that the CPE was also the GRA-NAT.
As a interesting data point, using pathchar to the GRA test Revelio
purged 165 of cases where the CPE replied as being two different
hops, creating false positives. In particular, Revelio detected this
behavior in one single ISP for 78 out of 228 probes.
Carrier Grade NAT. For 92 probes in 6 ISPs (76 SK probes in 1 ISP
and 16 Atlas probes in 5 ISPs) Revelio detected the presence of CGN
technology in the ISP’s network. Table 8.1 details the number of
probes that tested positive for CGN per ISP3 We identified one satel- 3 We only disclose the names of the
ISPs we tested using the RIPE Atlas
platform. We are currently pending the
approval of the FCC for disclosing the
names of the ISPs we tested with the
FCC-MBA testbed.
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lite provider in the U.S. where all probes tested positive for CGN. For
the rest of the ISPs, we detected a mix of some probes that tested pos-
itive for CGN and others that did not. Overall, about 2% of the probes
tested positive for CGN. About 10% of the ISPs we tested hosted
at least one probe that tested positive for CGN. Of these latter ones,
only one ISP had a widespread deployment of CGN, while the other
ISPs presented a few scattered probes that tested positive, hinting a
localized deployment, e.g., possibly for trials or suggesting a specific
service.
8.3.3 Validation of Revelio Results
NAT Revelio tested 5,121 Internet lines in 64 different ISPs world-
wide. In total, it reported 92 end users with an upstream CGN,
which connected to 6 different ISPs. We validated both the posi-
tive (upstream CGN) and negative (no upstream CGN) results at the
IP level through different means, including direct contacts with the
involved ISPs or, in one case, using the WHOIS database information.
Positive Revelio Results. We obtained confirmations at the IP
level from 4 ISPs (89 probes) for the presence of CGN in their network
for the lines we tested and received no replies from the other 2 ISPs
(3 probes). In Table 8.1 we report on the status on communication
with the ISPs for which Revelio identified the presence of CGN. In
particular, for ISP#1 from Table 8.1 – the satellite provider in the US
for which all probes tested positive – the operator confirmed that its
normal configuration includes performing the NAT function in the
ISP network and that all the 76 lines that tested positive were indeed
behind a CGN. ISP#3 (Fastweb) confirmed both the positive and the
negative Revelio results. For ISP#5 (Liberty Global) from Table 8.1,
the GRA associated with the probe is actually tagged in the WHOIS
database (in the Organization field) as CGNAT (the other 279 probes
in the same ISP did not have a GRA in the subnet marked as CGN).
ISP#2 (Kabel Deutchland) from Table 8.1 confirmed that it is using
CGN in its network. However, we did not obtain explicit confirma-
tion from their representatives that the exact lines we detected as
positive are actually behind a CGN, which is why we marked it as a
partial confirmation.
Based on the ground truth we collected, we conclude that NAT
Revelio did not generate any false positives. Thus, provided that
NAT Revelio can successfully run (see Section 8.2.3 for limitations),
its precision4 is 100% reported to the set of probes which the ISPs 4 The precision represents the ratio
between the number of true positives
and the sum of the true positives and
the false positives.
validated.
Negative Revelio Results. Out of the 5,121 lines Revelio tested,
its results pointed to a simple NAT configuration (no CGN) for 3,454
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probes in 63 different ISPs. For the negative results, we obtained val-
idation from 4 ISPs for which all probes tested negative for upstream
CGN in the ISP. The 4 ISPs account for 508 probes. We mention that
(confirmed) negative results from Revelio testing do not preclude the
existence of CGN technology in the corresponding networks.
Based on the ground truth we collected, we conclude that NAT
Revelio did not generate any false negatives. Thus, provided that
NAT Revelio can successfully run, its recall5 is 100% reported to 5 The recall represents the ratio between
the number of true positives and the
sum of the true positives and the false
negatives.
the set of probes which the ISPs validated. However, the Revelio
methodology reported inconclusive results in 24% of the cases (this
numbers drops to 12% if the measurement platform supports both
UPnP and traceroute based tests). This is a consequence of Revelio’s
limitations, which we detail in Section 8.2.3.
8.3.4 Analysis of Results
The information we retrieved through the Revelio tests reveals ad-
ditional insight about confirmed CGN operational setups, which we
discuss next.
Number of hops between the CPE and the CGN. In 76 of the
92 positive cases, the CGN was located in the first IP hop in the ISP
network. This is the case for all the 76 cases of the US satellite ISP
that tested positive and as well for ISP#6 (Zen). The other ISPs had
2 to 6 IP hops between the CPE and the CGN. This reflects two dif-
ferent CGN deployment architectures. The ISPs that exhibit only one
hop between the CPE and the CGN deploy the CGN functionality
in the first IP aggregation point in the network (e.g., the BRAS). This
is consistent, for example, with some CGN cards that are available
for insertion in the BRAS products. The other deployment setup in-
stalls the CGN in the ISP core network, allowing the aggregation of
a higher number of costumers in a single CGN box. This enables a
more efficient multiplexing of the public IPv4 address pool.
Addressing. In terms of addressing used in the hops between the
CPE and the CGN, ISP#1 and ISP#3 (Fastweb) assign shared address
space 16 to devices in the access network. Interestingly, ISP#1 uses 16 J. Weil, V. Kuarsingh, C. Donley,
C. Liljenstolpe, and M. Azinger. IANA-
Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Ad-
dress Space. RFC 6598, April 2012
Weil et al. [2012]
shared address in the modem interface facing the home network
and uses public IP address for all hops in the ISP network. ISP#3
uses both shared addresses and private addresses (the first hop after
the CPE uses shared address space and the subsequent ones private
address space). The remaining ISPs use a mix of public and private
addressing between the CPE and the CGNs.
GRA stability over time. We analyzed the number of GRAs that
we identified for each probe during the period we performed the
tests. We found that the majority of the probes (4,388 probes, ac-
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counting for 85% of the total) have only one GRA during the whole
tested period. The remaining 733 probes use 2 to 19 different GRAs
in the analyzed period. The average number of GRAs per probe for
all the probes is 1.3 while the average number of GRAs per probe for
the probes that tested positive for CGN is 3. In particular, for ISP#1
the mean number of GRAs goes up to 4. We can see that while fre-
quently changing the GRA is by no means exclusive of the CPEs
behind a CGN, CGN deployments exhibits a considerably higher
number of GRAs per customer. Additionally, we searched for GRAs
simultaneously used by multiple probes/CPEs. We found two GRAs
simultaneously used in ISP#1, one for 2 hours and the other for 48
hours. (Incidentally, we found 40 GRAs that were used by 2 probes
each, but we discovered that these cases were home networks that
were hosting multiple Atlas probes. This is likely related to the incen-
tives for hosting probes in Atlas).
9 Tracking and Characterizing Carrier Grade NATs in
Mobile Broadband Networks in Europe
Mobile Broadband Networks operators have deployed Car-
rier Grade NATs (CGNs) as the only realistic mean to accommodate
the ever-increasing number of mobile nodes connected to their net-
works. While CGNs enable mobile operators to provide Internet-
access to millions of devices with a limited amount of IPv4 addresses,
their adoption imposes functional and potentially also performance
penalties to the end-users that may affect their perceived quality of
experience.
While the difficulties in supporting alternative application
paradigms are fundamental to the nature of the NAT operation, the
functional limitations resulting from CGN adoption are exacerbated
by the myriad of behaviors of the different NAT implementations
deployed in the Internet.
9.1 CGNs in Mobile Broadband Networks
In this Chapter we describe CGNWatcher, a measurement tool that
executes a number of active tests to fully characterize CGN deploy-
ments in MNOs. The CGNWatcher tool systematically tests more
than 30 behavioural requirements of NATs defined by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) and also multiple CGN behavioural
metrics. We have deployed CGNWatcher in MONROE and per-
formed large measurement campaigns to characterize the real CGN
deployments of the MNOs serving the MONROE nodes. The tool
was designed to easily allow future features to easily be integrated in
MONROE.
The measurement results obtained through CGNWatcher are rel-
evant to application and protocol developers to inform their design
about how to overcome the limitations imposed by CGNs. The in-
formation retrieved through CGNWatcher are also useful for exper-
imenters using MONROE, as CGNs may have an important impact
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in the feasibility of experiments and can potentially bias the results if
not accounted for.
We deploy our experiment considering three fundamental tasks:
• Design, development and implementation of CGNWatcher.
• Execution of the measurements on MONROE.
• Analysis of the measurement results.
9.1.1 IETF Standard for CGNs
We design active metrics to characterize CGNs on the MONROE
MNOs. Particularly, we define:
TCP Requirements.
1. TCP mapping. We first send two STUN binding requests to two
different public addresses of our STUN server. We compare the
address and port returned in the two STUN responses received. If
both the addresses and the ports match then we conclude that the
mapping behavior of the NAT is Endpoint-Independent. If this is
not the case, we send a third binding request to our STUN server
using the primary addresses used before and a different port. If
the address and port reported in the STUN response is the same
than the one reported before when using the primary address and
a different port, the NAT is Address dependent, else the NAT is
Address and Port-Dependent. Additionally we tests the behavior
of the NAT when we send packets with different source ports, but
same IP address. We check wherever we get the same public IP
address.
2. IP address pooling and persistent. We sends a SYN from a host
we control to the CGNwatcher client and sniff the response in the
client. We then sends a SYN/ACK from the CGNwatcher client
and sniff the response in the server. We can also apply the TCP
state tracking from MAO paper SIGCOMM: two tests.
• SYN-out SYN-in tests: if a NAT allows an incoming SYN packet
after an outgoing SYN.
• SYN-out SYN-ACK-out tests: if a NAT allows a client to send
out a SYN-ACK packet after sending a SYN packet.
3. TCP filtering. We send a binding request to the primary address
of our STUN server with a change port and change address at-
tributes. These binding request attributes solicit the server to send
the response from the alternate IP address and port. If the client
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receives the response, then the filtering behavior of the NAT is
Endpoint-Independent. If not, we send a third binding request to
the primary address with only change port. If the client receives a
response then the NAT is AddressDependent Filtering, if not it is
Port- Dependent Filtering.
4. Unsolicited inbound SYN packets. We perform two tests:
• Send a SYN packet from our server, use an exponential back off
time and verify we receive an ICMP Port Unreachable error for
the original SYN.
• Send a SYN packet from an out server, send a SYN packet
from in for the connection and then verify that the SYN has
been dropped. This test can be done only if the NAT has a port
preservation behavior. Then it would assign the same port from
the client to the NAT and the same port from the NAT to the
server. We first verify if the NAT perform port preservation and
then we send the SYN to the assigned port to that source port.
5. Source port selection. We send a packet using a given source
port and then we compare the port number with the external
bound port. If they match the NAT is performing port preserva-
tion. Moreover, if they are even or odds, the NAT implement port
parity. If they do not match, it is possible that the NAT does not
implement port preservation, but it is also possible that the specific
port used as source port was already in use in another mapping
(from another internal host) for this reason we will repeat the test
several times. we also provide the percentage of port preserved.
We verify if the port range is maintained by setting a source port
in a given range and then check the external port.
6. Supporting hairpinning. In order to check it we send two pack-
ets: the first one to discover our mapped address using STUN
protocol and the second one from a different source port and to-
wards the discovered mapped address. If we receive the response
it means the NAT supports hairpinning.
7. Behaviour with respect to the ICMP Destination Unreachable.
We establish a TCP connection, then we send a ICMP Destination
Unreachable message. We verify that the packet is forwarded and
we check the payload to verify that the IP address and the port are
translated in both directions (i.e., from the client to the server and
from the server to the client).
8. Mapping and ICMP packets. We established a mapping and
then we send an ICMP destination unreachable, then we check the
mapping is still ok.
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9. TCP Connectivity with the STUN Server. This test can be per-
formed together with the other test. We simply send a STUN
Binding Request to a TCP STUN server and verify the response.
10. Packet modification. To test if the NAT manipulates packets.
We first run Revelio in order to understand the location of the
CGN. Then we run tracebox forging different packets (adding
TCP options or fixed sequence number) to understand which
modifications the CGN implements.
UDP Requirements.
1. UDP mapping.
2. Source port selection.
3. Mapping lifetime over 2 minutes. We send a first binding request
to our server and after 2 minutes we send another binding request
using a different port but specifying that the response should be
sent to the previous binding. If the answer is not filtered, it means
that the previous mapping has been preserved.
4. Outbound refresh behavior. This test is similar to the previous
one, except that an additional outgoing packet is sent one minute
after the initial binding request and the second binding request is
sent after 3 minutes.
5. UDP filtering.
6. Supporting hairpinning.
7. Deterministic behavior. We check the mapping and filtering
behavior several times.
8. Unreachable ICMP packets. A device on the inside sends a
packet to an external address that causes an ICMP Destination
Unreachable packet to be returned. The test records whether this
packet makes it back through the NAT correctly.
9. Mapping and ICMP packets. The methodology is the same than
before unless that we are going to check the mapping after the
ICMP unreachable packet is received.
10. Supporting the “do not fragment” flag. Our application sends
a packet with the “Do not Fragment flag” set and waits for the
reception of the correspondent ICMP message.
11. Out-of-order UDP fragments. In order to check this behavior,
we send from our server disordered fragments and check their
reception in the application.
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12.
ICMP Requirements.
1. ICMP query from internal. The test verifies if the NAT supports
simple ICMP Reply/Request message exchange by sending a
query and waiting for the answer.
2. ICMP query session less over 60 sec. In order to check this, we
send a first binding request to our server and after 2 minutes we
send another binding request using a different port but specifying
that the response should be sent to the previous binding. If the
answer is not filtered, it means that the previous mapping has
been preserved.
3. Handling ICMP error packet. We send an ICMP packet with
wrong checksum and verify that the NAT drop the packet. a) send
a ICMP packet with incorrect IP checksum and verify that the
NAT drops the packet. c) check if a ICMP error message is sent.
4. Refreshing mapping ICMP error packet.We send an ICMP er-
ror packet from an external server with no mapping and verify
that the NAT drops the packet. Then create a mapping and send
a ICMP error packet check that the error type and code are un-
changed and check that the destination IP address is the same as
the source IP address of the embedded packet after translation.
5. Error packet hairpinning. We check this by sending two packets,
the first one to discover our mapped address using STUN protocol
and the second one is an ICMP Echo Error message sent to the
mapped address from a different port. The NATwatcher verifies
the reception of the error message.
6. Support of ICMP destination unreachable. We send an UDP
packet to our server and the server replies with Destination Un-
reachable behavior. We then verify is the ICMP error is received by
the CGNwatcher client.
7. ICMP time exceeded. Same as the previous one but for ICMP
Time Exceeded messages.
8. Timestamp and Timestamp Reply Messages. We send a times-
tamp server function and check if the NAT returns a timestamp
reply.
9. Source route options. We send a packet with source route option
from outside and see if the packet it’s forwarded correctly. If the
message is not forwarded we verify that outbound it contains the
route ip option.
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10. Address Mask Request/Reply Message. We send a ICMP Ad-
dress mask request and verify that the NAT answer with a ICMP
Address mask reply.
11. Parameter Problem Message. We send a ICMP parameter prob-
lem message and verify that the NAT answer with a ICMP param-
eter problem message reply.
12. Non-QueryError ICMP Messages. We send a Non-QueryError
ICMP Messages and see if the NAT handles or not those packets.
13.
CGNs Requirements.
1. Limiting the number of external ports or identifiers for ICMP. A
CGN MUST support limiting the number of external ports
2. Limiting the amount of state memory allocated per mapping
and per subscriber.
3. Port reallocation. Once an external port is deallocated, it
SHOULD NOT be reallocated to a new mapping until at least
120 seconds have passed.
4. Tracking the connection. We can verify if the CGNAT is tracking
the connection.
5. Implementation of Port Control Protocol.
6. Unable to create mapping. The CGN:
• MUST drop the original packet.
• SHOULD send an ICMP Destination Unreachable message with
code 1 (Host Unreachable) to the sender;
• SHOULD send a notification (e.g., SNMP trap) towards a man-
agement system (if configured to do so); and
• MUST NOT delete existing mappings in order to "make room”
for the new one. (This only applies to normal CGN behavior,
not to manual operator intervention.).
7. A CGN’s port allocation scheme SHOULD make it hard for at-
tackers to guess port numbers.
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Figure 9.1: CGNWatcher Operational
Setup.
9.2 Design, Development and Implementation of CGNwatcher
Figure 9.1 summarizes the operational setup of CGNWatcher.
In a nutshell, we create the CGNWatcher Docker container nec-
essary to run the experiment in the MONROE node. The Docker
container executes the CGNWatcher application. The CGNWatcher
application automatically executes the tests to characterize the CGN
behaviour, by sending different combinations of packets to our Mea-
surement server deployed in the public Internet and processes the
response packets sent from the server back to the MONROE node.
The server does not produce any experiment results. Once all the
tests are completed the application create an output results file and
sends the compiled measurement results to a Collector server where
they are stored. All tests are started by the CGNWatcher client on the
MONROE node. Most experiments use stream sockets on the server
side, some of them also use python-scapy, meaning raw sockets. The
goal of CGNWatcher is to enhance the MONROE platform with the
ability to measure CGN properties that cannot be measured in other
crowdsourcing measurement platforms. For example, MONROE of-
fers the possibility to repeat the tests over time and to decide when to
run the tests (day or night).
In this Section we describe the methodology we used for testing
each requirements.
The goal of the behavioural tests is to determine the real impli-
cations for the end users. We implement the tests to have a short
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execution time, in order to make the MONROE usage efficient.
The behavioural tests are the following.
1. Port exhaustion test. Behind a CGN there are multiple devices
that have to share the port space among each other. This test es-
timates the maximum number of mappings that can exist for one
device behind the CGN by opening any given number of connec-
tions and waiting for periodical responses. We create a mapping
every 0.1 second until reach the given number of connections. We
then send a keep alive message to maintain the mapping. There-
fore, we observe if new connections are rejected or old mappings
are eliminated in favour of new ones. We also observe if the map-
ping is eliminated silently or if any ICMP error message or RST
is sent. After experimenting the test on MONROE development
nodes and observing that the MNOs do not block the user, we
consider the same test for different traffic patterns to verify if this
influences the CGN on removing existing mapping in favour of
new ones. For example: for a few selected connections we send a
small amount of data and for the remaining connections we send
data more frequently or bigger packets. We then observe the be-
haviour of the CGN.
2. Mapping lifetime on different ports tests. The goal of this test is
to determine the configured mapping lifetime. NATs are required
to maintain UDP mappings during no less than 2 minutes and
TCP mapping during no less than 2 hours and 4 minutes to follow
the IETF requirements. In order to check this, we create a mapping
from the MONROE node. After receiving the initial packet, the
server waits for a fixed amount of time before responding with
another packet to test the liveliness of the mapping. When we test
TCP we consider 120 minutes, incrementing the time to send the
keep alive every 10 seconds. When we test UDP we consider 10
minutes, incrementing the time to send the keep alive every 10 sec-
onds. According to the specifications of the CGNs, the maintainer
can set different mapping lifetime depending on the port used.
For this reason, we check the mapping lifetime in different ports
such as 53 (DNS port), 80 (HTTP port), 443 (HTTPS) and 5228-5230
(Android application notification port).
3. Port allocation strategy tests. This test checks if the CGN leaves
the external port unchanged when creating a mapping. We send
a packet using a particular local source port and then we compare
the port number with the external bound port. If they match the
CGN is performing port preservation. If they do not match, it is
possible that the CGN does not implement port preservation, but
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it is also possible that the specific port used as source port was
already in use in another mapping (from another internal host).
Because of this limitation, this test only provides a lower bound
to the number of CGNs that implement port preservation. It was
possible to increase the accuracy of this test by repeating the test
several times, thanks to the repeatability property that MONROE
offers. It is also possible that the CGN implements a ’common-
not-random’ behaviour. For this reason, we have a deeper look at
allocation ports. We allocate a block of port first randomly and
then sequentially.
4. IP allocation strategy tests. The test checks if the assigned pub-
lic IP address changes over time and the average duration of the
IP address for each MNO. The test is as follows: we first send a
STUN binding request. We then save the IP address returned in
the STUN response received. The STUN protocol operates as fol-
lows: the client located behind the CGN sends a binding request
message to a STUN server. The STUN server replies with a re-
sponse message containing the IP address and port of the client
in its payload, as observed from the server. We implement CGN-
Watcher using python and the packet generator python-scapy. In
particular, we design it to be as simple as possible in order to be
used not only in MONROE, but also in other measurement plat-
forms.
The output produced by the tests is in the JSON format which
allows the file to be parsed easily. We built an evaluation script that
analyses and summarizes the results.
9.3 CGNwatcher: Results and Dataset
9.3.1 CGNwatcher Measurements
We initially implement the tests on 5 operators: Orange ES, Yoigo
ES, Vodafone IT, Telia NO and Telenor NO on dev nodes. Once veri-
fied that the tests are safe (the link was not broken during the test)
we implement the tests on the rest of the MONROE nodes. The
CGNWatcher container was created to be simple and scalable. It is
possible to specify the parameters of the tests using python flags:
cgnwatcherclient.py  iINTERFACE  sSERVER  oOUTPUT  
portexhaustionPORTS maxtimeoutMAXT IMEOUT
In order to shed some light about CGN while roaming we run
the set of measurements, we first need to configure the nodes by ac-
tivating and deploying the SIMs. For each MNO, we perform the
measurements at the same time from all six countries and coordinate
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the configuration of the experimental setup. We repeat the mea-
surements ten times towards each target for each SIM in the visited
country and in the home country. The resulting dataset lists the set of
IP hops along the data paths from each vantage point towards each
measurement responder.
9.3.2 Analysis of the Measurement Results
The output produced by the tests is in the JSON format which allows
the file to be parsed easily. We built an evaluation script that analyses
and summarizes the results. In Table 1 we summarize the MNOs and
report whether the user is behind a CGN or not. If the assigned local
IP address is public, then the user is not behind a CGN. Results show
that Telenor NO, Telenor SE and Vodafone IT are not behind a CGN.
This is quite uncommon for an MNO that usually has a limited pool
of IP addresses to assign.
Requirements Tests Results. Table9.1 summarizes the results from
the requirements tests.
CGNWatcher test/MNO Orange Yoigo Movistar ICE Telia NO Telia SE Three TIM
Mapping behavior TCP E.I. A.P.D. E.I. E.I. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. E.I.
Mapping behavior UDP E.I. A.P.D. E.I. E.I. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. E.I.
Filtering behavior TCP A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D.
Filtering behavior UDP A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D. A.P.D.
Simultaneous Open Connection NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Unsolicited inbound SYN packets YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Hairpinning TCP NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Hairpinning UDP NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Behaviour with respect to the ICMP Destination Unreachable TCP YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Behaviour with respect to the ICMP Destination Unreachable UDP YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mapping and ICMP packets TCP YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mapping and ICMP packets UDP YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Packet modifications TCP NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Packet modifications UDP NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Deterministic behavior TCP YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Deterministic behavior UDP YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Supporting the “do not fragment flag" YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ICMP query from internal YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Handling ICMP error packet YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Refreshing mapping ICMP error packet YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
ICMP time exceeded YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Timestamp and Timestamp Reply Messages YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Address Mask Request/Reply Message YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Parameter Problem Message YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Non-QueryError ICMP Messages YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 9.1: Results from the require-
ments tests.
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All tests were performed 97 times during the day and during the
night. We run a first campaign during December 2017 and a second
campaign during the month of June 2018. Results from requirements
tests are similar among MNOs. Most MNOs use a restrictive CGN
configuration like an Address and Port-Dependent mapping and
filter (Yoigo, Telia NO, Telia SE and 3). The rest uses a more open
configuration: Endpoint-Independent mapping and Address and
Port-Dependent filter. No CGNs allows hairpinning or implement
packets modification. All the MNOs have a deterministic behaviour,
the CGN maintains the same mapping or filtering during time. All
kinds of ICMP packets are supported.
Behavioural Tests Results.
1. Port exhaustion results.
Figure 9.2: Port exhaustion results.
We run the test both during day and night. Figure9.2 shows that
Orange and Yoigo are allocating fewer ports during the day.
We then evaluate why the maximum number of ports that we
can use differs on the same MNO. According to the specifications
of the CGNs, the maintainer may choose to reserve a subset of
the total port quota, thus freeing the remainder of the ports to
be used by another user. For example, one hundred ports can be
immediately reserved while the remaining 900 ports are free to be
used by other clients.
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Next, we try to understand what happens once the ports limit
is reached. Orange and Movistar are discarding older connec-
tions when the maximum number of mapping is reached, in order
to make room for new connections initiated.Yoigo refuses new
connections and keeps the existing ones. Moreover, Orange and
Movistar discard old connections silently (i.e. no ICMP, RST pack-
ets detected), while Yoigo sends an ICMP error message. When
different traffic patterns are tested the situation is unchanged. This
means that not specific strategies for different traffic pattern are
used by the CGN.
2. Mapping lifetime on different ports results. Figure9.3 and Fig-
ure9.4 show the mapping lifetime for each MNO for the TCP and
UDP tests respectively. Results show that TIM has a short map-
ping lifetime. As the RFC specifies the UDP mapping lifetime
must not expire in less than two minutes. All MNOs follow this
requirement.
Figure 9.3: TCP mapping lifetime per
MNO.
3. Port allocation strategy tests results. We observe that the CGNs
allocate both registered and ephemeral ports (1024 - 65535). No
MNOs, apart from the ones that are not using a CGN, implement
port preservation. Yoigo is the only MNO that implements a non-
random port allocation strategy. Figure9.5 shows the internal ports
assigned by us and the corresponding mapped ports assigned
by the CGN. The ports are assigned sequentially. Results do not
change with time. The same ports are mapped when we assign the
same internal port after 3 hours.
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Figure 9.4: UDP mapping lifetime per
MNO.
Figure 9.5: Yoigo port mapping.
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9.4 Lessons Learned
We created a measurement test suite for the analysis of CGN in cel-
lular network. While the experiments were designed to run in the
MONROE nodes, the test suite can also be used on other measure-
ment platforms. Moreover, our container is easily extendable. During
the development of the test suite we gained experience with the
MONROE testbed. The results show different configuration between
MNOs. In general, the mapping timeouts are lower than recom-
mended by the RFCs. Our results showed similar behaviour for TCP
and UDP.
The integration of the test suite into the MONROE testbed could
be improved further. Our tests could be executed in parallel for all
available same MNOs and therefore yield more results on the strat-
egy for the same MNO in the same Country.
Part III Implication of Roaming in Europe

10 Implication of Roaming in Europe
Roaming allows mobile users to use their voice and data ser-
vices when visiting a network other than their home network. Roam-
ing can be national or international. International roaming allows
mobile users to use their voice and data services when they are
abroad. The former takes place within a users home country, whereas
the latter allows users to access their services also when they are
abroad. While national roaming is virtually transparent to users,
international roaming can be associated with high costs.
The EC, in an effort to create a single digital market across the
EU, has recently (as of June 2017) introduced a set of regulatory
decisions 1 as part of the “Roam like Home” initiative. This initiative 1 European Commission: New Rules
on Roaming Charges and Open
Internet. https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/news/
new-rules-roaming-charges-and-open-internet.
[Online; accessed 06-March-2018]
ec-
abolishes charges for users when they use voice and data services
while roaming in EU.
Figure 10.1: Roam like Home.
It is designed to prevent unexpected charges due to extra me-
diation and billing costs when roaming services are active. In this
setting, MNOs are expected to deliver services with QoS properties
similar to the ones a user experiences when at home.
In this work, we perform an extensive large-scale measurement
study to understand the roaming ecosystem in Europe after the
“Roam like Home” initiative. More specifically, we investigate:
• Which technical solutions are actually being deployed and used
today?
• What are the implications of roaming on the service experienced
by the roaming user?
10.1 Roaming background
To support roaming, MNO commonly connect with each other
through an IPX network. An IPX. 2, 3 can be described as a hub 2 GSM Association: IPX White Pa-
per. https://www.gsma.com/iot/
wp-content/uploads/2012/03/ipxwp12.
pdf, b. [Online; accessed 06-March-
2018]
ipx [b]
3 GSM Association: Guidelines for IPX
Provider Networks. https://www.gsma.
com/newsroom/wp-content/uploads/
/IR.34-v13.0-1.pdf, a. [Online;
accessed 06-March-2018]
ipx [a]
that interconnects MNO over a private IP backbone network and
is possibly run by a third party IPX provider. An IPX provider has
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Figure 10.2: Internet access options for
a mobile node at home (left) and when
roaming (right).
connections to multiple network operators and thus enables each
MNO to connect to other operators via a single point of contact.
The interconnections between MNOs are accompanied by roam-
ing agreements that enable the operators to apply policies, control
network access for roaming subscribers, and manage their roaming
services. Figure 10.2 illustrates the three main schemes that can be
employed for providing data roaming services and are further de-
scribed below, namely, HR, LBO and IHBO.
When a mobile node is at home (left, see Figure 10.2), the home
user’s traffic will take a short path inside the network to reach a suit-
able PGW to the Internet. The traffic of a roaming user (right, see
Figure 10.2) is directed to an egress PGW whose location depends on
the roaming architecture. In the case of HR, the mobile node receives
the IP address from its home MNO and the roaming user’s traffic is
first routed towards a PGW in the home network (red path).
When LBO 4, 5 is used, the IP address of the roaming user is pro- 4 GSM Association: LTE and EPC
Roaming Guidelines. https://www.
gsma.com/newsroom/wp-content/
uploads/IR.88-v15.0.pdf, a. [Online;
accessed 06-March-2018]
lte [a]
5 Huawei: LTE International
Roaming Whitepaper. http:
//carrier.huawei.com/en/
technical-topics/core-network/
LTE-roaming-whitepaper, b. [Online;
accessed 06-March-2018]
lte [b]
vided by the visited network. The GTP tunnel is terminated at the
PGW of the visited network and IP-based services can be accessed
directly from there (purple path). This does not add latency and
reduces network resource usage, but may restrict access to private
services in the user’s home network. Service control and charging
also become more complex using LBO.
IHBO 6 provides an alternative to overcome the limitations of
6 Method and System For Hub Breakout
Roaming. https://patents.google.
com/patent/US20140169286/en. [Online;
accessed 06-March-2018]
US2
home-routed roaming and local breakout. Here, the IP address of
the roaming user is provided by the IPX network. The GTP tunnel
from the Serving Gateway (SGW) in the visited network terminates
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at a PGW in the IPX network (green path). There may be multiple
PGWs so that latency and resource usage can be reduced by selecting
one geographically close to the visited network. As the IPX network
maintains a trusted relationship with the home network, it may as-
sign an IP address recognized by the home network to the roaming
user, thereby allowing the user access also to private services in the
home network. IHBO can also simplify setup and management as a
single GTP tunnel, terminated in the IPX network, can be used for
roaming users from different home networks.
The topology can have a potential impact on the communication
performance. For instance, when the node accesses services inside
the visited network, the performance is likely to be worse in the HR
case, because all packets travel twice between the visited and the
home country; less so when the communication peer is in a third
country and is minimal when accessing services in the home country.
This may also have implications in the selection of Content Delivery
Network (CDN) when roaming abroad, because the mobile user will
access a server in the home network rather than one close to their
location.
In this Chapter, we present the hardware platform we built for
roaming measurements, and the manner in which we orchestrate it to
collect our data.
10.2 MONROE-Roaming Platform
We design and build MONROE-Roaming, a dedicated platform for
roaming measurements in Europe. MONROE-Roaming integrates
several components that we depict in Figure 10.3.
The main blocks include measurement nodes distributed in six
different EU countries, the backend system, several measurement
servers and a scheduler, all of which we detail next. To build the
MONROE-Roaming platform we adapted the open source software
provided by MONROE. 7 7 Ö. Alay, A. Lutu, M. P. Quirós, V. Man-
cuso, T. Hirsch, K. Evensen, A. F.
Hansen, S. Alfredsson, J. Karlsson,
A. Brunstrom, A. S. Khatouni, M. Mel-
lia, and M. A. Marsan. Experience: An
Open Platform for Experimentation
with Commercial Mobile Broadband
Networks. MobiCom 2017, pages 70–78,
2017b. doi: 10.1145/3117811.3117812
Alay et al. [2017b]
MONROE-Roaming nodes: Each MONROE-Roaming node is
equipped with an APU board from PC Engines with two 3G/4G
MC7455 LTE CAT6 miniPCI express modems. Because of the high
cost of nodes and subscriptions, and the complexity of the coordina-
tion effort required (see subsection 10.2.2), we have set up a platform
with a total of 12 MONROE-Roaming nodes dedicated for roaming
measurements.
MONROE-Roaming backend: Upon completion of each measure-
ment, MONROE-Roaming nodes transfer the measurement results to
a central server for further analysis.
Measurement servers: We have deployed one measurement server
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Figure 10.3: MONROE-Roaming plat-
form and experimental setup. We
exemplify our setup for Vodafone DE.
We have five Vodafone DE SIMs in in-
ternational roaming nodes and another
SIM in the home country nodes. For
each roaming Vodafone DE SIM, we
insert the SIM corresponding to the
local roaming partner for the MNO.
For example, in Sweden we use the
Telenor SE SIM which corresponds to
the network on which the Vodafone DE
SIM is camping.
in each country as measurement responders and also to capture
traffic traces.
MONROE-Roaming scheduler: The scheduler allows the user
to query for resources, select nodes and launch different tests in
the platform simultaneously. We used the open source MONROE
scheduler as a basis for the MONROE-Roaming scheduler. Each test
is designed and implemented in a Docker container. 8 8 D. Merkel. Docker: Lightweight Linux
Containers for Consistent Development
and Deployment. Linux Journal, 2014
(239), Mar. 2014. ISSN 1075-3583
Merkel [2014]
10.2.1 Experimental Setup
MNO
NO Telia NO Telenor NO
SE Telia SE Telenor SE 3 SE
UK Vodafone UK EE
DE Vodafone DE T-Mobile O2
ES Vodafone ES Movistar Orange
IT Vodafone IT TIM 3 IT
Figure 10.4: The distribution (left)
of the MONROE-Roaming nodes in
six countries and (right) SIMs for 16
MNO we measure across Europe.
Each country deploys two MONROE-
Roaming nodes and one measurement
server.
To understand the roaming ecosystem in Europe, we focus on di-
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versity of the MNO. In other words, we aim to cover a large number
of SIM rather than running measurements from a large number of
vantage points. To this end, we deployed two MONROE-Roaming
nodes in each of the six European countries to measure a total of 16
MNO that operate their own network, as illustrated in Figure 10.4.
For each MNO, we bought six SIMs that support roaming in Eu-
rope and we distributed one SIM in each of the countries we cover.
For example, in Germany, we bought six Vodafone DE SIMs that sup-
port roaming. We kept one Vodafone DE SIM as the home SIM in the
home country (i.e., Germany). Then, we distributed five roaming SIMs
from Vodafone DE to the other five countries (i.e, Sweden, Norway,
UK, Italy and Spain). Each roaming SIM connects to (or camps on) a
local roaming partner (or visited network) native to the visited coun-
try. For example, Vodafone DE in Germany is a roaming partner of
Telenor SE in Sweden. Therefore, Telenor SE serves Vodafone DE’s
customers roaming in Sweden by allowing Vodafone DE users to
camp on Telenor SE’s network. For each roaming SIM, we identify
the corresponding visited network (e.g., Telenor SE in Sweden for
Vodafone DE) and, when available, activate the corresponding native
SIM from the visited network (which we hereinafter denote by visited
SIM). We illustrate this configuration in the experimental setup in
Figure 10.3. We also describe the terminology in Table 10.1.
Home network The network to which a mobile user subscribes.
Home SIM The mobile user SIM while in the home country and
connected to the home network.
Visited Network The network to which a user connects while roaming
internationally in the visited country.
Visited SIM A user subscribed to visited network in the visited
country.
Roaming User A user subscribed to a home network in country A
and who is roaming in a foreign country B.
Table 10.1: Terminology.
10.2.2 Measurement Coordination
Each MNO-specific measurement campaign involves 11 SIM and 6
nodes: (i) one node with the home SIM and (ii) five nodes with both
the roaming SIM and the corresponding visited SIM, as illustrated in
Figure 10.3. This enables us to capture performance metrics for the
roaming SIM, but also to compare those with the local performance
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of the home network and the visited network (when possible).
Before running the set of measurements (see section 10.3, sec-
tion 10.4 and section 10.5), we first need to configure the nodes by
activating and deploying the SIM. For each MNO, we perform the
measurements at the same time from all six countries and coordinate
the configuration of the experimental setup in two steps:
Home and Roaming User Activation: To measure a MNO, we
first insert the SIM into the first SIM slot in each node in all six de-
ployment locations. For the SIM active in its home country, this
step triggers the home user activation (by inserting the SIM in the
measurement node). For the rest of the nodes, this step triggers the
roaming user activation.
Visited User Activation: Once we complete the home and roam-
ing user activation, we check which visited network the roaming SIM
uses in each of the five visited countries. Then, we insert the SIM
of each partner MNO (when available) into the second slot of each
corresponding node.
Using the MONROE-Roaming scheduler, we orchestrate the exe-
cution of the measurements so that they run in parallel on all nodes.
The measurement coordination effort was a significant part of the
process. In each country, at least one person was dedicated to carry
out the physical experimental setup configuration for each MNO in
a timely manner. Given that we deploy two nodes per country, we
could measure two MNO and (maximum) 22 SIM in parallel. We
coordinated the SIM changes over email. Furthermore, before the
change of the next pair of SIM, we double-checked the measurement
results we had collected to ensure correctness and completeness of
the dataset. Each round lasted one week, over a total period of more
than four months of experiments.
10.3 Roaming Setup and Performance
10.3.1 Methodology
We run a series of measurements that enable us to identify the roam-
ing setup, infer the network configuration for the 16 MNO that we
measure and quantify the end-user performance for the roaming con-
figurations which we detect. We run traceroute for path discovery,
dig for DNS lookups and curl for testing data transfers with popular
URLs. We complement this analysis with metadata (e.g., radio access
technology, signal strength parameters) collected from each node.
For each MNO, we measure in parallel the roaming user, the home
user and the visited user (see Table 10.1 for terminology) through the
MONROE-Roaming scheduler. In this way, we are able to capture
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potential performance penalties that might result, for example, from
roaming internationally under a home-routed configuration. We
performed measurements using both 3G and 4G networks to evaluate
the impact of potentially different configurations for the two radio
access technologies.
Next, we describe each measurement test and its resulting dataset
in more details.
traceroute. We run periodic traceroute measurements against all
the servers we deploy in each country as measurement responders.
We repeat the measurements ten times towards each target. The re-
sulting dataset lists the set of IP hops along the data paths from each
vantage point towards each measurement responder. Additionally,
we collect the public mapped IP address for each vantage point (i.e.,
the IP endpoint associated with the mobile client as seen from the
public Internet).
dig. We run the dig utility for DNS lookups against a list of 180
target FQDN mapped to advertisement services. We use the inde-
pendent filter lists from https://filterlists.com to build the list
of targets. We focus on ad services because this type of third party
services inflate significantly performance metrics of web services
(e.g., page load time), as well as impact the web experience of mobile
users. 9 Thus, it is important to captute (and potentially eliminate) 9 U. Goel, M. Steiner, M. P. Wittie,
M. Flack, and S. Ludin. Measuring
What is Not Ours: A Tale of 3rd Party
Performance. In M. A. Kaafar, S. Uhlig,
and J. Amann, editors, Passive and
Active Measurement, pages 142–155.
Springer International Publishing, 2017
Goel et al. [2017]
any additional delay penalty that might impact how fast a roaming
user receives this type of content. Each experiment uses the default
DNS server for the tested MNO and queries for the A record associ-
ated to each of the target FQDN. We store the entire output of each
dig query, including the query time, the DNS server used and the A
record retrieved. We repeat the dig queries 2 times for each FQDN
from each vantage point, for a total of more than 2,000 queries per
round.
curl. We run curl towards a set of 10 target popular webpages10 10 We target the following web
pages: www.httpvshttps.com,
facebook.com/telia/, en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_far_
future, linkedin.com/company/
facebook, www.yahoo.com/movies,
instagram.com/leomessi/,
google.com/search?q=iPhone+7,
youtube.com/watch?v=xGJ5a7uIZ1g,
ebay.com/globaldeals, nytimes.com,
theguardian.com.uk/lifeandstyle.
over HTTP1.1/TLS. We repeat the measurements towards each URL
at least 10 times (increasing the sample size if the SIM data quota
allows it). We store various metrics, including the download speed,
the size of the download, the total time of the test, the time to first
byte, the name lookup time (query time) and the handshake time.
metadata. We collect contextual information from the nodes, in-
cluding the visited network MCC / MNC for each roaming SIM and
the radio technology. This allows us to verify which visited network
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each roaming SIM uses as well as to identify and separate the col-
lected data by radio technology.
10.3.2 Roaming configuration
Our initial goal is to determine the roaming setup for each MNO (i.e.,
whether it used LBO, HR or IHBO). For this, we determine the MNO
that allocates the public IP address of the roaming SIM. Our results
show that HR was used by all 16 MNOs from all the different roaming
locations we capture. We further corroborate this result by retrieving
the first hop replying with a public IP address along the data path
from a roaming SIM to each server and identifying the MNO that
owns it. We find that the first hop with a public IP address along the
path lies in the original home network of each roaming SIM, which is
consistent with HR.
Next, we evaluate the following performance metrics for each
roaming SIM, home SIM and visited SIM: (i) the number of visited
networks we observe for the roaming SIM, (ii) the number of hops
from vantage point to target measurement server, (iii) the number
of home network PGWs that the roaming SIMs reach in comparison
with the home network SIMs.
Visited network selection: The metadata we collect during the
measurement campaign for each MNO enables us to verify the vis-
ited network that each roaming user camps on in the visited country.
In general, we note stability both in 4G roaming and 3G roaming in
the selection of the visited network (Table 10.2) in the five roaming
locations. We also observe some differences between MNOs. For
example, for Telekom DE, the 4G visited network chosen by each
roaming SIM never changed during the measurement campaign, even
when we forced the radio technology handover. This is consistent for
all the five roaming locations. For O2 DE, on the other hand, the de-
fault 4G visited network did change over time for the SIMs roaming
in Italy (3 visited networks), Norway (3 visited networks), and Swe-
den (2 visited networks). However, it should be noted that the length
of the measurement period varies for each MNO, as it is impacted
by multiple external factors (e.g., at times some of our measurement
responders were affected by power outages or some SIM cards were
not connecting to the 4G network due to poor coverage). This may
explain or influence part of the differences observed between the
MNOs.
Traceroutes, number of hops: We analyze our collected traceroute
results from the roaming SIMs and compare with the traceroute
results we collect from the corresponding home SIM towards the
same target server. For all MNOs we find that the number of hops is the
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MNO
# of
visited
net-
works
# IP addr. # Tests First hop breakdown(%)
3G 4G
O2 DE 9 9 20 657 1; 1; 1; 2; 2; 2; 2;
2; 3; 3; 3; 4; 4; 5;
6; 6; 9; 9; 11; 24
Telekom
DE
5 5 4 1424 13; 19; 25; 43
Voda DE 5 6 2 1511 46; 54
Movistar
ES
6 6 8 282 4; 5; 5; 7; 8; 21;
22; 28
Orange ES 7 7 3 900 6; 43; 51
Voda ES 5 5 1 1943 100
TIM IT 6 6 4 497 1; 1; 46; 52
Voda IT 5 5 4 759 19; 19; 23; 39
Telenor
NO
5 5 3 398 8; 30; 62
Telia NO 5 5 4 379 7; 16; 38; 39
3 SE 7 6 2 828 44; 56
Telenor SE 5 5 2 1362 32; 68
Telia SE 5 5 4 379 7; 16; 38; 39
EE UK 5 5 9 1038 3; 4; 4; 5; 8; 13;
17; 19; 27
Voda UK 5 5 1 503 100
Table 10.2: Distribution of the first IP
interface and visited network per MNO.
We report the number of networks each
roaming user camps on in the visited
country (# of visited networks), the
number of unique first IP addresses (#
IP addr.), the total number of tracer-
outes we ran for the corresponding
SIM (# tests) and the distribution for
each first IP address we find (First hop
breakdown(%)).
same. 11 This is consistent with the HR configuration (Figure 10.2), 11 Traceroute for 3 IT did not work in
any country to any server.where the GTP tunnel is defined between the SGW of the visited
network and the PGW of the home network.
Traceroutes, infrastructure: By learning the IP addresses of the in-
frastructure elements along the data path, we are able to infer aspects
of the infrastructure deployment strategy of each MNO. In particular,
by checking the IP address of the first hop in the path (Table 10.2),
we find that MNOs have different strategies in terms of their deploy-
ments. We note that the first hops have an even distribution on their
assignation to mobile users, showing that the MNOs have a similar
approach for load balancing in their network. For example, for O2
DE we find 20 different first hops, suggesting that there might be
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a large number of PGWs deployed in the LTE infrastructure, while
for Vodafone UK we see that the same first hop appears on the data
path, suggesting that the GTP tunnels of all our roaming users is
terminated at a single PGW. We also note that although for the major-
ity of MNOs, these hops are configured with private address space,
three operators (Telekom DE, Telenor NO and Telenor SE) use public
address space for their infrastructure. The last column in Table 10.2
details the breakdown of measurements among the number of differ-
ent first hop IP addresses found. In some cases, a clear bias exists.
Finally, we verify that the set of first hops for roaming SIMs is
the same as the set we observe from the home SIMs. This suggests
that the roaming SIMs do not receive any differential treatment in
terms of allocation to the PGWs. This is consistent for all MNOs we
measure. Furthermore, when checking the 3G data paths, we find
that the set of IP addresses we see in 3G is a subset of the set of IP
addresses we see in 4G, suggesting that the two functions are co-
located in the same PGW. 12 We also check the time when the first 12 C. Marquez, M. Gramaglia,
M. Fiore, A. Banchs, C. Ziemlicki,
and Z. Smoreda. Not All Apps Are Cre-
ated Equal: Analysis of Spatiotemporal
Heterogeneity in Nationwide Mobile
Service Usage. CoNEXT 2017, 2017
Marquez et al. [2017]
IP address was used. We discover that all the PGWs are active in the
same time. Multiple first IP addresses can be used at different time.
We further contacted 3 MNOs and the information they provided
about their network confirms our findings.
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Figure 10.5: ECDF of the RTT from
mobile nodes to target servers.
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10.3.3 Home-Routed Roaming: Implications
Delay implications: The HR data implies that the roaming user’s
exit point to the Internet is always in the original home network (Fig-
ure 10.2). Thus, the data that the roaming user consumes always
flow through the home network. Depending on the location of the
server, this translates to a potential delay penalty. Figure 10.5 shows
the ECDF of the RTT we measured between the roaming SIMs and
the target servers located in the visited or home networks (red and
green curves, respectively). To compare the HR with the LBO config-
uration, we also include the RTT measurements between the visited
SIMs against the same targets in the visited or home networks (blue
and purple curves, respectively). The RTTs experienced by the visited
SIMs serve as estimates of the best RTTs that one could expect with a
LBO configuration, since LBO relies on access to local infrastructure
with no need for tunnelling back to the home network. We note that
the largest delay penalty occurs when the roaming user tries to access
a server located in the visited country. This is because the packets
must go back and forth from the home network. Surprisingly, we
note that the HR configuration also impacts the case when the roam-
ing user accesses a target server located in the home network. That is,
the GTP tunnel is slower than the native Internet path. In this case,
the median value of the delay penalty considering all the MNOs is
approximately 17ms. This varies across MNOs and in some cases we
observe very low penalties (e.g., just 0.2ms for O2 Germany).
We investigate this performance impact further and calculate the
estimated delay penalty between LBO and HR when the target is in
the visited network. In more detail, we compute the delay penalty as
the difference between the median delay to reach a given server when
roaming, and the median delay to reach the same server from home.
Figure 10.6 exemplifies these median values for Vodafone Germany.
We note that, in general, the delay penalty varies widely with the
geographical location of the roaming users and the target servers. For
example, when a German SIM roams in Spain, the difference in terms
of RTT is higher if the server is in the visited country (i.e., Spain) (red
curve in Figure 10.5). If the German SIM roams in Spain or Italy and
the target server is in Norway or Sweden the delay penalty of the
roaming is smaller, since to go to Norway or Sweden the data path
would anyway likely pass through Germany (and this is similar to
the delay one would have because of the HR configuration).
We then evaluate the RTT difference between the roaming SIM
and the visited SIM towards the same target and we group them per
MNO. Figure 10.7 shows the median value of the delay penalty of
an MNO (on the x axis of the tile plot) while roaming against each
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Figure 10.6: RTT difference from the
visited country to all servers for Voda-
fone DE.
of the six different servers (on the y axis of the tile plot, marked by
country). We note that the delay penalty varies as a function of the
location of the home country. For example, German SIMs experience
a lower delay penalty, which is potentially due to them being in an
advantageous position in the center of Europe.
DNS implications: The results of the dig measurements show
that the DNS server offered to a roaming user is the same as the
one offered when at home. This is again consistent with the use of
HR. We verify whether this translates into an inflated query time
for the roaming user. Figure 10.8 presents the distribution of DNS
query times for all the SIMs of TIM IT. We note that for the home
user the query time is significantly lower in average than for the
other five roaming users. This is consistent for all the 16 MNOs we
measured. This further translates into implications in terms of CDN
replica selection: the roaming user would be likely redirected to CDN
content at its home network, and will not be able to access the same
content from a local cache (which would in any case result in facing a
higher delay due to the home routing policy).
HTTP performance implications: Similar to the delay and DNS
implications, international roaming affects HTTP and HTTPS perfor-
mance. We quantify this penalty by considering the handshake time
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Figure 10.8: DNS Query time to all
FQDNs for TIM IT.
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between each SIM and the target web servers. The median value of
the handshake time from the visited SIMs towards all the targets we
measure is 170ms, while the median value for the roaming SIMs is
230ms. This leads to a delay penalty of approximately 60ms. As in
the cases before, some MNOs are affected more by this roaming effect
than others.
10.4 VoIP
This Section investigates potential traffic differentiation policies (such
as blocking or throttling) that may hamper VoIP communications
for a roaming user in comparison to a home user. We focus on three
popular VoIP applications: FaceTime 13, Facebook Messenger, and 13 iOS 11: iOS Security Guide. https:
//www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_
Security_Guide.pdf. [Online; accessed
06-March-2018]
ios
Whatsapp. 14
14 WhatsApp Encryption Overview.
https://www.whatsapp.com/security/
WhatsApp-Security-Whitepaper.pdf.
[Online; accessed 06-March-2018]
wha
10.4.1 Experiment Design
We begin with checking whether the MNO allows successful au-
dio/video VoIP calls by carrying out some manual experiments with
smart phone running the original applications and making calls
among roaming SIMs. This lets us verify possible filtering or block-
ing in place at the time of the test. If successful, we then check for
traffic differentiation mechanisms that could affect the call quality.
The experiment makes three audio and video calls using each
application running on a regular mobile phone connected using an
instrumented WLAN access point (AP) in our lab. Packet traces were
recorded using tcpdump resulting in 18 traces, each with duration
between [60,80] s. We verify the call-setup phase, which used a com-
plex mix of TCP, STUN 15, and custom protocols to setup the end- 15 J. Rosenberg, R. Mahy, P. Matthews,
and D. Wing. Session Traversal Utilities
for NAT (STUN). RFC 5389, Oct. 2008b.
URL https://www.rfc-editor.org/
rfc/rfc5389.txt
Rosenberg et al. [2008b]
to-end communication. From each trace, we then extract the actual
audio/video streams. In the next step, we create a Docker container
with pre-loaded traces, which we replay using tcpreplay to properly
edit them so that packets are directed toward dedicated receivers
hosted in our premises.
All applications run SRTP 16 on top of UDP, enabling easy adjust- 16 M. Baugher, D. McGrew, M. Naslund,
E. Carrara, and K. Norrman. The Secure
Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP).
RFC 3711 (Proposed Standard), Mar.
2004. ISSN 2070-1721. URL https://
www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3711.txt
Baugher et al. [2004]
ment of the packet timing and updating of the source and destination
IP addresses. The dedicated server in each country acts as a UDP
receiver with a custom signalling TCP connection to log the status
of the node (visited network, node identifier, metadata, experiment
type, etc.) and the experiment associated with the receiver. In each
test, the mobile node sequentially replays the pre-recorded traces
with two receivers: a call to a destination in the home country, and
a call to a destination in the visited country. For each call, we record
pcap traces on both the client and server sides. We post-process these
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traces to check for traffic differentiation.
10.4.2 VoIP Results
We first verify that calls can be freely made from the tested network.
We found that all operators allow users (even when roaming) to
freely make Voice over IP (VoIP) calls using popular applications on
their smart-phone. This confirms that no filtering was in place at the
time of testing.
Next, we consider eventual traffic differentiation. We analyze
well-known QoS metrics for real-time VoIP applications: packet loss,
instantaneous bit rate, and Inter-Packet Gap (IPG), the time difference
between two consecutive packets, to detect traffic differentiation. The
results show that the packet loss ratio is less than 1% in all experi-
ments. We conclude that no operators introduce artificial packet loss
during our tests. MNOs could do so if desired to reduce the quality
of calls for these applications and enforce traffic policing.
For each trace, we compare the bit rate we observe at the
sender side and at the receiver side. Figure 10.9 presents this as an
ECDF for the three applications. Solid/dashed lines indicate the
sender/receiver side when calling a receiver in the home or vis-
ited country (operator O2 DE). The applications use different au-
dio/video codec combinations with different bit rate requirements.
We observe no differences when using the tested network and the
home network.
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Figure 10.9: Bitrate for operator O2 DE.
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Figure 10.10 shows a mobile user of the O2 DE operator making a
Facetime call to our server in Germany while roaming. The periodic
60 ms long IPG is typical of low rate audio codecs the modern VoIP
applications use. We observe some differences when comparing
measurements at the sender (solid line) and the receiver (dashed lines
– one for each visited country). Some gaps are compressed (a smaller
IPG), while others become expanded (a larger IPG). We observe this
in all experiments with all operators when the sender is in its home
country. We ascribe this to the modulation of the IPG by 3G/4G
access mechanisms. Given the IPG is bounded to less than 80 ms, we
conclude that this would not hamper voice quality, and expect these
variations to be absorbed by the receiver playout buffer. 17 17 R. Birke, M. Mellia, M. Petracca,
and D. Rossi. Experiences of voip
traffic monitoring in a commercial
ISP. International Journal of Network
Management, 20(5):339–359, 2010
Birke et al. [2010]
0 20 40 60 80 100
IPG [ms]
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
E
C
D
F
Sender
Node in NO call in DE
Node in SE call in DE
Node in DE call in DE
Node in ES call in DE
Node in UK call in DE
Node in IT call in DE
Figure 10.10: IPG f r operator O2 DE.
All experiments give very similar results, pointing to no evidence
of traffic manipulation. We summarize these findings using the well-
known KS Test 18 and P-Value 19 to determine whether the ECDFs 18 Kolmogorov–Smirnov Test. The
Concise Encyclopedia of Statistics,
pages 283–287, 2008. ISBN 978-0-387-
32833-1
KSt [2008]
19 R. L. Wasserstein and N. A. Lazar.
The ASA’s Statement on p-Values: Con-
text, Process, and Purpose. The Ameri-
can Statistician, 70(2):129–133, 2016. doi:
10.1080/00031305.2016.1154108
Wasserstein and Lazar [2016]
differ between the sender (our reference) and the receiver. If statis-
tically similar, the KS would be close to 0 while P-Value would be
close to 1. If significantly different, the KS would be greater than
0, and the P-Value close to 0. Figure 10.11 shows the scatter plot
of the (KS, P-Value) points. Our results confirm that the receiver
throughput is statistically identical to the sender throughput in all
experiments. The IPG statistics are affected by the 3G/4G access
mechanisms that alter the distribution (albeit not impairing the VoIP
quality).
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Finally, while QoS in terms of IPG and throughput are good, the
total end-to-end delay could be significantly higher when roaming
because of the HR solution. The one-way-delay could thus grow
excessively large when two roaming SIMs call each other, making
the interactive voice conversation difficult. The same effect was faced
in GSM networks, and fixed by anti-tromboning 20 solution (e.g., 20 C. Aoun. Identifying intra-realm
calls and Avoiding media tromboning.
Internet-Draft draft-aoun-midcom-
intrarealmcalls-00, Internet Engineering
Task Force, Feb. 2002. URL https:
//datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-aoun-midcom-intrarealmcalls-00.
Work in Progress
Aoun [2002]
allowing local breakout for voice traffic).
Takeaway We do not observe any traffic differentiation on any
of the 16 MNOs we measure. However, the additional delay of HR
could impair real-time applications. This is an old issue (typically
referred to as tromboning) which has been solved in GSM networks,
but persists for 3G/4G VoIP applications.
10.5 Content Discrimination
In this Section, we evaluate the availability of content when roaming,
in particular whether MNOs filter website content and apply geo-
graphical restrictions. There are many reasons operators could have
content filtering, which include complying with government guide-
lines or following court orders, e.g, to restrict access to file-sharing
websites in the UK 21, or the use of ’opt-out’ parental filters. We refer 21 E. Rosati. 2015: the year of blocking
injunctions? Journal of Intellectual
Property Law & Practice, 10(3):147, 2015
Rosati [2015]
to any differences in the availability of websites and their content due
to network interference as "content discrimination". When this dif-
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ference is attributed to geographical location rather than the studied
network, it is known as "content geo-restriction".
10.5.1 Experiment Design
The OONI22 provides software tests for detecting censorship, surveil- 22 https://ooni.torproject.org/
lance and traffic manipulation in the Internet, using open source
software. We ran two measurement campaigns using OONI’s tool
ooniprobe to detect network interference in home and roaming
scenarios, geared at both content discrimination and content geo-
restriction.
The ooniprobe web connectivity test 23 performs the following 23 Ooni - ooni: Open observatory of
network interference. URL https:
//ooni.torproject.org/
oon
steps over both the network of interest (tested network, using both
home and roaming SIMs) and the Tor network 24: resolver identi-
24 K. Loesing, S. J. Murdoch, and R. Din-
gledine. A case study on measuring
statistical data in the Tor anonymity
network. In Proceedings of the Workshop
on Ethics in Computer Security Research
(WECSR 2010), LNCS. Springer, January
2010
Loesing et al. [2010]
fication, DNS lookup, TCP connect and HTTP GET requests. First,
ooniprobe performs DNS queries to disclose the IP endpoint of the
DNS resolver in the tested network, and records the response, along-
side a control response returned by Google’s DNS resolver. Then, a
TCP connection on port 80 (or port 443 for URLs that support TLS)
is attempted using the list of IP endpoints identified in the DNS re-
sponses. HTTP GET requests are sent towards a list of URLs over
both the tested network and over the Tor network and the responses
are recorded. Differences in the results for the two tests are indica-
tive of network interference. The results are made available to the
public via the OONI API25. Our first set of tests considers 50 ran- 25 https://api.ooni.io/
domly selected websites from ooniprobe’s default global censorship
list Citizenlab [2018] contributed by users, seeking to identify content
discrimination for roaming users. For the second set of measure-
ments, we provide a list of 15 websites known to be available locally
in the tested countries, but geo-restricted abroad. Beside network
interference profile matching for the home and visited results, we
additionally searched HTTP responses for known geo-restriction in-
dicators and warnings. The high latency of the Tor network and data
quota limitations limited us to test only a small number of websites.
10.5.2 Content Discrimination Results
We create a network interference profile for each measurement, con-
taining the names of blocked websites and the HTTP body responses.
For each visited website, we compare the responses observed using
the plain connectivity against the one obtained using the TOR net-
work. If those are different, this is an indication of manipulation. We
then consider the home country interference profile as the baseline
profile against which we compare the roaming profiles for that MNO
to check if additional filtering is in place when roaming. If the HTTP
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UK NO SE DE IT ES
Vodafone UK 100% 98% 99% 98% 99% 86%
Telenor NO 99% 100% 98% 98% 98% 97%
Telia SE 99% 97% 100% 99% 99% 99%
Vodafone DE 98% 97% 99% 100% 98% 97%
TIM IT 98% 98% 98% 97% 100% 97%
Orange ES 99% 98% 98% N/A 97% 100%
Table 10.3: Interference profile match
Home vs. Roaming. High percentage
indicate no difference between home
and roaming setup.
response was unavailable due to censorship, we record the blocking
mechanism as reported by ooniprobe.
We tested a mixture of dynamic and static websites and saw no
content discrimination, with a perfect match of 95% and above of
the tests between the home and roaming case. That is, if any censor-
ship or blocking is present, it is the same in home and roaming case
(this is consistent with HR again). The detailed results (shown in Ta-
ble 10.3) are consistent with HR for all MNOs. The only exception is
the case for Vodafone UK, where 3 websites were blocked (by DNS)
in the home country, but were instead available in Spain. We double
checked this, and found them to be a measurement artefact where
ooniprobe incorrectly reported the blocking method, but we could
not reproduce it later. We note N/A in the table where the results
could not be collected at the time of measurement.
The findings are similar for the geo-restricted content tests. Here
we check if a geo-restricted content that is accessible from home
could be accessed also when roaming. To detect this, we search the
body of the websites for known content indicating geo-restriction.
We found results consistent with HR: content available in a user’s
home country remains available when roaming. Table 10.4 presents
the profile match between the roaming profile and that of the visited
network, for geo-restricted content. We did not observe substantial
differences between the content policy of the two scenarios. We did
also further (manual) investigation to verify video streaming ap-
plication behaviour. We observed 10 cases where the website was
accessible with no limitations, but then the actual video streaming
was blocked with an alert to the user on the restriction.
It is worth noting that different countries may have different inter-
ference profiles. This can be due to, e.g., different court rules or legal
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UK NO SE DE IT ES
EE UK 100% 86% 89% 80% 87% 88%
Telenor NO 93 100% 94% 90% 88% 90 %
Telia SE N/A 88% 100% 92% 90% 89%
O2 DE 87% 89% 82% 100% N/A 84%
TIM IT N/A 85% 83% 85% 100% 87%
Orange ES N/A 85% 83% N/A 89% 100%
Table 10.4: Interference profile match
for geo-restricted websites, Roaming vs.
Visited. Differences are higher when
comparing accessible content as home
user or as roaming user.
guidelines. Given HR, a roaming user is always subject to his home
country rules, even when visiting a foreign country where different
laws are in place. This justifies the slightly lower figures in Table 10.4.
Takeaway We found no evidence of content discrimination and
geo-restriction for users in roaming scenarios, and the experience of
browsing websites was the same in roaming and at home. However,
there are clear differences between experience of a user of a network
and a user visiting the same network, including the inability to re-
trieve geo-restricted content and the availability of different content.
10.6 Discussion
10.6.1 On Measurements Limitations
The MONROE-Roaming platform integrates measurement nodes
located in six different EU countries and a measurement responder
per country. Although this allows us to capture at an unprecedented
scale the performance of international roaming in Europe, it is still
a limited view in terms of spatial sample distribution within each
country (we only use two hardware devices per country, in the same
location). Similarly, the findings in this paper refer to just one snap-
shot – and the community should repeat these experiments over
time to identify and investigate changes. The high cost of mounting
such an experimental study is a major restricting factor for the den-
sity of sampling geo-locations. We instead focus on characterizing
multiple MNOs by taking advantage of the SIM farm we built using
MONROE-Roaming. For each MNO, we purchased a similar data
plan (10GB/month) enabling us to capture similar number of sam-
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ples per MNO and country. Furthermore, using the same equipment
type throughout the measurement platform and in all locations elim-
inates potential device bias we might observe in the measurement
samples.
Our measurement study focuses mainly on network performance
and content implications of the roaming solutions in Europe. We
leave for future work the exploration of potential performance penal-
ties (see Section 10.3) on actual end-user Quality of Experience (QoE).
10.6.2 On Roaming Configurations
LBO appears a natural choice for an IP-based service and could offer
lower operational cost as well as cheaper data tariffs. At the same
time, we have shown that this can eliminate delay and potentially
increase capacity for some traffic (depending on the destination).
Although, LBO relies on access to local infrastructure, offering this
could act as a product differentiator for the MNOs that provide this
service first. In contrast, HR provides the home MNOs with all the
accounting and billing information. This has been verified to be the
major problem with MNOs that need to have near real-time view of
the customer traffic for accounting reasons.
Whereas Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) signalling could be used
to derive billing information for voice (and VoLTE) calls, an MNO
typically uses records to issue bills. Breakout at different points
complicates this accounting, with possible abuse from customers
(e.g, the delay in billing might allow excessive amount of data traffic
when roaming). Within the cellular network, classes of traffic can be
differentiated using the Access Point Name (APN) and QoS Class
Identifier (QCI). This could be used, for instance, by MNOs to im-
plement HR for data, but LBO for VoLTE. 26 This raises the question 26 I. Kaltsas. Make Yourself at Home
: A Comparative Study of VoLTE
Roaming Architectures. Master’s
thesis, KTH, School of Information and
Communication Technology (ICT), 2017
Kaltsas [2017]
of whether the roaming agreement could be updated using the same
principle to break out some/all data traffic.
Any additional complexity from LBO can add to the operational
cost of supporting users of the network (e.g., debugging issues, track-
ing faults, and predicting traffic). And if a service fails, it is not ob-
vious who is responsible for finding the fault and fixing this. An IP
Packet Exchange (IPX) can help mitigate these impacts. Some solu-
tions introduce additional proxy elects 27, responsible for routing 27 GSM Association: Guidelines for IPX
Provider Networks. https://www.gsma.
com/newsroom/wp-content/uploads/
/IR.34-v13.0-1.pdf, a. [Online;
accessed 06-March-2018]
ipx [a]
traffic towards the correct network, and the associated control func-
tions to coordinate.
Additionally, there are filtering rules, Digital Rights Management
(DRM), language preference and personal content that depend upon
the location (country) in which the content is viewed. Lawful inter-
cept further complicates the picture. Here, the home network has
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full visibility of the necessary data, but the visited network may not.
Lawful intercept may be further complicated because of variations
in regulatory requirements depending on the geographic location of
equipment. In a nutshell, enforcing and accounting for multiple poli-
cies for different content in different locations can become complex.
Home routing simplifies this by letting the original operator see and
manage all the traffic.
Lastly, access to content served by Content Delivery Networks
(CDN) needs to be carefully optimized to avoid cases where a roam-
ing user is redirected to local replica that is spatially close, but whose
network path is unnecessarily long (due to breakout constraints).
The choice of which form of roaming is used therefore is a func-
tion of the roaming agreement and capabilities of the visited net-
work. These are constrained by many technical and legal require-
ments. Therefore, different breakout options can affect performance
of application in different ways.
11 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we describe an experimental model for using crowd-
sourcing platforms to perform large-scale Internet measurements.
Our research efforts expand the traditional crowdsourcing focus from
the human element to use a diverse and numerous group of end-
user devices as measurement vantage points and use crowdsourcing
large scale measurements platforms. We demonstrate the described
approach while assessing the feasibility of deploying encryption by
default in the Internet.
We focus our crowdsourcing campaigns on building a represen-
tative dataset to show the potential success of widespread adoption
of TLS encryption for existing protocols and HTTP2 in their native
ports. We argue that the proposed experimental setup gives us a re-
alistic idea on the behavior of the Internet ecosystem towards the de-
ployment of the secure versions of protocols using different ports. In
this context, we exemplify how to overcome several of the limitations
of the crowdsourcing platforms, including the collection of specific
user data without having direct control over the measurement agents.
We find that in average the failure rate of TLS over different ports
is near the 6%. We also find that in the case of mobile networks
where proxies are used, the failure rate can be as high as 70%. We
conclude that it is probably feasible to roll out TLS protection for
most ports except for port 80, assuming a low failure rate (6%). We
argue that probably port 80 is the one port where using TLS is less
needed, as there is already in place a well known mechanism to se-
cure web communication through port 443.
For HTTP2, we tested 4 HTTP/2 variations accessing 67 different
ports from 38 countries world-wide. Our preliminary results suggest
that the presence of middleboxes in the Internet can detract from
H2C deployment, especially if the server is listening on port 80 and
the client resides on a mobile network. In fact, the Upgrade mecha-
nism failed up to a 7% of the times.
We also believe that our results can serve as a lower bound for the
failure rate for using protocols other than expected in different ports.
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We then worked on extending our tool to also test new protocols
at transport layer, like TCP Fast Open and ECN++.
We evaluate the interaction of TFO with the elements of the path.
Lessons learned from this study can help in designing robust TCP
protocol extensions in the presence of middleboxes. Only the 41,3%
of the paths we test allowed for a successful TFO communication.
Once the client is able to receive the cookie, the 32,14% of the packets
are received with no data in the SYN. In the case in which we force
data in the SYN without the TFO option, the percentage of success is
50%.
Testing ECN++, we found good news for the deployment of
ECN++, which was the original subject of the study. And we can
confirm that ECN adoption is proceeding well over fixed networks.
However, we found bad news over mobile. More than half of the
18 mobile carriers tested routinely wipe the ECN field of all incom-
ing packets. Fortunately, wiping the ECN field at the first hop only
denies the benefits of ECN to the connection; the session otherwise
proceeds as normal.
ECN problems in mobile have not surfaced before because this is
the first ECN study to have extended to a broad enough set of mobile
vantage points. This is due to the considerable work needed to build
infrastructure like MONROE, which makes it feasible to measure the
effect of kernel level changes over a wide range of mobile networks.
We conjecture that wiping ECN could be due to a bug, where wip-
ing the Diffserv field accidentally includes ECN. Similar bugs have
been fixed quickly in the past. We could not prove any correlation
between ECN and Diffserv wiping, given we found Diffserv is always
wiped. We plan further work on this, in cooperation with the affected
carriers.
We then argue that evaluating how the middleboxes behave and
particurlarly how NATs behave can be useful for future protocols
design. Part of our work is devoted to evaluate the behavior of NATs
in fixed and mobile lines. We presented NATwatcher, a tool that
allows to shed some light on the NAT behavior in the wild. Using a
crowdsourcing approach we provide insight into how vendors, ISPs
or users configure and use NATs with respect to TCP, UDP and ICMP
packets, providing useful data for designing future applications. We
presented the first large-scale measurement campaign of home NATs,
based on data from 781 homes, from 65 countries and from 280 ISPs.
The data we collected are good enough for understanding NATs
deployed behaviors, but not necessarily statistically representative of
the Internet that is composed by billions of devices.
Our study demonstrated that about 80% of the tested NATs fol-
low the IETF sanctioned behavior with respect to 11 tests over 17
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(64% of tests) For the remaining 6 tests our findings show that only
13% of the NAT boxes follow the IETF requirements of filtering, hair-
pinning and mapping lifetime over 2 minutes. Moreover, we listed
the 11 most common configurations, finding that the 52.5% of the
tested NAT boxes use Endpoint-Independent mapping for UDP and
TCP and Address and port dependent filtering, they do not sup-
port hairpinning or UDP mapping over 2 minutes. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the largest dataset available describing the behav-
ior of the deployed NAT base and we believe it would provide useful
input for application and protocol designers aiming to make their
applications and protocols to work across NATs.
On the other hand, despite concerns about its performance im-
pact, CGN solutions are part of the technology landscape during this
ongoing phase of transition from IPv4 to IPv6. Though passive data
analysis allowed the quantification of CGN penetration in the cur-
rent Internet ecosystem, we have no knowledge of a client-size only
tool that can empower the end-user to determine the upstream NAT
configuration. Revelio aims to fill this gap. Using NAT Revelio, we
conducted a large-scale active measurement study for CGN detection
targeting Europe and the U.S. More specifically, we deployed Revelio
on two hardware-based crowdsourcing measurement platforms: RIPE
Atlas (with significant presence in Europe) and FCC’s Measuring
Broadband America (with significant presence in the United States).
In total, we instrumented 5,121 measurement vantage points in over
60 different ISPs, capturing myriad combinations of home network
topologies and Internet access technologies. We found that 10% (6
out of 64) of the ISPs we tested have some form of CGN deployment.
We believe the combination of the FCC and RIPE Atlas study repre-
sents the largest active measurement study of CGN deployment in
broadband networks to date.
We also validated our results at the probe level with represen-
tatives of 4 of the ISPs we tested (approx. 10%). Considering the
ground truth we collected, we calculate the accuracy of our method
at 100%. However, due to the limitation of the methodology, there
are cases when some of the Revelio tests cannot run, thus hindering
the test-suite efficiency. Overall, in 24% of the lines we tested, Reve-
lio gave inconclusive results. In the Atlas platform, where the probes
do not support UPnP, the rate of inconclusive results is 36%. This
decreases significantly to only 12% of the SK probes in the FCC-MBA
testbed, where Revelio was able to invoke UPnP actions.
In order to better understand CGN in mobile network, we then
created a measurement test suite for the analysis of CGN in cellular
network. While the experiments were designed to run in the MON-
ROE nodes, the test suite can also be used on other measurement
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platforms. Moreover, our container is easily extendable. During
the development of the test suite we gained experience with the
MONROE testbed. The results show different configuration between
MNOs. In general, the mapping timeouts are lower than recom-
mended by the RFCs. Our results showed similar behaviour for TCP
and UDP.
We finally studied CGNs in roaming scenario, discovering inter-
esting insides on roaming configuration. Different roaming network
configuration options can indeed affect performance of various appli-
cations for the end user. In practice, although there are three possible
solutions (i.e., HR, LBO or IHBO), we find that HR is the norm for
the MNOs we measured. This comes with performance penalties
on the roaming user, who experiences increased delay and appears
to the public internet as being connected in the home country. This
has further implications in the selection of CDN server replica when
roaming abroad, because the mobile user will access a server in the
home network rather than one close to their location. However, at
the same time, the roaming user is still able to access (in majority of
cases) the geo-restricted services from the home country in her native
language.
We put these results in perspective while trying to also speculate
on the commercial implications of the “Roam like Home” initiative.
As regulation reduces the ability of MNOs to compete on price, the
subscribers’ quality of experience will potentially become a key factor
in choosing a provider. The subscribers will increasingly start to com-
pare the roaming experience to the home experience. Thus, an expec-
tation of high quality, always-on services in a visited network follows
and if a home network fails to deliver in the visited network, the risk
of churn increases. To this end, LBO is a natural step for an IP-based
service, and could offer lower operational cost, and cheaper tariffs for
data, while at the same time we have shown this can eliminate delay
and potentially increase capacity for some traffic (dependent on the
destination). Although LBO relies on access to the infrastructure of
the visited network which can have implications on service control
and charging, offering this could act in the advantage of the first op-
erators to provide the service. Furthermore, in some cases, under the
“Roam like Home” paradigm, some users may purchase SIMs from
abroad to use in their country under permanent roaming conditions.
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